Photography, perception and language: towards a theoretical 

groundwork for image education by McTaggart, Andrew Brown
Middlesex 
University 
London 
Middlesex University Research Repository: 
an open access repository of 
Middlesex University research 
http: //eprints. mdx. ac. uk 
McTaggart, Andrew Brown, 1982. 
Photography, perception and language: towards a theoretical 
groundwork for image education. 
Available from Middlesex University's Research Repository. 
Copyright: 
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University's research available electronically. 
Copyright and moral rights to this thesis/research project are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain is 
strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study without 
prior permission and without charge. Any use of the thesis/research project for private study or 
research must be properly acknowledged with reference to the work's full bibliographic details. 
This thesis/research project may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or extensive quotations 
taken from it, or its content changed in any way, without first obtaining permission in writing from the 
copyright holder(s). 
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the 
Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address: 
eprints(aD-mdx. ac. uk 
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. 
PHOTOGRAPHY, PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE: TOWARDS A 
THEORETICAL GROUNDWORK FOR IMAGE EDUCATION. 
Andrew Brown McTaggart, M. A. 
Thesis presented for the degree of 
Master of. PhilosQphy of the 
Council for National Academic Awards 
Middlesex Polytechnic 
July 1982 
ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the status and nature 
of photography in relation to two basic approaches: one 
derived from theories of perception and the other from 
analogies with verbal language. The implications and 
conclusions drawn from this critical survey are assessed 
in terms of their relevance and value for education in 
photography and as the basis for a possible curriculum in 
image education. 
The fact that the position of photography is not firmly 
established in school highlights the need for a funda- 
mental re-appraisal of the medium and the part that it can 
play in education. Section One deals with the two main 
justifications for photography in education, following 
categories derived from Eisner: the contextualist and the 
essentialist. While the former provides a very strong 
case, the latter is also regarded as critical and concerns 
the value of photography as a medium in its own right. 
Issues regarding the criteria for photography, particularly 
as an art form, are then raised, and lead to basic questions 
about the nature of the medium itself. 
In Section Two, perceptual theory is examined by comparing 
two positions: Gibson's "registration" theory and the 
"constructive" tradition, with some consideration of the 
Gestalt view. The photograph's link with the real world 
- i. - 
is maintained in the comprehensive psychological theory of 
Neisser and the passage from nature to convention is 
accounted for here, as well as in Peirce's theory of 
signs. In photographic theory proper, the "trace of the 
real" is regarded as of seminal importance. 
"Language analogies are then considered in Section Three. 
Basic differences between word and image are clarified, and 
it is contended that while "language" metaphors can be used 
with some profit, too close a model borrowing from structural 
linguistics is fraught with difficulties. Sebeok's semiotic 
framework of communication and signification is introduced 
and regarded as useful in uniting natural and nonverbal 
phenomena to photographic concerns.. However, the project 
of "translinguistics", initiated by Barthes, but not 
ultimately pursued by him, is shown to have dangerous 
formalist and determinist leanings especially in conjunction 
with Marxist-Läcanian concepts. Partisan political concerns 
in "ideological" image analysis have become over-dominant 
in some instances for a wide understanding of issues. 
Finally, in Section Four, suggestions for new priorities in 
image education through photography are advanced and compared 
to present practice. Examples of work are given in the 
Appendices. 
- 11 - 
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SECTION ONE - THE EDUCATIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHY 
A. The ambiguous role of photography in education. 
Photography is a relative newcomer to the educational scene 
and its credentials are still regarded with some suspicion. 
It has appeared as an outgrowth of Science, of English, of 
Social or Cultural Studies and of Art. This very diversity 
of origin raises a number of further questions. Is it 
merely a useful adjunct to other subjects or has it a 
definable nature of its own ? Even if it has the-latter, 
does photography require close examination ? What is its 
particular contribution that requires consideration within 
a formal educational context ? In an already overcrowded 
curriculum, does it merit a place ? 
These questions cannot be answered immediately but the last 
has been given added force by the effects on education of 
the current economic recession, the move towards defining 
what constitutes a "core curriculum" and the consequent 
need to define priorities within schools and colleges. 
The present Education Minister, Sir Keith Joseph., in a 
letter dated 30 October 1981 and circulated to all teacher- 
training institutions,. urged that they should "seek to 
insure that within their total lower recruitment figures, 
all recruits have good degrees in main subjects of the 
school curriculum"1 (my underlining). This precept 
obviously implies the retention of a very traditional 
-1- 
school curriculum and discourages any shift in the balance 
of existing school practice. It also has implications for 
the status and currency of degrees among prospective 
teachers of subjects which have strong relevance to 
photography as well as the other modern media - ranging 
from well-recognised subjects like psychology to the more 
newly-established communication studies courses. 
Photography, which has been a growing if marginal subject 
area, is in danger of losing impetus and suffering a 
decline in the present educational scene; although it must 
be remembered that the current depressed climate may not be 
of a permanent nature. 
On the other hand,, the inverse of the static policy adopted' 
in this country may be seen in Australia-where: 
"On the grounds that visual education now ranks 
as a priority alongside literacy and numeracy, the 
Australian education authority of New South Wales 
has established media studies as part of its core 
curriculum". 2 
It will be noted no doubt that it is media studies as a 
whole and not photography which has been accepted, but of 
course photography is obviously an important if not a basic 
part of visual education within the umbrella term of media 
studies. 
This contrast of policies should make us aware that change 
is indeed possible and does take place; although it is 
ironical to note in the same article that "the Australian 
-2- 
media educationalists took their cue from this country 
(i. e. the U. K. ) ... where media studies have broken new 
ground". However, a period of stasis may be seen not 
just as a frustration, but as an opportunity for serious 
academic reflection and regeneration. It is important to 
pose fundamental questions about the curriculum, the 
reasons for justifying the inclusion of a subject within 
it and the nature of the subject itself. 
It is true, as the -Australian experience has demonstrated, 
that media studies can be a successful curriculum offering, 
but it has academic difficulties in that it covers such a 
wide spectrum, including in addition to photography, film, 
television and the press. The rationale for joining them 
is not so much the nature of the media themselves as their 
industrial base, as was noted in a conference of film and 
television educators at -York University in 1976: 
"All these various media were-interrelated within 
society, in terms of structures'of ownership and 
means of organisation". 3 
In such a perspective, a possible if as yet undocumented 
approach in photography4, the specificity of the individual 
medium is in danger of being lost within social concerns. 
The orientation of this thesis is towards the medium 
itself and the psychological rather than the sociological, 
and while recognising the validity and usefulness of the 
latter approach5, the standpoint to be taken here does not 
* The reference is to the application of French semio- 
logical theory, to be discussed in Section Three. 
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regard the above emphasis of the York Conference as the 
primary one, particularly for early education in photography. 
For younger pupils, as a basic starting point, the approach 
poses problems of presentation and motivation. 
Thus in considering photography-at York, the Images 
Commission took the notion of "reading" as an exploration 
with children of "how meaning is socially constructed ... 
the ideological. dimension of the visual image , 
6, 
and saw 
this as "forming a basis for subsequent study of media in 
greater detail"7. As a recommended "curriculum elemen t"8 
in the lower years of secondary education or primary school, 
however, image study in this sense seems inappropriately 
over-sophisticated. 
I have therefore chosen to consider photography within a 
wider definition of image education which incorporates the 
personal taking of photographs and formal concerns as well 
as its social implications. The "main subject"'home of 
image education would from this position be in art, though 
with a greater critical emphasis than is the norm in that 
area. 
Having given some indication of photography's shifting 
situation in education, we need at this point to bring . 
forward again the question of its identity. What is 
photography ? We have seen that it can be placed under 
umbrella fields like media and yet have links with more 
-4- 
specialised disciplines like psychology and sociology. 
In school it has arisen within such diverse subjects as 
science, English and art. There is an obvious temptation 
to consider it only as a resource, a carrier of messages 
for other subjects, and not something more, namely a 
subject with its own criteria and standards of excellence. 
We need to ask in what sense there is simply education 
through the medium and in what sense it is possible to have 
education in the medium. Furthermore, in making such a 
distinction we can in practice recognise that the two may 
combine: for example, we may appreciate Eric Hosking's 
famous pictures of owls as both accurate visual-aids and 
as aesthetic, -obje. cts. That photographs. have this 
potentiality and facility suggests that they have particular 
qualities which make them unlike as well as like other kinds 
of pictures. How is this achieved ? One way forward is to 
consider photography in relation to theories of both 
perception and pictures, and in this way we may move 
towards a theory of photography which will unify the 
subject conceptually. ' This task will be undertaken in 
Section Two. 
Even before tackling this, however, we should examine more 
closely some basic questions about the curriculum and 
photography's place within it. 
An educational subject can be examined from several points 
of view. We can consider the general ultimate aims to 
-5- 
which photography could aspire or, as a consequence of 
these, and at a more practical level, the objectives or 
likely outcomes attainable and how the subject could be 
taught, learned and monitored. Because photography's 
established position is unsettled, however, there is a 
need to consider first the more basic general questions. 
In dealing with aims and objectives, we are implicitly 
dealing with photography in an established educational 
position. It may be more advantageous to consider photo- 
graphy's claim to such a position. in general terms, that 
is, to consider how we can justify room for a subject in 
the first place. Here it will be useful to turn to 
general educational theory and. then relate considerations 
in that area to photography. 
-6- 
B. Contextualist and essentialist justifications for 
photography. 
Following Eisner, we may distinguish two types of 
justification for the inclusion'of a subject in education: 
the contextualist and the essentialist. The first type 
emphasises the "instrumental consequences" of a subject 
and concentrates on particular needs, both of society and 
of the learner; the second "emphasises the kinds of 
contribution to human experience and understanding"9 that 
the subject alone. can give. Eisner is thinking particularly 
of conventional art education when framing these definitions, 
but they can, I believe, be used profitably in discussing 
photography. 
Eisner's first kind of justification is linked with the 
notion of change. - People change, not only as members of a 
changing society, but in their personal growth from child- 
hood to adulthood. ' We are here concerned to keep education 
in tune not only with a changing world, its present 
influence and its future possibilities, but also with. 
changing individuals and the development of their capacities. 
The keynote should therefore be one of relevance. 
In education we, have to make a balance between the. 
particular needs of society and those of the learner. 
Musgrove expresses these sentiments vigorously with the 
bias towards the needs of society.: 
-7- 
"My prescription from the commonsense standpoint 
is that education is essentially preparatory for 
the life ahead ... in all cultures its purpose is to prepare the young to cope effectively with the 
circumstances of the life which they are likely to 
encounter" 10. 
We should note that Musgrove is of necessity making value 
judgements and decisions which ultimately and inescapably 
will relate to a particular kind of curriculum - in his 
case a socially relevant one. In this system of justific- 
ation, Media Studies - and photography within it - can be 
seen as centrally important. 
The developmental psychologist and educationalist, Jerome 
S Bruner, while accepting the force of the instrumental 
view, is more particularly concerned with the kind of 
competencies required to function adequately in our 
technological society: 
"The first object of any act of learning, over 
and beyond the pleasure it may give, is that it 
should serve us in the future. Learning should 
not only take us somewhere; it should allow us 
to go further more easily" 11. 
In thus advocating a policy of "assisted growth"12, he 
is concerned not only with what competencies or skills 
are required, but how they are acquired so that there is 
a transfer of principles and attitudes. For Bruner, 
this continuity of learning "is dependent upon mastery of 
the structure of the subject matter". But do we know 
13 
what that structure is in the case of photography ? 
For Bruner, the structure of a subject with a practical 
-8- 
character should, in this respect, be more than the 
learning of a particular skill, for this provides only 
specific transfer. He regards as more important "the 
transfer of principles and attitudes". As he explains: 
"In essence, it consists of learning initially 
not a skill but. a general idea, which can then 
be used as a basis for recognising subsequent 
problems as special cases of the idea originally 
mastered. This type of transfer is at the heart 
of the educational process - the continual 
broadening and deepening of knowledge in terms 
of basic and general ideas" 14. 
Can we then point to key concepts which govern photography ? 
Is that of "denotation", with its obverse of "connotation" 
a valid example of such a concept, as Roland Barthes 
maintained in his early uses of these terms ? 
15 Furthermore, 
how far are general ideas'about photographs learned 
consciously, and how far in the process of daily living 
and human contact, as in the kind of learning of one's 
native language, a phenomenon to which Bruner draws 
attention? How far are ideas about photography linked with 
perception - and how do we conceive of that process in terms 
of learning ? 
In deciding what skills can be usefully learned, Musgrove 
and Bruner would refer to their useful social and develop- 
mental purposes. In turning to the essentialist justific- 
ation for a subject, we would be more concerned with 
intrinsic worth. -While Eisner gives the concept of 
intrinsic worth due weight, it is perhaps RS Peters in 
-9- 
Britain who has most strongly pursued this notion of the 
basic value of a subject, being concerned not to tie 
education too closely to societal needs which, interpreted 
in a narrow sense, could result in mere vocational 
training. Education for Peters is about coming to care 
about what is valuable: 
"... to be 'educated' implies a) caring about what 
is worthwhile and b) being brought to care about 
it and to possess the relevant knowledge or skill 
in a way that involves at least a minimum of 
understanding and voluntariness ... Education involves the intentional transmission of: worth- 
while content. " 16. 
How one decides what is worthwhile is of course the 
difficult question and would involve a major philosophical 
enquiry. The issue cannot be resolved here,, but it should 
be noted that while Peters' notion of the "worthwhile" is 
dangerously static and without sufficient reference to 
change in society,. as an unqualified guide to educational 
principle, change by itself is open to the winds and 
hazards of fashion. - 
It would appear therefore that both principles are 
necessary. We need to consult both of Eisnerts justific- 
ations in formulating a rationale for the inclusion of a 
subject matter. We can now ask: how does this apply to 
photography in a more concrete manner ? 
According to the contextualist rationale, photography 
would appear to have an overwhelming case for inclusion 
- 10 - 
in the curriculum. Photographs are simply ubiquitous 
in contemporary society, and they influence us in a variety 
of ways. The argument of relevance cannot reasonably be 
gainsaid. Perhaps the very fact of ubiquity is associated 
with proliferation and quantity -. with mass production - 
and in the mind-this is . 
felt. to militate--against- quality 
production. Products of the machine are still unfortun- 
ately too closely associated with low aesthetic standards 
and trivialisation - as if this were inevitable. The 
achievements of modern industry are negated through 
neglect. In this respect, photography may be said to 
suffer some of the prejudice against'Design Education, a 
turning away from technological advance in our society 
17 within education. 
One difficulty for educators then presumably arises from 
an excessively conservative attitude. Thus the sheer 
number of photographic images may lead. them to undervalue' 
their cultural value and significance. Responses may 
take the form of indifference or amount to open hostility. 
If this hostility is not based on'understanding and 
discrimination, then it can be educationally negative: 
an erection of defences against a modern phenomenon. 
Hence if we think of photographs in terms of a common 
metaphor like "a flood of images", we may react simply 
by trying to set up a flood barrier. But surely the 
education of discrimination is more valid than censorship 
- 11 - 
or inattention 
Furthermore, we need not answer negatively the essentialist 
question about the worthwhileness of photography itself: 
photographs can be socially influential, but can also be 
aesthetically valuable. Indeed, it may be a disservice 
to consider them only from the former perspective, for 
then their specific photographic qualities may be bypassed 
in favour of social significance, a danger inherent in the 
formulation of the Images Commission at York University, 
as already noted. 
If we are going to value photographs in any real sense, then 
it is important in an educational context that we consider 
quality as well as quantity. 
If we are indifferent to photographs, it may be because we 
think they appear to be simply "obvious" and therefore 
lacking in complexity', thus precluding their'serious 
consideration in education. However, this obviousness may 
be more apparent than real, so that what is going on in a 
photograph is overlooked. It is interesting to note that 
recent "conceptual" photography has drawn our attention to 
what we accept without thinking, as in Hilliard's work which 
is certainly complex in its implications. A reportage 
1$ 
photographer's work like Bill Owen's Suburbia may be 
ironic in effect while at first appearing "obvious". 
19 
- 12 - 
Indeed, it could even be said that the very obviousness of 
photography, its ability to allow immediate recognition of 
objects and people (which indeed is a very positive 
quality in a context such as documentary photography), has 
paradoxically prevented education largely noticing it. Like 
the postman in Chesterton's Father Brown story, "The 
Invisible Man", photography has become so much part of our 
ordinary existence that is seen but not noted. 
20 
For photographs can be both ordinary and extraordinary; 
and this . is particularly the case with news photographs. 
They have achieved a level of artistic achievement which 
is only beginning to be widely recognised. Indeed, 
artistically valuable work has been unfortunately lost as 
a result of neglect. Ian Jeffrey notes in his discriminating 
Photography: A Concise History: 
"Photo-journalists. have also been consistently 
overlooked, especially if they worked for local 
newspapers or for the mass-circulation press. 
Few of them had the time or the inclination to 
tend their reputation as artists. They also worked 
constantly against the pressure of deadlines and, 
as a result, their negatives vanished into archives 
from which, in some cases, they never emerged again. 
Among their number are some outstanding artists: 
James Jarche, for instance, one of Britain's most 
resourceful picture-makers during the 1930s. " 21 
Writers like Jeffrey have moved some way from the misleading 
dictum of George Bernard Shaw: 
"The photographer is like the cod, which-lays a 
million eggs that one may be hatched. " 22 
From a purely aesthetic point of view, however, there is a 
- 13 - 
core of truth in this vivid if exaggerated simile, in that 
the really fine photograph emerges only occasionally. But 
photographs need not be considered solely in this light, 
and thus as a largely undifferentiated mass, with only a 
few worthy contenders for attention. In the workaday 
world, photographs oftef have to be primarily functional. 
As Harold Evans puts it in relation to news photographs, 
"Artistry is second to actuality", though he adds: 
"It is astonishing what a good photograph can 
do. After all, the newspaper photograph which 
has such power is only a small flat series of 
tones from black to white. Yet within the 
confines of a small newspaper page the skilled 
photographer can give a real feeling of what is 
happening. " 23 
A developed notion of photography then would wish to 
consider a variety of contexts and uses, and value both 
function and aesthetics. It is within such a context that 
the concept of "image education" could take root. - 
Let us take some moments in a typical day, and consider 
ways in which photographic images impinge on our attention. 
We may'open the newspaper at breakfast, and inevitably find 
t 
a photograph on the front page, even if we read The Times. 
Harold Evans, former editor of that newspaper, has argued 
that the still image has never been more powerful, even 
compared to television. In the coverage of the Vietnam 
war, the photograph of the police chief in Saigon executing 
a prisoner in 1969, he claims, is "an image you will be able 
to recall for a long time"; it can be a "trigger image" 
- 14 - 
of all the emotions roused by the subject; and he 
maintains: 
"The difference between the moving picture on, 
television and the still image is that the moving 
picture cannot easily be recalled to mind or 
pondered on. The still picture has an affinity 
with the way we remember. It preserves forever 
afinite fraction of the infinite time of the 
universe. It--i--s easier to recall an--event--or- -a - 
person by summoning up a single image - capturing 
a single point in time". 25 
Here it must be added that this argument, though intuitively 
convincing, needs empirical verification . We could also 
ask: is this affinity a natural or a learned one, or a 
combination of both ? 
Again, to return to a typical day, we will most likely pass 
on the way into town or city centre a variety of advertise-' 
ment hoardings which are usually filled with photographic 
images. We need only compare such photographs to the 
Victorian poster, covered in. text, to realise how much the 
photograph has. taken over from the word. Now the word is 
often used only to reinforce the image, or often simply to 
name the brand advertised, with the meanings contained in 
the image. The-most conspicuous example of this change to 
image dominance in advertising is probably the Benson and 
Hedges cigarette series where the brand name is 
not even captioned, although an inscribed cigarette 
packet is included within the picture. Indeed this 
development goes one stage further in one particular 
* The widespread use of the "freeze-frame" on film to 
emphasise an important moment in the flow of images 
is a strong pointer. 
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1. Benson and Hedges advertisement, 1980. 
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example which shows cigarettes falling down like rain in a 
stylised slanting pattern, after Magritte, where even the 
brand name is not included on the cigarettes themselves. 
It is assumed that the name is too well known to need 
mentioning: the "surrealist" series has made its own mark 
and identified the-.. cigarette - sufficient1y. 
(. 11,1. ) ._-- 
In this series, our reaction to advertising is surely 
mixed. While we may deprecate the advertising of a harmful 
drug or the appeal to-snobbery associated with the brand 
and: its visual "knowingness", nevertheless the series has 
a definite aesthetic appeal. To tease out such consider- 
ations is surely one task of image education. 
With cruder, more "hard sell" examples of advertising, 
the link with painting may be simply with the reproduction 
of colour,, texture and the tangibility or presence of 
objects.. Here a hostile attitude . may. be justified, but it 
must be one based on the analysis and the understanding of 
the appeal. There will be a need to point to the 
acquisitive feelings which are being stimulated. Berger 
comments on the connection between the former uses of oil 
paint and modern colour photography as used in advertising: 
"Both media use similar, highly tactile means to 
play upon the spectator's sense-of acquiring the 
real thing which the image shows. In both cases 
his feeling that he can almost touch what is in the 
image reminds him how he might or döes possess the 
real thing". 26 
- 17 - 
2. Nina Leen, "Ozark Family, " 1948. 
3. The Sunday Times Magazine cover, 28 Oct. 1973 
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In the home, as a final stage in our consideration of photo- 
graphic influence throughout the day, the family album may 
be leafed through. The way we recall our past, especially 
when we try to think back beyond the threshhold of personal 
memory to the toddler stage, will be highly influenced by 
any photographs at that early period of-our lives. Again, 
our relatives preserved in photographic, form can make up a 
kind of pictorial family tree. If we attain fame or 
notoriety, our private photographs may become public and 
become another way of describing us, one which has gone 
beyond our control. Photographs then can shape our personal 
notion of ourselves, and. thi's link with our sense of identity 
is another aspect with which image education should be 
concerned. (Ills. 2 and. 3). 
Even from such brief considerations-of photographic influence 
on our lives, it is now surely evident that photography can 
have a variety of important public and private meanings. 
Photographs are an established part of the way we receive 
knowledge about the world; they can contribute to our 
aspirations in life and they can be a- means of helping or 
making us think about ourselves. In addition, the 
implications of looking at photographs, when we dig below 
the surface, begin to pose complex-problems. Finally, photo- 
graphs are not simply minor adjuncts to what many still 
think of as a totally dominant word-culture. 
It was perhaps McLuhan in the sixties who drew our attention 
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most strikingly to the ways in which a medium can affect a 
culture, a famous example relating to the effects of the 
invention of printing27. While his reputation has 
declined in the past ten years he did much to make people 
aware of aspects of the hitherto unnoticed nature of our 
man-made environmental media. Jonathan Miller, though 
highly sceptical. of MoLuan's grand theories which he 
attacked in a damaging and influential critique, admits: 
"He has successfully convened a debate on a subject 
which has been neglected too long. For all the 
maddening slogans, paradoxes and puns; for all the 
. gross breaches of intellectual etiquette - or 
perhaps even because of them all - McLuhan has 
forced is to"attend to the various media through 
which we gain our knowledge of the world". 28 
McLuhan particularly. drew our attention to the effects of 
the medium itself rather than simply its message content, 
and he rightly'critised previous modern media "effects" 
research which concentrated on quantitative and verbal 
formulations, even when'. dealing with pictorial material. 
29 
As Norman Mackenzie, as Director of the Centre for 
Academic Services at Sussex University commented in the 
late sixties in a statement which still has force today: 
"The point in McLuhan which is valid is that we 
have been very much a print oriented culture and 
that all forms of education have tended to under- 
estimate the contribution that visual elements and 
the visual experience. makes to learning. This is 
reflected in the school by an unwillingness or an 
inability to use visual materials of all kinds - 
not merely motion pictures, but all kinds of 
visual experience". 30 
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Earlier, if less influential writers than McLuhan, had 
noted changes taking place as a result of the diffusion 
of the photograph. John R Whiting, an American journalist 
in the tradition of Life magazine,. writing of the 
increasing influence of "picture information" in the 
1940s, comments as follows: 
"As a means of expressing ideas and emotions, 
as well as direct facts, photography has achieved 
a unique distinction: it has altered the scope of 
the spoken and written languages, making them 
partially obsolete. For example, your mind's 
knowledge of Abraham Lincoln's face is derived, 
not from written accounts, but. from the photographs 
of Lincoln by Alexander Gardner-and Matthew Brady". 31 
If. this extending sphere. of influence is acknowledged, 
there would appear to be a prima, faeie. case for confronting 
the photographic phenomenon more directly than in the 
past, and particularly in education; not simply registering 
it as a social phenomenon'viewed from a distance, but- 
examining it closely,. trying to understand the variety of 
its manifestations and purposes, and in doing s. o grappling 
with the medium, using it. We need to consider the 
photographic image in its specificity anc not simply as 
an extension of the word. 
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C. Problems of criteria in essentialist considerations. 
Photography then has a very strong case from the context- 
ualist point of view, but it is also important to consider 
the value photography can have as a medium in its own 
right, as an art form - to examine its essentialist 
justification. To see photography only as a social 
phenomenon may lead us to under-value it as a medium with 
a power of personal and collaborative expression. In 
considering its undoubted social. influence,. we may become 
pre-occupied with its power over us and ignore the positive 
creative use that we can make of it. Of the modern visual 
media it is the most aceessible: for personal or group use. 
An article in New Society in 1978 notes that, in the 
previous year, "more than 61 per cent of British households 
? Therefore it would seem only commonsense held cameras ". 
3 
to claim that, to begin. to understand the visual or 
pictorial aspect of photography and cognate media, the most 
direct way would be to become familiar with the key devices 
of the photographic process, such as framing, focus and 
angle in taking shots, together with the uses of the 
enlarger. To deal with these through verbal description 
or discussion would be not simply a poor substitute: it 
would mean not attaining a concrete base for further 
development in an inside understanding of the workings 
of photography. Such practice would also have to include 
experiment with the medium, to obtain a sense of the 
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medium's expressive potential through making individual 
acts of choice, these being open to later critical 
appraisal. In this way practice would not simply be the 
rehearsal of a mere technical process. 
In practice, unfortunately, much of photographic education 
has been merely technical with a fixed and inflexible 
notion of what the camera. is capable of. As a branch of 
science photography can easily become assimilated to the 
scientific knowledge of optics, physics and chemistry. It: 
is highly debatable whether such .a strong attachment is 
most suitable in the early stages of'photographic education 
if a basic priority is that of developing a creative and 
critical picture sense, which is after all the raison d'etre 
of using a camera beyond bare recording. Over-technical 
emphasis on photographic controls can also be obfuscating, 
it can be argued, at an early stage in practising picture- 
taking. 
But is a photographic pictorial sense at all complex ? 
Has it a particular identity ? To justify using it in 
the context of institutional education, we need to consider 
the achievement of photography, and make a brief exposition 
of some of the key issues involved. 
A news event in the 1970s both highlights the general 
indifference of the British to their past Victorian 
achievement in the medium, and the changing attitude that 
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was in the air. In 1975 Colin Ford, the special curator 
for film and photography appointed by the National 
Portrait Gallery in the early 1970s, launched a widely 
reported appeal to save an album of portraits by Julia 
Margaret Cameron from being exported to America. 
This step had a number of important consequences. Although 
Aaron Scharf claims that, "From the 1890s, superseding all 
arguments, photography was accepted as an established form 
of: art", 
33 this was not officially the case in Britain 
until 1975., according to The Sunday Times (in France a 
court case had resulted in a favöurable decision in 1863) 
34. 
The circumstance was an'American publisher's application 
to export the Cameron album referred to above. Under the 
heading "Art ruling reprieves old photos, " the report 
reads: 
"For the first time, photographs have been officially 
classified as-works of art in Britain. This has 
halted the export to America of an irreplaceable 
collection of portraits of eminent Victorians". 35 
The step was taken by the Government's Reviewing Committee 
for the Export of Works, of Art, but the official reprieve 
was to last only ten weeks. Colin Ford in the same 
article is reported as saying, "This is the greatest 
photographic treasure in the country and we have got to 
save it somehow". In a later review of the events which 
followed, William Messer wrote: 
it .. an enormous public campaign was waged, including TV and radio appeals, newspaper articles, 
subway posters, even schoolchildren collecting 
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pennies ... and still they fell short 
(of the 
£52,000 paid by the American, Sam Wagstaff). 
Wagstaff permitted a two-week extension and the 
money was raised, and with it the photographic 
awareness of the whole country". 36 
In this way American interest in buying up historic British 
photography, of which this was the most publicised instance, 
helped substantiate a new attitude of photography's worth, 
expressed in concrete financial terms. Foi British society, 
gallery exhibition was a clear sign of status, and this 
developed considerably for photography in the seventies, 
Galleries might be regarded as a danger for education, 
particularly in such matters, of the promotion of precious 
connoisseurship, limited editions of prints at inflated 
prices and simple snobbery rather than enlightenment - 
but the first West End gallery to devote itself exclusively 
to photography, The Photographer's Gallery, which opened 
in 1971 and was sponsored by the Arts Council, provided 
an admirable educational model: it has promoted a wide 
variety of exhibitions and range of prints, while also 
running a bookshop and lecture series. 
This delay in recognition of well over a hundred years 
reflects the varying attitudes to photography by the 
traditional art world. The problem was not only that 
the new medium proved a threat to contemporary working 
artists - particularly insportraiture - but also that its 
ability to record make it appear to be too impersonal to be 
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considered as an art form, at least by traditional standards. 
It did not require the kind of manual dexterity and-skill - 
"handling" - necessary in drawing and painting. 
Photography could be said to begin as a record: in fact 
this was how it was considered on its invention. As 
Gernsheim notes: 
"The daguerrotype's power of rendering, detail, 
texture and form with marvellous clarity and 
exactitude, and with comparative ease and 
quickness, was considered its greatest asset. " 37 
With this ability it was possible for photography to advance 
in a variety of directions: while it could simply document, 
as in topography, it could also, with the skilful use of 
light and composition, make arresting landscapes. Thus 
while it could advance knowledge as science, as in aerial 
photography or microscopy, it could also aspire to be 
pictorial art. The calotypes, pr "beautiful images", of 
Fox Talbot, for example, were often described as "sun 
drawings", and he produced a number of pictures of which 
the majority were matter-of-fact records, while a few were 
fine compositions in the picturesque mode. He also 
produced direct patterns on paper, a technique to be 
developed in the twentieth century by Man Ray and Moholy. 
Nagy. 
However, simply because photography was a mechnical record, 
when considered apart from the photographer, it was 
difficult for the unsympathetic critic to accept it as 
- 27 - 
an art. The polemical essay written by Charles Baudelaire 
on the occasion of photography's admission to the French 
Salon in 1859, represents at its extreme this hostile 
stance: he criticised it as "the refuge of every would-be 
painter, every painter too ill-endowed or too lazy to 
complete his studies", and declared that "this industry, 
by invading the territories of art, has become art's most 
mortal enemy, and that the confusion of their several 
functions prevents any of them being properly fulfilled ... 
Each day art diminishes its self-respect'by bowing down 
before external reality; each day the painter becomes more 
and more given to painting not what he dreams but what he 
sees". Baudelaire's solution to the problem was to make 
photography very much a visual aid: "It is time, then, 
for it to return to its true duty, which is to be the 
servant of the sciences and arts - but the very humble 
servant, like printing. or shorthand, which have neither 
created nor supplemented literature . 
38 This problem of 
photography's nature and potential is still not completely 
and happily resolved, either in society at large or in 
education. The nineteenth century saw attempts by photo- 
graphers to raise the status of the medium through 
imitation of the ideal subject-matter and the use of 
montage, particularly in the work of Reijlander and Robinson. 
Later, in pictorialism, the use of soft focus and materials 
like gum-bichromate was used to attain supposedly painterly 
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qualities. 
With the advent of cheap hand-cameras in the 1880s, and the 
promise of Kodak, "You press the button, we do the rest, " 
an era of relatively cheap and easy photography began which 
intensified the, problem of status. There was inevitably a 
general lowering of standards, although the camera was now 
more accessible, a democratic medium, and there was the 
possibility of setting new standards of, for example, 
informality.. Now a general mode of pictorial communication, 
even though this was often in the form of haphazard snap- 
shooting, it was an opportunity for a general education 
in the medium, but this was simply not recognised by the 
Victorians. 
Gernsheim puts a classic case for the valid cultivation 
of photography, on-a model of the serious amateur'of 
Victorian times: 
"No pursuit is better'Adapted than photography 
to cultivate the powers of observation, but this 
cultivation demands attention and reflection. 
However simple the manipulation, there is no 
short cut to artistic knowledge. Intelligence 
and care-are as vital. for the production of good 
photographs as for success in any other medium". 39 
Gernsheim's formulation, however, thinks of photography 
only as being a craft first and an art afterwards; and 
adopted too strictly and traditionally as policy, it would 
preclude many applications in Junior or even Infant Schools. 
There, and in other situations, positive use could be made 
* See Appendix One. 
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of the ability to capture an image of a face rapidly 
and convincingly, or simply the quality of relaxedness in 
an impromptu snapshot. 
40 
Nevertheless, Gernsheim's ideas 
are not to be discarded, only modified: particularly where 
development beyond an elementary stage is considered. 
In the early twentieth century, photographic pictorialism 
as an attempt to acquire status through manipulative 
means, was gradually succeeded by "straight" photography. 
Paul Strand's article, originally. published in "Camera 
Work", edited by Stieglitz, was a landmark definition: 
"The full potential power of every medium is 
dependent upon the purity of its use, and all 
attempts at. mixture end in such dead things as 
the color-etching, the photographic painting 
and in photography, the gum-print, oil-print 
etc. in which the introduction of handwork and 
manipulation is merely the expression of an 
impotent desire to paint". 41 
Such unique photographic characteristics as "a range of 
almost infinite tonal values which lie beyond the. skill 
of human hand" were promoted. The emphasis on 'creativity 
shifted from handwork to qualities of mind, "honesty, no 
less than intensity of vision". Thus a way was opened 
for the cultivation of "photographic seeing". In educat- 
Tonal terms, however,. Strand's position and its implications, 
while being more ambitious, makes the recognition of 
quality much more difficult to detect. As a clear-cut bid 
for the autonomy of photography, and the recognition of 
its unique qualities, as'well as the need for a special 
- 30 - 
place from which to develop, it was no doubt a necessary 
step. However, it also makes for paradox: an emphasis on 
rendering the photographed object or person as it is in 
great detail, yet a claim that this rendering can be more 
than a literal one. A premium on previsualisation is 
combined with "a real respect for the thing in front of 
him". There are dangers of romantic aesthetics here with 
the weight of meaning being placed on what the photo- 
grapher says he means. Stieglitz's series of cloud photo- 
graphs,, "Equivalents", to cite a controversial case, are 
still not accepted as expressions of his philosophy of 
life. 42 Ultimately, this can become a problem of 
communication: we need to put the photographer's product 
to the critical test of long-term acceptability, of the 
common but informed viewer. 
To move forward to the present day, Bill Jay has pointed 
out the danger of photographic education in higher 
education in America where photography, while widely 
accepted as a fine art in such institutions as Arizona 
State University with 300 students "majoring" in photo- 
graphy, has fallen into the trap of"a romantic aesthetics 
in cultivating a "self-indulgent arrogance that sees the 
individual as the centre of the medium". 
43 
Jay deplores 
the "insular, self-centred nature" or the art photography 
he found, and comments: 
"With no cross-fertilisation with other areas 
of the photographic spectrum art photography has 
become incestuous to a remarkable degree". 44 
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This would have dismayed Strand of course, who had a 
strong humanist orientation, but the contemporary American 
malaise which Jay detects is a regrettable over-development 
of the romantic individualist thrust of his argument. 
The manipulative idea did not die with the rise of purist 
doctrine in America in the 1920s and 30s. Of course it 
shared with "straight" photography the notion that photo- 
graphy was a means of artistic expression, although it 
differed radically as to what could be regarded as 
legitimate means. William Mortensen championed what. he 
called "creative pictorialism" in a series of articles in 
Camera Craft in 1934 which were in part a dialogue with 
Ansel Adams: 
"Nor'may any restrictions be laid upon the 
artist's pictorial interpretation of his subject 
materials. The perfect setting forth of the 
picture idea is its own justification. This 
permits free selectivity to be applied to the 
original image, together with all means of control 
through which selectivity is attained. Local 
printing, distortion, montage - any variation 
or combination is valid if the use of it is 
related to subject and theme". 45 
Mortensen saw photography as one of the graphic arts, but 
denied that it imitated lithography, etching and other 
such arts. Simply as one of them, "photography is 
concerned with their common problem of representing form 
in terms of pattern and tonal values on a two-dimensional 
surface". At the same time, Mortensen recognised that 
"for photography has its'own unique qualities, which are 
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unavailable to etcher and painter". Moreover, such formal 
concern did not for Mortensen imply self-concern: 
"The artist is not blowing bubbles for his own 
gratification, but is speaking a language, is 
telling somebody something". 46 
Unfortunately Mortensen's practice has not been as cogently 
communicative as his writing, and he does omit from his 
framework the all-important notion of recording, while his 
dull photographs have been forgotten. Nevertheless, his 
arguments are important in the perspective of the 
development of photography considered as a graphic art, 
both in colleges and schools. 
The exponents of the pictorial/experimental and the 
realist/purist attitudes have continued their debate in 
various writings down the years. Thus Gernsheim on Otto 
Steinert and his followers' photo-patterns: 
"I am all for expressing the spirit of our time 
(in painterly style) in photography, but not at 
the expense of sacrificing one iota of its 
characteristics. If we abandon photographic 
halftone for the sake of achieving a graphic design 
we are left with a skeleton without substance, or 
fishbones without fish, as Cartier-Bresson neatly 
put it". 47 
In contrast is the declaration of Aaron Scharf: 
"In our time it seems entirely-appropriate that the 
widest choice be open to artists. Those using 
the camera, or other photographic means to produce 
works of artistic merit should seek to exploit their 
medium in the most adventurous ways". 48 
In their extreme form the two polarities present a dilemma 
for the theorist in deciding what photography is, and thus 
in schools, what can be appropriately valued as education 
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in photography. If Gernsheim seems too determinedly craft- 
orientated, Scharf appears too loose. 
Gerry Badger defines the contrasting positions this way: 
"Does the photographer concern himself with 
merely recording the world, interfering as 
little as possible, or reconstructing and 
reconstituting it, in the manner of the 
traditional artist ? ". 49 
Badger finds the dichotomy a false one, a kind of phoney 
war, "a gulf more practised in the manner than in the 
observance", with some manipulation inevitably being 
practised at the printing stage. He proposes instead: 
" ... a continuum, running from the 'pure' 
application of photographic technique and 
vision at one end, to the 'impure' hybrids 
of mixed-media". 50 
In this structure, Badger would look for qualities of 
'photographicness' in work at one end of the spectrum and 
'painterliness' at the other. What joins them is the 
common use of the medium of light. 
This formulation goes a long way towards providing criteria 
for judgement. Its attempt at unity - reminiscent of 
Moholy-Nagy without his stress on impersonality - is still 
not without its problems, for example in that it leaves 
out of account the social significance of people and 
objects, but it does represent a recent coming-together 
of photography and the other arts, rather than their 
necessary separateness or' photography's complete loss of 
identity. It is then not unreasonable to claim that 
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photography has an autonomy and characteristics of a 
special kind, not only formally but in the way its images 
are considered, while sharing certain features with pictures 
in general. 
In considering the value of photography for education, it 
has been necessary to go into some detail about the basic 
controversies concerning the status of the medium and its 
potential as an art form, for different orientations result 
in different value judgements. According to Baudelaire, 
photography could be no more than an aid to art and 
science; with Gernsheim it is a serious craft-based art 
capable of. developing thought, attention and powers of 
observation. In this century, particularly in America, 
serious photography has placed a premium on creative 
vision, whether using purist or experimental means. This 
presents. problems of criteria, but overall it seems 
necessary that both. traditions be borne in mind and 
appropriate adjustment made. 
What aesthetic theory and discussion there has been in 
photography then has on the whole been polarised with the 
result that the controversies and polemics surrounding the 
nature of photography have narrowed rather than opened up 
general` awareness of the potential range and complexity of 
the medium. - 
Furthermore, its development as a fine art 
in America would seem to-have isolated it from its 
functional uses and range of public concerns. 
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Photography's recording potential is too important to be 
cast aside in favour of the cult of developing individual 
personality. Is it not essential to incorporate the 
mirroring quality of the medium with human purpose ? If 
we ignore the former, surely we ignore the very basis of 
photography, its raison d'etre, the fundamental impulse 
for its invention ? We retreat to a solipsistic artistic 
ghetto, cutting ourselves off from a world to which it 
should give access. On the other hand, the documentary 
quality of photography need not preclude the exercise of 
human imagination, both in taking and viewing photographs. 
For the purposes of analysis, one way forward in Section Two 
will be to consider such denotative processes separately 
before bringing in aesthetic and social connotations. In 
this connection, the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, the 
American logician and philosopher of pragmatism, will be 
considered in providing a theory of signs which form a 
bridge linking the documentary with the potentially 
symbolic quality of photographs. 
51 
If the artistic potential of photography is to be developed 
soundly in schools, then it would seem necessary that the 
medium is not isolated from its functional uses. In one 
sense this is a curriculum question and will be raised in 
Section Four. The statement also suggests that photography 
can be considered in its range as similar to verbal 
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language in a sense; for language has a variety of 
functional uses and-can also become art as literature. 
However, a further crucial question arises: how far can we 
take this analogy ? We. can agree that photography has a 
variety of communicative uses - and can be considered as 
language in that broad sense - but we also want to ask how 
far it works like a language when we examine photography 
and language more closely and compare them. Is photography, 
for example, tied to culture or social usage in the same way 
as verbal language is ? How is meaning in photographs 
conveyed ? 
In our discussion of the art potential of photography, the 
question of how we look at photographs in relation to what 
they represent arose as an important issue. This would 
seem prior to the language question, and therefore requires 
to be considered first. However, it is also important not 
to begin such an investigation with the question of photo- 
graphy as an art, but rather to go back to its fundamental 
characteristic as a medium for recording an image. We need 
to elucidate problems pertaining to this basic function 
and take note of some of the developments in the psychology 
of perception, particularly in relation to pictures. How 
do we see the world, how do we see photographs, and what 
kind of link is there between the two ? 
In moving towards a theory of photography, we can identify 
two issues which require fundamental analysis. The first 
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is that of an adequate account of human perception, an 
examination of the way we perceive the world in general and 
photographs in particular. It is contended in this thesis 
that such an issue is of primary importance to a theory of 
photography in education. The second issue is the wide- 
spread use of "language" analogies to describe photography. 
This issue will be closely examined in Section Three. 
While we have already acknowledged a loose bond joining 
"language" and photography in the sense of communication, 
it must be noted here that the concept of "language" as 
an over-riding model will be resisted and instead a 
perceptual account will be put forward as a more appropriate 
starting-point. 
A common and fundamental feature of the "language" analogy, 
it should also be noted, seeks to link photography to 
social convention and usage, and in doing so considers the 
photograph as something to be learned like a language; 
in that sense its link with that to which it refers would 
be, as claimed in verbal language theory, essentially 
"arbitrary", as is a word's connection with the object to 
which it refers. The notion of the "arbitrary" nature of 
language has gained in strength from the rise in esteem 
of linguistics in this century, especially from the 
groundwork laid down by Saussure. 
52 In addition, the 
influence of language itself in determining the thought- 
patterns of a people has been argued forcefully by cultural- 
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linguistic determinists like BL Whorf in a typical strong 
formulation: 
"We cut nature up, organise it into concepts, 
and ascribe significancies as we do, largely because 
we are parties to an agreement to organise it in 
this way - an agreement that holds throughout our 
speech community and is codified in the patterns of 
our language". 53 
Whatever the influence of verbal language on mind - and 
this account is narrowly circular and static - such ideas 
have spread beyond the confines of verbal language and been 
applied to other areas of communication. It will be contended 
that they are often misjudged. Indeed,. an historically early 
"language" analogy applied by Berkeley to perception will 
be critically evaluated below. However, this is not to 
deny totally the value of. such analogies; rather, the aim 
is to provide a perceptual setting in which such comparisons 
can be usefully made. 
Through such a progression, we should be able to obtain a 
wider overview of the scope of photography as. well as some 
answers to the basic questions raised by the medium. At 
that point a more detailed examination of curriculum 
considerations in theory and practice will focus its 
educational application. 
Photography often appears to be simple, but the status of 
a photograph as a piece of knowledge is a profoundly 
problematic one for many writers, and this basic issue 
is well formulated by Stanley Cavell, whose reflections 
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make an appropriate conclusion to this Section: 
"We do not know what a photograph is; we do not 
know how to place it ontologically. We might 
say that we don't know how to think of the 
connection between a photograph and what it is 
a photograph of. The image is not a likeness; 
it is not exactly a replica, or a relic, or a 
shadow, or an apparition either, though all of 
these natural candidates share a striking feature 
with photographs - an aura or history of magic 
surrounding them. " 54 
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SECTION TWO - PERCEPTION AND PHOTOGRAPHY 
INTRODUCTION 
In Section One, it emerged that educational consideration 
of photography was dependent on a prior clarification of the 
nature of the medium itself. Photography has no strong 
tradition of theory beyond technical considerations, its 
position and identity in educational practice are not well 
established and indeed in many quarters are under threat. 
While firm recognition of photography as an art form has 
been recently demonstrated in Britain, following American 
precedent, the theory of photography itself is not so well 
founded. Such a theory would have to be concerned with the 
full potential of photography, not simply as a "pure" art 
material available for personal expression, but as a 
medium with a variety of functional and communicative 
purposes. To gain some purchase on this wide coverage, 
however, we will need first of all to consider photography 
at a simply descriptive level, then move later to the 
aesthetic plane. The task of the following sub-sections 
A-C will be to describe theories of the process of perception 
in general with special reference to those of pictorial 
perception, including the perception of photographs. It is 
not possible to focus on the way we look at photographs in 
isolation without relating this to the perception of 
pictures as a whole. The form of these sub-sections will 
in consequence be an expanding one in terms of the material 
discussed; moving from simple realistic images drawn from 
the audio-visual field to those which can be appropriately 
looked at in a more formally sophisticated way. This will 
be accompanied by an examination of the adequacy of the 
body of perceptual theory available to describe the material. 
In this connection, therefore, the bias of emphasis of 
theories considered will be important, as well as the 
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purpose of the photographs described. 
The study of perception is concerned with how the objects 
and scenes in the outside world, and in pictures, are 
recognised and ultimately interpreted by our minds. 
Emphasis in the study of perception can vary: for example, 
it may be predominantly concerned with the referents in the 
external world, and a question that is often raised is: how 
much of what is there in the world is transmitted to the 
observer ? How adequate is this information ? How true is 
it ? Alternatively, the emphasis can shift to the observer 
or viewer; how much does he contribute to the process of 
perception ? Is what arrives at the retina sufficient for 
basic recognition ? Or is a reference to the non-visual, 
such as the memory store, necessary for recognition ? What 
does, or can, the beholder contribute ? In asking these 
questions, the notion of what is the primary area of study 
in the process of perception can vary: from an examination 
of information in the external world as it impinges on 
our retinas to a study of the cognitive processes which can 
be held to co-ordinate and/or interpret the received rays 
of light. Finally, in looking at photographs, what similar- 
ities to and differences from ordinary perception are to be 
found ? In attempting answers to these questions which 
arise in considering perception, we shall also note some 
implications for education. 
- 42 - 
A. Perception as "registration" and "construction" 
compared, with reference to Gestalt theory. 
It will be useful initially to follow the lead of the 
psychologist, Kennedy, by focusing on ordinary pictures 
(including, but not specifically, photographs). 
1 Thus 
attention will be directed to those pictures which provide 
information for recognition or identification, and to leave 
aside at present the aesthetic or expressive image. To do 
this is not simply a convenient decision: as Kennedy points 
out in his important study of picture perception, "picturing, 
at heart, is a means of informing people about visible 
things", 
2 
and furthermore he declares that "the basic 
function of pictures is surely to allow us to see objects 
and scenes that are not in our immediate surroundings". 
3 
In fulfilling this function, Kennedy aligns himself with 
the common sense view that "pictures are usually fairly 
precise and unambiguous in their referent", 
4 
and that even 
in looking at new information in pictures, "we can also make 
sense of unfamiliar things", 
5 
such as, for example, the 
moon's surface from an astronaut's photograph, or the shape 
of an unusual creature like the duckbilled platypus. The 
implication of this view for education in the audio-visual 
field of education is that ordinary pictures should be 
valuable and valid aids in use. If we define "language" as 
Kennedy does as "a complex system of invented rules", 
6 
then on this culturally-based formulation, such pictures 
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are a non-language. Kennedy, in a summary chapter for The 
National Society for the Study of Education in 1974, suggests 
that "educators can expect to make use of pictures with the 
very youngest school children to show objects and scenes". 
By claiming that "learning to see by means of pictures is a 
process resting on the full foundation of everyday perception", 
he can conclude that: 
"Given pictures with a reasonable fidelity to their 
referent, children should have no difficulty". 7 
Kennedy bases his view on a "registration" theory of 
perception, derived from JJ Gibson, under whom he studied 
at Cornell University. "Information" for Gibson is optical 
information. Such information is contained in light rays 
which project from objects or scenes on to our retinas, and 
this information can be shown to be veridical: it gives us 
a true indication of highlights, edges, shadows, corners and 
textures - that is, the basic features of the layout of the 
visual environment. 
If we contrast this with the traditional empirical view of 
perception, we can see that this constitutes a radical 
departure. In that tradition, the stimuli coming to the 
eye - whether described as "sensations" or "sense-data" - 
were always seen as being quite inadequate even for basic 
recognition and these meaningless aggregates needed to be 
put together and verified by the brain - hence it is a 
"constructive" theory. It does not suggest much confidence 
- 44 - 
in visual material. In carrying out this task, the memory 
had to be consulted, so that associations with past 
experience could be built up. A sophisticated version of 
this view has used the construction of the computer as a 
way of thinking about this kind of "information-processing". 
Such a view, however, goes back to the influential works of 
Berkeley. The following passage illustrates the tenor of 
Berkeley's thought, dealing as it does with the apprehension 
of visual space: 
"Not that there is any natural or necessary 
connection between the sensation we perceive by the 
turn of the eyes and greater or less distance. But 
because the mind has, by constant experience, found 
the different sensations corresponding to the 
different dispositions of the eyes to be attended 
each with a different degree of distance in the 
object - there has grown a habitual or customary 
connections between those two sorts of ideas so that 
the mind no sooner perceives the sensation arising 
from the different turn it gives the eyes, in order 
to bring the pupils nearer or further asunder, but 
it withal perceives the different idea of distance 
which was wont to be connected with the sensation. 
Just as, upon hearing a certain sound, the idea is 
immediately suggested to the understanding which 
custom had united with it. " 8 
Berkeley is using a theory of learning by association here, 
and the import of the last sentence is that not only is 
vision learned, it is learned like spoken language. Thus 
it does not arise from optical information, but from habit, 
here muscular habit. In this instance it is connected with 
movement of the eye itself, but for Berkeley it need not be. 
Measuring distance with movements of the body also makes a 
basic connection. 
9 Berkeley then takes language, as some- 
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thing learned by association, to be not just a metaphor, but 
a model for vision. Indeed, the basis for perception is not 
primarily a visual one, but learned habitual association. 
Furthermore, if we see that Berkeley defines verbal language 
as "the arbitrary use of sensible signs", 
10 
we may surmise 
that little credence is given to vision as such in this 
"language" model. 
A present-day illustration of the development of distance by 
an infant is given by Hochberg. As he notes, the empirical 
hypothesis emphasises the kinaesthetic experience of the 
child in learning the idea of distance, for example, in 
reaching for a toy: 
"After many such experiences, it is reasoned, the 
child needs only to glance at. the toy in order to 
recall either the half-bent arm or the fully-extended 
arm when the corresponding size of image falls upon 
his retina. From this viewpoint, the observation 
of distance always rests on the memory image of 
previous kinaesthetic experiences". 11 
Thus according to this theory, distance is not a direct 
visual sensation at all: Berkeley would say that it was a 
"tangible idea" arising primarily, not from vision, but 
from sensations of touch. 
Traditionally in this account, vision itself is closely 
allied to the apprehension of a picture, as Woodworth in 
his once popular text-book states: 
"The stimuli received from the environment are 
spread out in two dimensions on the retina like 
a picture projected upon a screen". 12 
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According to this view, therefore, perception of ordinary 
objects and scenes is not clearly separated from pictorial 
perception; and indeed study of the latter gained impetus 
only in the 1960s. 
A further development of the key features of this theory - 
that perception is not given but constructed, that it is 
learned through experience and habit, and that it is built 
up in large measure from non-visual components - leads to 
the notion that vision is also language-like in being 
subject to convention. In the view of Hayakawa, such 
vision can become a convention-dominated kind of perception: 
"What is true of verbal languages is also true 
of visual 'languages': we match the data from the 
flux of visual experience with image-cliches, with 
stereotypes of one kind or another, according to 
the way we have been taught to see ". 13 
Finally, in the "language theory" of pictures offered by 
Goodman in his consideration of representation, the notion 
of arbitrary convention is prominent: 
"Realism is a matter not of any constant or 
absolute relationship between a picture and its 
object but of a relationship between the system 
of representation employed in the picture and the 
standard system. Most of the time, of course, the 
traditional system is taken as standard; and the 
literal or realistic or naturalistic system of 
representation is simply the customary one". 14 
Goodman thus concludes: 
"Realistic representation, in brief, depends not 
upon imitation or illusion or information but upon 
inculcation. Almost any picture may represent 
almost anything ... " 15 
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Consequently, if "realism is a matter of habit", 
16 
the 
inference is: 
"Realism is relative, determined by the system of 
representation standard for a given culture or 
person at a given time". 17 
Goodman's nominalism puts all the emphasis on the conception 
of an object or scene, and this applies even when a camera 
is used. 
18 His argument for the relativity of vision and 
representation follows from his philosophical view which 
he summarises as: 
" ... the world is as many ways as it can be truly described, seen, pictured, etc, and ... there is 
no such thing as the way the world is". 19 
Despite his addition of the word "truly" in this quotation, 
his view would appear to deny the objectivity of reality, 
and that of its possible representation. 
Such a view is echoed even by an experimental psychologist 
like RL Gregory who, believing that "sensory information is 
so incomplete", 
20 
sees perception as the building and 
testing of "hypothesis". Thus: 
"The brain is in large part a probability computer, 
and our actions are based on the best bet in a given 
situation. The human brain makes efficient use of 
its rather limited sensory information in the same 
kind of way astronomers discover the distance and 
the constitution of the stars by inference". 21 
His view can be seen to correspond to that of Goodman: 
"Given the slenderest clues to the nature of 
surrounding objects we identify them and act 
not so much according to what is directly sensed, 
but to what is believed". 22 
Despite disclaimers about facts being facts, and that it is 
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descriptions which may or may not be fiction, Gregory's 
formulation, with its devaluation of the veridicality of 
the stimulus configuration and with its emphasis on the 
illusions of perception, implicitly attacks the very nature 
of the scientific enterprise itself, a basic assumption of 
which is the objectivity of reality. 
Gregory's theory and emphasis therefore appear to be much 
more apposite to an artistic view of reality as expressed 
in an artwork than to a scientific view, that is, where 
the kind of truth asserted is not objective, but subjective. 
Applied to ordinary scenes and pictures, however, where the 
communication of literal information is paramount, his 
"hypothesis" theory is intriguing but contrary to our 
usual phenomenal experience of using our eyes and recognising 
things. The world does not normally appear to our eyes to 
be a puzzle and a tease, like the illusions which Gregory 
presents as the basis for his view. The model derived from 
Berkeley poses problems of learning which seem insurmountable: 
how, for example, do aggregates of meaningless visual data 
postulated by this model come to have sense at all - unless 
visual means themselves are given greater weight ?A 
partial answer to this problem has already been provided 
by Gibson (see p. 44). 
The theory of perception, evolved by the pragmatic philosopher 
CS Peirce, is also relevant here. As described by Almeder, 
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Peirce links both immediate perception and mental construction: 
"I suggest that, given Peirce's definition of the 
percept as that which we directly perceive in any 
act of perception and given the way in which he 
talks about a percept as a mental construct of 
sensory elements, his apparent vacillation between 
physicalistic and mentalistic descriptions of the 
percept is simply an attempt to emphasize the fact 
that the percept is both a what which is given to 
the perceptual act and a what-as-interpretated in 
the perceptual act". 23 
In this formulation, Peirce makes a clear distinction 
between objects as they appear and as they are in themselves; 
in this respect he can be said to adopt a moderate realist 
line in the tradition of Aristotle, and to oppose a nominalist 
one, as exemplified by Berkeley among many other philosophers 
following the direction taken by Ockham in the late Middle 
Ages. For Peirce the element of purpose in phenomena was 
important, rather than the extension of the operation of 
simple mechanical principles which was a feature of nominalism. 
24 
Knight characterises Peirce's complaints against it thus: 
"Nominalism holds that classes are mere names 
designed for the convenience of referring to 
multitudes. Laws likewise are not mere convenient 
mathematical fictions whose only justification is 
the predictive controls that result from our 
employment of them. Laws are real and operative 
in the world. Realism is a necessary assumption 
of science, and it is the business of philosophy 
to show its truth". 25 
Peirce argued for the existence of physical objects and 
denied the necessity for the introduction of sense-data 
theory thus: 
"It will be recalled that for Peirce if we simply 
have no real doubt about the externality of what 
we perceive, then our belief is perfectly justified 
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as a matter of common sense whose reports are said 
to be 'infallibly true' for the simple reason that 
. in the absence of real doubt they must be accepted 
and are not subject to critical inquiry". 26 
If there was real doubt, then the perceptual judgement would 
be as fallible as any judgement of a matter of fact, and 
would use the method of prediction and confirmation. The 
legitimacy of Peirce's claim cannot be fully demonstrated 
here, but in general, it can be claimed, following Almeder, 
that his view of perception displays no obvious "irremed- 
iable defect". 27 More positively, it provides a bridge in 
philosophy for the divided psychological views - those of 
construction and those of registration. 
Peirce's trichotomy of signs exemplifies this kind of 
reasoning: the index is a link with the world as it really 
is, but it also asks for inference or construction (as 
smoke may indicate fire); the icon involves the notion of 
purpose with its definition as "imputed resemblance't28 (and 
thus bypasses Goodman's strictures on the notion of iconicity 
by resemblance and his ultimately meaningless claim, already 
quoted on page 47, "Almost any picture may represent almost 
anything ... ")29; while the symbol allows 
for the develop- 
ment of concepts beyond the literal meaning. Peirce's 
categories are "ideal" in that they are based on deductive 
logic: most signs have more than one aspect and pragmatic 
"impurity" is the norm. Thus a photograph may both indicate 
a reality which is indeed "there", and is therefore available 
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as scientific evidence, but equally it may go beyond such a 
purpose. 
John Szarkowski, in his collection of photographs from a 
variety of sources, The Photographer's Eye, argues that 
"the study of photographic form must consider the medium's 
'fine art' tradition and its 'functional' tradition as 
intimately interdependent aspects of a single history" . 
30 
The photograph, "Leopard Lurking in Tree, India, 1954-55". 
by Ylla, exemplifies this. 
31 
It is at once a record of 
the leopard's camouflage and an evocation of the creature's 
tense power. This response occurs as we, not immediately, 
but gradually discern the animal crouching on the branch of 
a tree amid the dappled light from leaves. We are permitted 
to surmise that it is waiting intently because of a white 
patch of light falling over its face and revealing its 
intent gaze. Szarkowski's eclectic approach and sentiments 
are echoed in Chris Steele-Perkin's introduction to the 
Arts Council's collection, About 70 Photographs: 
"Indeed it is precisely the inter-relationship 
between the functional and the artistic traditions 
in photography that makes it such a vital and potent 
medium". 32 
He notes that the initial motivations of photographers such 
as Muybridge, Atget, Lartigue, Jacob Riis and Weegee were 
various: scientific research, documentary illustration and 
social reform, for example. Thus, from a denotative base, 
photography is able to serve a rich variety of communication 
purposes, and in effect can be aesthetically expressive and 
evocative. 
- 52 - 
This denotation, however, has not yet been fully examined, 
and we need to consider it further in the light of Gibson's 
intervention in traditional empirical theory. 
We have already observed that the basis of Gibson's divorce 
from traditional empiricism was his conviction that the 
environment was capable of providing faithful information 
to the eyes and brain by means of light rays reflected from 
objects and scenes. A second basic concern of Gibson's was 
the environment itself, rather than clinical situations, as 
the basis for a psychological theory of perception and of 
pictorial perception. In his early formulations, Gibson 
did not, as in traditional empirical theory, radically 
distinguish ordinary perception from pictorial perception, 
but as his notions of environmental or ecological optics 
developed, so did his view of the necessary separateness of 
the perception of pictures. Whether he did not go too far 
in making this cleavage is, however, a matter for discussion: 
his former research student, Kennedy, for example, although 
he follows Gibson in the importance of optical information, 
does not make such a strong demarcation as his one-time 
mentor. This has important implications for the veridicality 
of pictures: at the beginning of this chapter I summarised 
Kennedy's conclusions and quoted his view that "learning to 
see by means of pictures is a process resting on the full 
foundation of everyday perception". 
33 
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The starting-point for Gibson's optical and environmental 
approach grew out of his work during World War Il'with pilot 
trainees, who were confronted with such tasks as identifying 
aircraft or landing planes, not only on ordinary runways but 
also on the flight-decks of aircraft carriers, while moving 
at high speed. 
' 34 
In this latter case of landing, the 
ability to examine correctly the layout and texture of the 
"ground" was an important skill, indeed often a life-or- 
death one: the accident rate on aircraft carrier landings 
was notoriously high. This was also the background to 
Gibson's "ground" theory of perception, where textural 
patterns were important evidence for the perception of 
distance. 
His views on pictorial perception were first systematically 
set out in 1954, and were an important influence in the 
audio-visual field. 
35 His article, "A Theory of Pictorial 
Perception", was regarded by Kenneth Norburg in 1966 as 
"still a landmark in the field"; 
36 however, this was also 
the year when his major book, The Senses Considered as 
Perceptual Systems, appeared in America and showed consid- 
erable modification of his original position, and one less 
congenial to the audio-visual tradition with its emphasis 
on simple information-giving. In 1954, Gibson's concept of 
education is that of training and instruction: 
"Learning requires not only that we make the 
appropriate reactions but also that we be sensitive 
to the appropriate stimuli. An important aspect of 
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education, or of any kind of special training, 
military, industrial, or professional, is an 
increasing ability to discriminate and identify 
things". 37 
His purpose in using pictures thus arose because of this need 
to become acquainted with objects, terrains, places and 
events which had not yet been previously encountered. His 
concern was that "surrogates", or reality-substitutes (which 
for him then covered words and models as well as pictures) 
were adequate. He proposed therefore a measure of "fidelity", 
which he defined as follows: 
"A faithful picture is a delimited physical surface 
processed in such a way that it reflects (or transmits) 
a sheaf of light-rays to a given point which is the 
same as would be the sheaf of rays from the original 
to that point". 38 
As he notes, this is the equivalent to saying that "a 
picture may be considered as a geometrical projection, and 
that the relation of a picture to its original is given by 
a polar projection of a three-dimensional solid on a plane". 
39 
Thus with this formulation Gibson is aligning himself with 
the tradition of Renaissance perspective as developed by 
Alberti and Leonardo da Vinci. 
As a criterion for the "fidelity" of a picture, Gibson 
proposed a correspondence of points-of-colour. Indeed, in 
looking at the approximation of pictorial perception to 
direct perception, Gibson had experimented with the kinds 
of media and conditions suitable for "trompe l'oeil": he 
had arranged that a picture and the original scene repres- 
ented (for example, a room or corridor) be viewed success- 
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ively, from a single aperture, with the possibility that 
the observer would be unable to distinguish one from the 
other.. In his article he concludes that "the picture most 
likely to yield success in this experiment is probably a 
large photographic color-transparency". (He adds, however, 
"if the original scene involved movement, it would have to 
40 
be a motion picture"). 
This latter criterion of points-of-colour "fidelity" was 
soon to be modified. The weakness in such a formulation was 
that the implied definition of "fidelity" could not disting- 
uish a naturalistic painting or photograph from a caricature 
drawing. As Gibson saw, but regarded as subsidiary in 
1954: 
"There is evidence to suggest, however, that a 
distortion which exaggerates some unique or 
characteristic feature of an airplane relative 
to all the others may lead to an improved 
identification of it". (His emphases) 41 
Kennedy, faced with the same difficulty, substitutes "features 
of objects" for points-of-colour. 
42 While retaining the 
projective concept for some kinds of displays, Kennedy moves 
towards Gestalt theory and its principles of wholeness 
preceding parts and inter-relationship of parts. Thus: 
"Pictures are not simply individual lines but 
whole groups of components, and the overall pattern 
must be considered as much as any one line ... It is the feature in relation to other features that 
matters, not the single isolated component". 
In shifting his attention to features of objects, Kennedy 
comes to concentrate his interest on line and contour as 
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signifying correspondences to key components of objects and 
scenes. Thus while dealing with photographs in the general 
discussion on ordinary pictures, his main concern is seen 
to be that of line drawing. 
Gibson does not take up Gestalt notions so strongly and it 
is curious that this is so. 
To combine the idea of rich optical information with the 
assumptions of Gestalt theory is not prima facie untenable. 
Gestalt theory was of course the early major twentieth 
century challenge to sense-data theory. Unfortunately, this 
tradition, particularly influential in the interwar period, 
supported its conception of "laws of organisation" with 
reference to the assumed presence of electrical fields in 
the brain, these fields copying the form of perceived 
objects. This formulation of "isomorphism", however, came 
under suspicion when experiments set up by empirical resear- 
chers yielded negative results. Sperry, writing in 1958, 
comments: 
"One can find little justification in the results 
of investigations for continuing to approach the 
problems of cerebral function in terms of 
electrical field theory as it is currently 
formulated". 44 
However, Pastore in his summary of theories of perception, 
regards this issue of isomorphism as still open, and con- 
eludes, "It is not yet known whether the various arguments 
are decisive". 
45 
Haber and Hershenson judge thus: 
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"The neurological model has fallen by the 
wayside, but (the Gestalt psychologists') guiding 
principles are still important to our understanding 
of form perception". 46 
In his book on pattern recognition, Corcoran in 1971 noted, 
"It is now generally accepted that much of the Gestalt 
descriptive doctrine is true". 
47 Kennedy, in an apprec- 
iation of Arnheim's Gestalt phenomenology, surmises that 
Arnheim, now the most influential writer in the Gestalt 
tradition, never took the concept of physiological "forces" 
literally: 
"The concept would be pressed into service when 
Arnheim wanted to give his more mechanistically- 
minded readers aspects of physics to use as a handle 
to grasp what he was talking about ... " 
48 
Finally, Arnheim says the following in 1974: 
"At which stage of this complex process the 
physiological counterpart of our perceptual 
forces originates, and by what particular 
mechanisms it comes about, is beyond our present 
knowledge ... An observer sees the pushes and 
pulls in visual patterns as genuine properties 
of the perceived objects themselves". 49 
Thus the varying critical fortunes of Gestalt theory may 
account for Gibson's aloofness: its waxing and waning and 
renewal may have made him wary; or perhaps he simply wished 
to pursue his own furrow as far as he could; and he did this 
by developing the notion of "invariants" rather than forms 
or "gestalten" in objects or scenes, and in pictures. 
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B. The development and tenability of Gibson's 
"registration" theory in relation to pictures. 
How then did Gibson come to modify his view of the character 
of pictures ? We have already noted that he developed a 
"ground theory" of visual perception; this was already 
present in his first book on perception: 
"The spatial character of the visual world is 
given not by the objects in it but by the back- 
ground of the objects". 50 
Thus a grassy or ploughed field, for example, in Figure 23 
of the book cited(I11.4), gives "Gradients of Natural Texture 
and the Resulting Impression of Continuous Distance". 51 
Indeed, Goldstein in his appreciation of Gibson, notes: 
"He considered the information provided by texture 
gradients to be superior to the information provided 
by depth cues (such as aerial perspective, inter- 
position, and relative size), because texture 
gradients are precise geometrical correlates of 
physical distance, whereas depth cues are less 
exact". 52 
In developing this theory, Gibson modified the prevailing 
empirical view. In his 1954 article he claims that it is a. 
"serious misunderstanding" that one cannot see three 
dimensions or depth in a picture; that "what one 'sees' is 
a patchwork of flat surface-colours which serve as clues, 
and that then one infers depth in the scene". He claims 
a duality in the optic array: 
"If, however, the man who looks at a picture does 
not give special attention to the surface as such, 
he perceives a three dimensional scene". 53 
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Thus he hypothesises that, because of the elements within 
light rays, "a picture can ordinarily be perceived in two 
different ways, as a surface and as a three-dimensional 
scene". 
54 
Gibson's concern with real-life perception made him realise 
that perception normally involves not a stationary observer, 
such as is the case in clinical experiments, but an active 
one who is moving about the environment and often moving 
his or her head. Thus he came to doubt the kind of fidelity 
available by projection to a unique point which is a 
principle of geometric perspective. As he noted in 1960, 
commenting on the illusion of reality from pictures: 
"The optic stimulus provided by an ordinary picture 
may be indistinguishable from that provided by the 
scene represented, when the latter is viewed with 
one eye through a window. The viewer is transported 
to the scene in question. But at best the perception 
aroused fails in three respects to be lifelike. 
First, the viewer cannot look around the scene. 
Second, he cannot move around in the scene nor can 
he observe anything moving in it. Third, he cannot 
obtain the binocular parallex resulting from the use 
of both eyes. The illusion of reality is incomplete". 55 
In this passage Gibson emphasis the gap between an "ordinary 
picture" and the scene it represents; whereas in 1954 he 
was prepared to minimise those differences noted above. 
With his increasing interest in "ecological" or environmental 
optics rather than the geometrical optics of the fixed 
stationary point, the starting point has shifted. In his 
1954 paper he was concerned with the photograph (along with 
other pictures) as a surrogate for a possibly unseen or 
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unexperienced reality; now in his later writings he begins 
with the experience of the moving observer in an environ- 
ment and gives a description of a picture in relation to 
that basis. Gibson says of his 1954 stance: 
"I defined the fidelity of a picture by analogy with 
the fidelity of a sound recording, assuming that 
it could go from a maximum to no fidelity at all". 56 
With his later growing doubts about the validity of a 
theory of point projection, of point-to-point correspondence, 
he looks for a relational or higher-order correspondence; 
but while Kennedy is content to find this in a relational 
structure of rays, Gibson moves towards "a new optics not 
limited to the rays of light". 
57 He now speaks more 
generally of optical information. 
The heart of his new approach is the notion of "invariants". 
Invariants provide the optical information for the perception 
of a scene in the environment. As the flux of movement 
impinges on the retina, higher-order variables are picked 
up, for we are programmed or "attuned" to perform this 
function. Such variables occur over time and are for 
Gibson "lawful": they provide accurate information for 
negotiating or moving round the environment, the basic 
function of vision. Invariants then are such general 
properties of the environment that remain constant when 
the observer moves or when the illumination changes. 
Examples of invariants, (gathered together by Goldstein 
58 
since Gibson's expositions are not always noted for their 
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variety of exemplification), are: texture gradients, straight 
lines, parallel lines, rectilinearityx size, gravity. 
Gibson describes the central portion of his new theory as 
follows: 
"The heart of the theory is the concept of 
optical information. Information consists of 
invariants, in the mathematical sense, of the 
structure of an optic array... The basis of 
this direct perception is not the form sensations, 
or even the remembered sequence of these forms, 
but the formless and timeless invariants that 
specify the distinctive features of the object. 
These are the information for perception". 59 
Because of its peculiar generality, the "invariant" notion 
is a particularly difficult concept to grasp. Gibson's 
new approach, however, is a fresh attempt to deal with the 
old problem of "the constancies" in the visual flux, even 
if its combination of high level abstraction and assertion 
does not suggest any obvious immediate progress. As 
Goldstein comments: 
"The problem is that invariants are so complex that 
it is difficult to know how to go about isolating 
these invariants and then studying them". 60 
He goes on to say that work on investigating invariants has 
recently begun, but adds: 
"... it remains to be seen whether enough empirical 
evidence can be accumulated to support Gibson's 
claim that the pickup of invariants can explain 
the totality of human visual experience". 61 
Yet although Gibson's claims are controversial, Haber and 
Hershenson, in the second edition of 1980 of their text- 
book on visual perception, published in 1980, regard his 
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approach as the main rival to the empirical one, and give 
his theory more prominence than in the first edition of 
1973 62 
In comparing ordinary perception and pictorial perception, 
then, Gibson's new theory suggests a relationship of 
difference rather than of similarity. Gibson, in 1978, for 
example, contrasts his own starting-point for general 
perception as different-from "the central fallacy of the 
picture theory of perception". He argues thus: 
"The showing of drawings is thought to be a good 
way to begin the study of perception, because 
vision is supposed to be simplest when there is 
a form on the retina that is a copy of a form on 
a surface facing the retina. The retinal form is 
then in point-to-point correspondence with the 
drawn form, although inverted. But this is not 
the simplest case of vision. Visual awareness 
of the surroundings cannot be explained on this 
supposition". 63 
With his new approach to perception, Gibson finds such a 
comparison irrelevant. His strongest statement of this 
comes in a letter to "Leonardo": 
"The rays of light coming from a picture and 
the rays coming from the scene pictured should 
never have been compared with one another". 64 
How then does a picture relate to perception, as Gibson now 
describes the general process ? First of all it should be 
noted that Gibson is now as dismissive of a definition of a 
picture as conventional as he is of it in point-to-point 
correspondence with the scene depicted. On the first 
count, he has no truck with a language model: "a picture 
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is not a layout of graphic symbols, like writing" 
65 
His definition of a picture now leaves out (injudiciously 
in my view)the continuum proposed in 1954, of pictures 
spanning a range from those specific to objects by 
projection to those by convention. 
66 
A picture is 
described as "a display of optical information". 
67 
Optical information for Gibson, as we saw, consists of 
his knowledge-providing "invariants": it is a broad term, 
perhaps too broad, encompassing the idea of a structured 
array, "a hierarchy of nested units, not of rays", 
68 
and includes the stimulus energy which excites the retinal 
receptors, like the old "sensations", but coming ready- 
ordered. 
In his new definition of 1971, Gibson intends to cover both 
the photograph and the caricature, the kind of picture 
which led him to revise his definition of 1954: 
"A picture is a surface so treated that a delimited 
optic array to a point of observation is made 
available that contains the same kind of 
information that is found in the ambient optic 
arrays of an ordinary environment". 69 
A consideration of the implications of this definition 
leaves many questions unanswered. Caricatures surely do 
depend on convention, for example in the way a particular 
political figure is judged and recognised as such by a body 
of opinion. Mrs Thatcher, for example, may be drawn as a 
well-permed lady by Emmwood of the "Daily Mail", 
70 
but 
as a witch, with tangled hair, by Gerald Scarfe in "The 
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vie 
"ý.: 
". ýc, ý+. nýt PIE ý" / "; ý ýýýý' i 
qt r S. f. -RNG(K fr'GMkN 0 AS S. l. r(wro o. " `, KaisO MOM 1i w+[E ft.. ntic. 
F+r ºKüiý ftirl. F "w p' fr+uta A S601"twS .'ý 
ýý ý"". 
`R 
KCýill 1% CoYIIMItL'1' MWMAN ., t". _ 
S. Gerald Scarfe, "Economic Pie, " in The Sunday Times, 
6 July, 1980. 
- 66 - 
Sunday Times" 
71 (I11.5). Harold Wilson was often cari- 
catured, not by an particular facial structure, but by the 
Gannex raincoat he wore. 
72 Thus what is regarded as the 
"distinctive features" of a political leader can vary 
according to political affiliation and group or personal 
judgement, they are not "invariant". (Gibson speaks only 
about "distinctive features" as "essential features of the 
face"). 
73 Here processes ofinterpretation become critically 
important. Gibson, trying for a more general definition 
while still ignoring cognitive processes, outreaches himself. 
"Information", other than optical information specifying 
structural layout, is required to handle this kind of 
caricature. We need to bring in the notion of purpose here. 
Invariants to specify distinctive features are not simply 
given in this instance: their selection partly depends upon 
convention: the agreement of a group of people about the 
qualities of a person which have led to the prominence 
given to certain features or garments selected to portray 
the person concerned. 
Ordinary photographs do not pose the same problems as 
caricatures, and indeed Gibson seems not to find much 
difference from reality in the special case of photographs, 
despite his new doctrine which stresses that the invariants 
in a photography will always be less than in ordinary 
perception and despite his acquiescence to Gombrich's 
description of a "radical separation" 
74 between 
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ordinary perception and that of pictures. It seems that 
only a radical separation of starting-point is intended, 
or the impossibility of "trompe l'oeil" with a moving 
observer. Even from a standpoint of ecological optics, 
"invariants" are present in a picture of a scene - some, 
if not all of them. They are in the "frozen array". Thus 
he can say: 
"An informative picture contains the same kind of 
timeless invariants that a sequence of 
perspectives contains. If it does not provide 
the eye with these invariants, it is not a good 
picture of the object (for example, if it is not 
depicted from a favourable point of view)". 75 
Although a good picture need not be in point-to-point 
correspondence with the facing surfaces of an actual concrete 
world, Gibson notes that a photograph is such a projection, 
76 
and therefore can be a good picture from his earlier or later 
point of view. We need not tie ourselves to his anti- 
gestalt, "formless" description then, while linking our- 
selves with the platform of objectivity which he has 
provided. 
Another way of describing Gibson's project, and in his own 
words, is to say that it provides "new reasons for realism". 
77 
He is claiming "sophisticated support for the naive belief 
in the world of objects and events, and for the simple- 
minded conviction that our senses give knowledge of it". 
78 
His theory of information-based perception then accords 
with our everyday experience of generally accurate seeing, 
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particularly as regards basic recognition of objects or 
scenes. It may not be the whole-story, but it is an 
important basis. The burden of his explanation throughout 
changes of opinion has been to refer to what he considers 
the lawful source of information in the environment, its 
light, particularly its structure at the point of observ- 
ation. While this project is in its early stages of research, 
since as Kennedy remarks, "most of the properties that are 
informative remain unknown" 
79 
, the work by Gibson himself 
on texture and texture gradients has been substantial; and 
it can reasonably be claimed that, despite misgivings on 
the range of meaning in the term "invariants", the starting- 
point for his new theory of perception as "the flowing 
" picture that results from locomotion" 
80 
rather than the 
still picture, is not unsoundly based. We need not think 
of it, however, as superseding the other starting-point or 
its usefulness. 
81 
But where concentration on the latter 
has a strong tendency to lead to solipsism, Gibson's 
approach validates our commonsense belief in the reality 
of things existing outside of ourselves. 
What then of the accuracy of picture perception ? Gibson, 
with his new concern to demonstrate the veridicality of the 
perception of the observer in motion rather than, as in 
1954,82 the closeness a surrogate such as a photograph 
could approach the reality of a surfaced landscape not 
directly experienced, tends now to leave the latter 
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question unexamin ed and unresolved. There is a strange 
vacillation in his pronouncements. While in 1971 he can 
favourably say that "picturing exploits some of the 
information in the structure of the light", 
83 
he can 
also say in 1978: 
"There is no such thing as a literal represent- 
ation of an earlier optic array. The scene cannot 
be reconstituted. Some of its invariants can be 
preserved but that is all. Even a photograph, a 
color photograph at its technological best, 
cannot preserve all the information at a point 
of observation in a natural environment, for 
that information is unlimited". 84 
Writing in 1967, Gibson uses the language of sense-data 
85 
theory when he admits "ambiguities" in a frozen picture, 
of size, distance, edges and layout. However, he never 
falls back to a arbitrarily conventional "language" 
theory of pictures. 
Gibson, of course, is consistent here in his main purpose, 
the veridicality of motion perception in a natural environ- 
ment, but as we have seen, he can be both negative or 
positive about the accuracy of pictures. Kennedy presents. 
a more positive and pictorially reflexive argument, for 
he notes that the observer can bring back information from 
his knowledge of the natural environment to his observation 
of a picture: 
11 ... pictures can never provide more 
information 
that is present in a frozen array, and hence pictures 
may be ambiguous about pröperties of the environment 
that are specified only across arrays. But it is 
important to note that whatever is invariant across 
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optic arrays is present in the frozen optic 
array. Provided the observer has had an 
opportunity to discover what is typically 
invariant across optic arrays, he may be "tuned" 
to those structural variables and so notice 
them when they are present in a frozen array, 
without their invariance being demonstrated 
each time". 86 
An example of this could be a photograph of an apparently 
still motorcyclist on a racing track whose motion is 
frozen; nevertheless he will be taken as caught in the 
action of moving by such an invariant or feature as the 
angle of his body on the machine, relative to the track. 
We can agree then that pictures will always be less than 
the full scene depicted and experienced, at a literal 
level; but we are still unsure if the invariants present 
are generally enough for the purposes of accurate basic 
recognition. Some important aspects will be missing in a 
photograph, for example, the dimension of time, perhaps 
that of colour, the phenomenon of accretion/deletion of 
texture elements 
87 
which reveal clearly nearer and more 
distant objects. But even with these removed, are we 
usually at a loss to recognise pictorial objects and scenes ? 
Our ordinary experience would say we are not, yet some of 
Gibson's later formulations, which I described as 
"negative" above, would seem to lead to the conclusion 
that the only valid test of the accuracy of a picture 
would be to compare it with the experience of the object 
or scene depicted. To accept this would be to deny the 
authentic qualities and value of the perspective view. 
- 71 - 
Visual aids, if emphasised as inherently ambiguous, could 
lose credibility for their basic function of providing 
information. There is thus the dilemma that, because of 
the paucity of research work on invariants in ordinary as 
compared to pictorial perception, it is not possible to 
confront these difficulties directly on Gibson's own terms 
and overcome them; at the same time it is unsatisfactory to 
leave the problem unanswered. 
The way forward here is to point to scientific evidence 
which supports the position that ordinary pictures are 
perceived without difficulty and to link this with the 
issue of learning. If pictures are like language, in the 
strong sense of "language" as being arbitrarily conventional, 
then it follows that they would require learning. Is this 
the case with straightforward pictures ? Do they need 
specific help in order to be understood at a basic level ? 
One method of examining the problem is to investigate the 
development of young children. Can a young child come to 
understand pictures easily, without direct help ? There 
is strong research evidence here that this is indeed so.. 
A key experiment was made by Hochberg and Brooks in 1962 
using their own child as subject. 
88 Up to the age of two, 
the child was given the least possible exposure to pictures 
by his parents: no picture books were given to him and 
even labels from cans and bottles were removed. No 
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instruction was given to him in the associations between 
words and pictures and he was never told that pictures 
depicted anything. At nineteenth months, when he had 
quite a large vocabulary, he was given picture recognition 
tests. These included both line drawings and photographs. 
The outcome was that the child labelled almost all the 
pictures correctly: he was as accurate in identifying 
familiar objects from the pictures as he was from seeing 
the objects themselves. The authors conclude: 
" ... the complete absence of instruction in the present case ... points to some irreducible 
minimum of native ability in the present case". 89 
Although there has been some disagreement about the inter- 
pretation of this classic study, it can be claimed that 
this does not affect the contention about basic recognition. 
For example, Haber and Hershenson, who incline to a moderate 
empiricist position, argue that the study, while "a powerful 
finding, suggesting that prior experience with pictures is 
not necessary ... does not rule out the possibility that 
object identification in three-dimensional scenes is 
learned". 
90 The authors also describe, in a section on 
"Developmental Evidence for the Dual Reality of Pictures", 
a number of studies which "suggest that young children 
are not as good at perceiving the surface information, 
even at ages when they can perceive the depth information 
in pictures. For young children, then, pictures do not 
have a dual reality, and contain only the reality of a 
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window opening out into space". They add: "The nature of 
this developmental process is not clear from these 
experiments". 
91 Hochberg in his survey notes that 
"almost any sweeping statement made today about the 
relative contributions of nature and nurture is bound to 
be premature and irresponsible". 
92 
He also brings out the 
difficulty of making a clear-cut distinction: 
"It is perfectly possible that perceptual 
learning occurs in very early infancy, and 
resists further modification or relearning; 
at the other extreme, we might be born with 
a full set of perceptual abilities that are, 
although innate, subject to continual change 
and education". 93. 
The question at issue, however, does not depend on the 
weight of relative contributions of nature or nurture. 
Nevertheless, whatever the nature and process of the 
"wiring" of perceptual abilities, whether before or during 
development, a natural capacity to perceive, and to perceive 
accurately, is a reasonable hypothesis, especially if we 
think in evolutionary terms, as Hochberg acknowledges. 
94 
The Hochberg and Brooks finding clearly showed that 
pictorial recognition occurred without direct teaching. 
That it occurred as an advance from three-dimensional 
perception does not affect the fact of the earliness of 
the achievement; and the direction of the advance is 
consistent with Gibson's own stance. Kennedy's summary 
judgement of 1974 therefore still stands: 
"Training may assist the development of pictorial 
skills, but it is not necessary to train children 
or even provide much experience with pictures in 
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order for pictorial skills to emerge". 95 
There remains one area of research work to consider: that 
of cross-cultural perception. From this field have emerged 
strong statements on the conventionality of pictures. 
Indeed Kennedy in 1974 states that "the orthodoxy still 
holds that unsophisticated subjects are puzzled by even 
clear photographs". 
96 
Descriptions such as that given 
by Herskovits of an African woman who had never seen a 
photography before being puzzled by a black and white 
photograph of her own son given credence to this belief: 
"In the instance to which I refer, a Bush 
Negro woman turned a photograph of her son 
this way and that, in attempting to make sense 
out of the shadings of greys on the piece of 
paper she held". 97 
Herskovits comments: 
"To those of us accustomed to the idiom of the 
realism of the photographic lens, the degree of 
conventionalisation that inheres in even the 
clearest, most accurate photograph, is something 
of a shock. For, in truth, even the clearest 
photograph is a convention: a translation of a 
three-dimensional subject into two dimensions, 
with color transmuted into black and white". 98 
In 1966, Segall, Campbell and Herskovits quote this 
instance and conclude: - 
"In a limited sense, one can regard the photograph 
as we use it as an arbitrary linguistic convention 
not shared by all peoples". 99 
This conclusion should, however, be compared with the 
final part of Herskovit's description: 
It was only when the details of the photograph 
were pointed out to her that she was able to perceive 
the subject". 100 
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To account for the Bush woman's puzzlement - and more 
importantly, its clarification --by describing a photograph 
as an arbitrary linguistic convention is surely misleading. 
Such a description implies no real link between the photo- 
graph and its subject-matter beyond that forged by a 
particular culture. - For an adult to learn a new language 
is a long and painstaking process, even when accompanied 
by skilled direct teaching; without it, a stranger to a 
new tongue normally makes little headway. A period of weeks 
at the earliest is required for even the most basic knowledge 
of a foreign language. Yet these implications obviously do 
not apply in this instance. All that was required to ensure 
recognition was a re-deployment of attention to the subject- 
matter. When details were pointed out, these surely 
provided a real link and were not culturally foreign. 
Moreover, the period of misrecognition was brief. If 
learning was required, it was of a minimal kind. The 
puzzlement of the Bush woman can reasonably be explained 
by the novelty of the situation, and the entire unexpect- 
edness of what the new medium is capable of achieving. As 
Hagen and Jones point out in their survey of studies of 
cross-cultural pictorial perception: "it is important to 
note the complete inattention of those subjects to the 
content of the representation while concentrating on the 
101 
medium". 
With regard to the claim that "it is a convention that 
coloured objects be represented by a series of greys", 
102 
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a traveller's report such as that by Lloyd shows spontaneous 
and physically active responses, and no obvious time lag in 
recognition. The pictures were transparencies which, 
considering the time of writing (1904), must have been in 
black and white. 
"When all the people were quickly seated, the 
first picture flashed on the sheet was that of 
an elephant. The wildest excitement immediately 
prevailed, many of the people jumping up and 
shouting, fearing the beast must be alive, while 
those nearest to the sheet sprang up and fled. 
The chief himself crept stealthily forward and 
peeped behind the sheet to see if the animal 
had a body, and when he discovered that'the 
animal's body was only the thickness of the sheet, 
a great roar broke the stillness of the night". 103 
Here the subject of the photograph had sufficient "presence" 
as to be overwhelming to many. At the same time, the 
chief presumably noticed information for flatness in the 
picture, a more sophisticated development. But "a series 
of greys" certainly did not interfere with content- 
perception here. 
Finally, a study carried out with two different Nigerian 
peoples, one of whom had an "imageless" culture, gave like 
results so far as identification of men and animals in 
photographs was concerned: no trouble was experienced. 
Kennedy notes: 
"Where the people differed was in terms of 
interpretative comments - for example, how 
the subject might have come to be where he was 
shown to be, or what he might be intending to do". 104 
Hagen and Jones, in summarising the evidence on black and 
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white photograph work, find that naive people have no 
difficulty in recognising depiction in such photographs, 
and they add: 
"It seems that black and white transformation 
is very simple to learn and that there is 
sufficient information remaining in the pictures 
from edges, textures, and shadows to support 
perception". 105 
The cross-cultural evidence then does not support a position 
which holds that photographs, even those in black and white, 
are like verbal language in being arbitrarily conventional, 
with the implication that they require to be learned at 
length - at least for the purposes of basic recognition 
of objects. Indeed, Hagen and Jones point out that photo- 
graphs have not often been used by researchers106 because, 
as Deregowski says, "they approximate to reality so 
closely". 
107 Much of the cross-cultural work has been with 
line drawings, particularly since the work of Hudson in 
1960108. Yet these line drawings have been poorly constr- 
ucted; and Hagen and Jones comment witheringly in their 
section on "Pictorial Depth Perception" that: 
"We will start with geometrically inaccurate 
minimal sketches and effectively end with them". 109 
Perhaps belief in the potential accuracy of photographs 
which aim at imparting information has suffered as a result 
of this kind of unreliable research. Haber and Hershenson 
concede this criticism of the unreliability of the Hudson 
and Hudson-type drawings when they conclude: 
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"Until we have better data, it is difficult to 
interpret any of the reported research as 
supportive of a learned component of picture 
perception". 110 
So far we have dealt mainly with the basic recognition of 
objects and used research and other evidence to minimise 
doubts raised about the potential accuracy of photographic 
material, its ability to furnish reliable information about 
the material it records. A photograph may be less than 
what it records, yet be unambiguous in providing basic 
information. Berkeley's classic argument of projective 
ambiguity, that distance is presented two-dimensionally 
only as a point, then needs to be re-formulated. Hagen and 
Jones raise this problem of a picture being a single static 
view from a station point and therefore possibly ambiguous. 
Refurbishing Gibson's "hi-fi" concept of 1954 in the light 
of later research, they argue that a scene which contains 
full colour, texture, shadow and edge information provides 
unequivocable information perceptually, if not logically or 
geometrically. If two common objects and a ground are 
shown, either 1) these things are seen, 2) a picture of 
them is seen, or 3) there can be a real scene so unlikely 
to occur in nature or by man's hand that it would never 
occur to the ordinary observer. 
111 Gombrich, in discussing 
this issue, cites the example of a straightforward photo- 
graph of the lecture hall of the Royal Society, which 
"could also be taken to represent a very unusual and 
inconvenient space, one in which the floor is slanting 
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upwards towards the dais, while the real chairs diminish 
in size so that only children could use the front row". 112 
The possibility of deception is there, but as can be 
deduced from such an example, particularly unusual and 
unfamiliar constructions would have to be employed. This 
is also the case with the famous Ames room. 
If we consider well-known "authentic" pictures of such 
disputed phenomena as the Loch Ness monster, we can see 
that they are chiefly silhouettes, and therefore do not 
contain full textural information, a situation which can 
give rise to ambiguity in not distinguishing figure from 
ground, or monster from wave configuration. Nevertheless, 
a close examination of the photographic evidence here on 
the principles suggested by Hagen and Jones would be a most 
valuable project: as they note, "Many pictures are modified 
or impoverished in a variety of ways ... the question of 
perceptual equivalence must be explored empirically"; 
113 
likewise, "A carefully constructed informational analysis 
114 
can teach us a great deal". 
Lacking such research, we can still 
a lack of precision and clarity can 
didactic photographic material. In 
aids", the common purpose is the co 
ationally unambiguous material, yet 
cases of inadvertent indeterminacy. 
point to examples where 
enter informationally 
this field of "visual 
nmunication of inform- 
there can still be 
An obvious example 
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is that of the close-up photograph which shows a creature 
whose size is unknown to the likely viewer, and indications 
for this are beyond the frame. However, once attention is 
drawn to this lack at the production stage, an object for 
scaling can be included, or at the viewing end, a textual 
note on size can be added. The placing of a common coin 
next to a photograph of a cancer crab is one solution to 
this problem of size indication; as a book from the United 
States Department of Audiovisual Instruction points out in 
connection with this example: 
"Every picture should contain at least one 
object so familiar to the viewer that it serves 
as a means for judging the size or purpose of 
unfamiliar objects. A human figure standing 
beside an architectural pillar helps in estimating 
the approximate dimensions of the pillar. The 
human hand which holds a sea shell serves as a key 
to the shell's actual size. This method is a 
greater aid to comprehension than a note such as 
'1/25th actual size', where full understanding 
requires a maturity of judgement and a background 
of experience not possessed by all school-age 
students. Items pictured by themselves often 
make comprehension difficult for the viewer. 
Bagpipes, a mortar-board, a stethoscope, or a 
pair of stilts, for example, should be shown 
in use". 115 
The latter part of this quotation, in referring to objects 
in use, also brings out the value of referral to possible 
previous experience of the viewer in aiding recognition and 
learning. Thus the Gibsonian approach to perception can 
usefully be supplemented by its rival in considering 
educational practice. 
A more complex instance of the recognition problem is that 
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of a recent photograph of the terrain of Mars, discussed by 
Gombrich. 
110 In one aspect, that of colour, accuracy of 
rendering could be checked against the colour calibration 
chart with the camera on Mars and colour values worked out. 
Thus, despite the immense distance of 212 million miles 
and a chain of mediating machines between the origin of 
light and the final picture, it could be confidently 
stated, when conversions were checked, that the sky on 
Mars was pinkish blue. However, the size of the boulders 
and ridges in the photograph are more difficult to assess. 
Here Berkeley's theory of space perception intrudes once 
more: as summarised by Hochberg, given a fixed monocular 
station point: "The same proximal stimulus pattern can be 
produced at the eye by an infinite number of different 
three-dimensional arrangements". 
117 However, while this 
multivalency is theoretically possible, and seems convincing 
in an isolated diagram such as Hochberg provides with the 
classic argument, in practice a context provides a circum- 
ference and other accurate information to counteract the 
tendency to ambiguity. I have argued, on the lines of 
Hagen and Jones, that in practice possible ambiguity can 
be anticipated and overcome, and one such way of doing 
this, in general terms, is the provision of an adequate 
context. With greater knowledge of the key determinants 
of basic recognition, this procedure should become more 
precise. In practice, in this planet, we have access to 
known determinants such as known or familiar size. This 
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is not the case with the landscape of Mars, or rather, not 
completely the case, since we recognise rocks of various 
shapes and what appears to be barren earth. But what of 
these rocks ? We have no sure knowledge of their size, 
it would seem. So Gombrich argues, but he adds a proviso, 
"unless we know their distance". 
118 A key piece of addit- 
ional information is thus required: the distance the camera 
was from one of the prominent stones when the picture was 
taken. Yet surely such information could be provided: a 
camera equipped with radar synchronised to the exposure 
mechanism would be able to furnish the data; and this, 
with the known knowledge of the covering angle of the lens, 
should be enough to specify the size of a particular stone. 
Such information is obviously important in the exploration 
of other planets. Thus the use of cameras, or camera-like 
objects, will no doubt act as a spur to further research 
into the accuracy of photographs, with terrains very 
different from those originally explored by Gibson, and 
with potentially useful "spin-offs" for audio-visual 
education. 
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C. The passage from nature to convention: Peirce and 
Neisser; with some implications for education. 
We have therefore upheld the functional accuracy of photo- 
graphs in conveying basic information for the recognition 
of objects, making use of Gibson's theory of perception - 
despite the counter-claim that photographs, like pictures, 
appear unproblematical only through habit and are convent- 
ional in an arbitrary manner, thus requiring to be learned 
like a language. However, it is not intended to argue that 
convention does not enter into photographs at all; rather, 
the issue now is at what point convention of a kind does 
so - beyond basic recognition. 
There is even the occasion for a slight disagreement here 
with Hagen and Jones, whose general position we have noted 
with approval. They agree with Herskovits, cited on Page 75, 
that a black and white photograph is a conventional trans- 
formation, and only grudgingly admits that a case can be 
made from "gray winter days, snowy landscapes, and twilight", 
119 
More could surely be made of the division of the light 
receptors in ordinary perception into rods and cones, with 
only the latter specialising in colour, so that the former 
is able to contribute to acts of recognition in terms of 
outlines and spatial layout, picked out on a grey scale. 
The case can also be argued by asking why a negative picture 
is not so easily understood as a positive. Gombrich, the 
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champion of convention in Art and-Illusion who has modified 
his views to take account of Gibson's objective realism, 
puts it this way: 
"It is quite true that we do not normally see 
our fellow creatures in black and white, and so 
the notation of greys looks superficially very much 
like a mapping device. But need it therefore be 
arbitrary ? Should we not rather ask how quickly 
we can pick up this code and adjust to its 
notation ? 
In any case if it were just a conventional notation 
the inventors pf photography would not have evolved 
the process of turning a negative into a positive. 
It is most unlikely that it is merely our habit- 
uation which makes it easier for us to read the 
latter". 121 
Gombrich pursues his point in examining the negative of a 
girl's portrait. He notes that, in looking at her eyes, 
his "immediate reactions are engaged" as a layman in their 
perception, and that, as a result: 
"I misinterpreted the direction of the girl's 
gaze on the negative where the highlights, of 
course, appear black while the black pupils 
appear white and elicit the false response". 122 
A positive black and white print then can be directly 
recognised, while a negative requires specific learning. 
Thus we can appreciate the skill of a "grader" in a film 
laboratory, in deciphering a film negative - though even 
here the outlines are not arbitrary marks, but are corre- 
lated through light rays to their referent. To conclude: 
even if there is some disagreement with Hagen and Jones on 
the role of convention within a black and white photograph, 
we must agree with these authors that "the adoption of 
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Western 'snapshot'art as a custom may be regarded as a 
choice of convention by a particular culture. But it does 
not follow that the components of such an art style are 
therefore conventional". 
23 Thus we can endorse the main 
components of their claim, only differing in arguing for a 
slightly wider area of the natural than the authors do: 
"Superposition, linear perspective, shading, and 
texture are not conventions. They are present in 
the ambient optic array of the ordinary environ- 
ment; they are present on the retina; they are 
present on the film plane of a pinhole camera. 
They are present by virtue of optical, logical 
and geometric necessity, and not by virtue of 
arbitrary custom" . 124 
This having been claimed, Hagen and Jones proceed to 
discuss the use of what they term conventional symbols, 
which they argue have a different status from ordinary 
environmental information and which they claim other 
researchers have not differentiated. Thus "the truncation 
of objects by bordering" and "implied motion" (through 
marks in drawing, though the use of "blur" in photography 
is similar) are given as examples of such symbols which are 
not separated in picture tests fromc&ponents such as linear 
125' 
and aerial perspective. Hagen and Jones conclude: 
,, It is quite obvious from this whole line of 
work that more careful attention to the various 
classes of pictorial components is critical not 
only to forwarding understanding of pictorial 
perception but also to successful utilisation 
of pictorial materials as didactic aids. System- 
atic variation of concentional components will 
allow us to specify more precisely their origin, 
nature, degree of universality, and conditions 
of interpretability". 126 
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Design and procedure in research in this cross-cultural 
field thus are given a more solid starting-point than 
before-as a consequence of Hagen and Jones' criticial 
review. Of the important problems defined by them, the 
one they regard as perhaps of greatest importance is: 
"How do we trace the continuous modification of information 
into convention ? "i27 We may not be able to answer this 
as yet, but to pose the question in this way is a very 
useful step forward. 
In considering perception and convention we have focused on 
a particular kind of picture, or a particular aspect of one. 
We have been concerned with the basic task of pictorial 
recognition, regarding this as a fundamental function, and 
the purpose of pictures has been considered in the light of 
this task. As a consequence the pictures examined have been 
generally straightforward, and discussion has centred round 
the issue of whether we can indeed reassure ourselves that 
they can be accurate and endorse one commonsense view that 
the objects depicted can be recognised for what they are, 
with only minimal help if need be. Such a view would also 
oppose a strong body of academic opinion, noted by Kennedy, 
that pictures are like verbal language first and foremost 
and "are necessarily conventional, tied to the culture that 
produces them by strong and quite arbitrary canons of 
depiction. (I find most of my students hold this view when 
128 
they first come to my courses)". 
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When we come to consider convention in pictures, however, 
we are moving to more sophisticated examples (a very complex 
level being, for example, mediaeval iconography). It is 
not proposed to maintain a simplistic position, or one 
suitable only for denotative purposes - rather a synthetic 
one, but one which recognises particularly the veridical 
qualities recorded by the photograph, and then gives due 
weight to convention of a kind. 
At this point it will be useful to invoke the philosopher 
CS Peirce again and bring in his tripartite division of 
signs: the icon, the index and the symbol. Peirce's 
categories are not sealed off from one another, we should 
remind ourselves; in practice, that is, as opposed to 
their ideal status. A referent is rarely a pure example 
of a single aspect, but rather one of mixed categories, 
with one or more in dominance, according to how it is 
viewed. Photographs, such as the one considered of Mars, 
have been examined for their documentary aspects, which 
include the indexical - their factual connections - and 
the iconic - or imputed resemblances - to the real. Had 
the Mars photograph been similar, however, to the well- 
known one of the first American landing on the moon, which 
showed aUS astronaut planting the American flag on moon 
soil, a more complex response than the factual could readily 
have asserted itself. A photograph from "Picture Post", 
therein entitled "Two Nations", (111.6), is an interesting 
example of how a basically documentary photograph can 
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6. "Two Nations, " 1941, in Picture 
Post 1938-50, p. 90. 
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change in aspect according to how it is viewed and exemplify 
in turn_a dominance in each of Peirce's divisons. If seen 
by the boys themselves, it could have been seen only for 
the pleasure of recognising themselves and thus it would 
fulfil primarily an iconic function. If the scene was 
taken by a viewer as one where transport was expected 
(outside Lords cricket ground, according to another 
caption) 
129 because of the presence of suitcases and the 
waiting schoolboys, then the viewer would be making an 
indexical connection. Finally, the viewer who saw the 
two groups of boys as representing the educational divide 
in England would regard the photograph primarily for its 
symbolic value, its capacity for vivid abstraction and 
generalisation in a concrete form. 
With this sign division in mind and the potential movement 
from one to the other, we can note that there can be progress 
in photographs to the symbolic - the preserve normally of 
verbal language - from that of the iconic-indexical. A 
photograph can begin as a factual recording and become a 
symbolic statement. 
If we take such an example of-a black and white documentary 
photograph. which on one level we have claimed as a surro- 
gate of the real, we can now concede that it may contain 
"conventional" or symbolic elements without conceding it 
as simply conventional. One advantage of the Peircean 
trichotomy is that it enables us to bypass the dualism 
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of thinking of a picture as either conventional or natural. 
It will be useful now to reconsider the possible convent- 
ional elements in an ordinary black and white print. In 
a general scene on orthochromatic film before the advent 
of panchromatic emulsions, the sky would usually be rendered 
as an overall white, through the early emulsion's over- 
sensitivity to blue. Such an "unnatural" recording had to 
be overlooked if it was not critical, and even come to 
stand for the sky in a conventional manner, especially if 
cloud detail had been "burnt out". At the same time, 
the sky's place in the photograph would in no way be 
arbitrary, even if detail within the sky were lacking. 
From a denotative standpoint, it would be lacking in 
information, but not necessarily critical information. 
But what if the sky itself was the subject ? This would 
not necessarily be a problem. The exposure would have to 
be adjusted to the blue/green sensitivity of the emulsion 
for a correct tonal rendering to be obtained. 
Yet the presence of blank sky, its "non-natural" quality, 
did grow more pronouncedly conventional in aspect as time 
passed. When panchromatic films became common, the 
presence of "blank sky" could be an indication of an "old" 
photograph. It is a striking feature now of the turn-of- 
the century snapshots reproduced in Camera: A Victorian 
Eyewitness. 
130 Today, with the colour print being the 
norm in snapshots, black and white itself can signify a 
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7. Brick advertisement, Observer Magazine, 1981. 
8. Radio Times cover, 22-28 Mar. 1980. 
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time dimension; and in magazine illustration and advertising, 
-__this conventional aspect of a photograph may 
be given 
prominence and become its dominant aspect. 
Thus in an advertisement for brick, (I11.7), a colour photo- 
graph of a family outside a suburban semi-detached house 
has inset a small black and white photograph of the house, 
presumably when it was first up for sale. This latter photo- 
graph gives a general. idea of age, made more specific by 
the thirties car included in it, and confirmed by the 
caption "BRICK-BUILT TO LAST, 1930x. STILL LASTING 
BEAUTIFULLY 6 FAMILIES LATER". 
To go further back in time, a sepia-toned photograph can be 
used to signify the Victorian period, as in the Radio Times 
cover contrasting winners and losers of the FA Cup in 1981 
and 1872,131 one example among many of this kind of use. 
Such a common practice may develop a stage further in 
convention towards arbitrariness, as in another Radio Times 
cover (I11.8). Here the three sepia-toned portraits are of 
actresses playing Victorian women accused of murder. The 
portraits now are arbitrary in the sense that the women 
in question could have been played by other actresses, 
and the use of sepia is here a deliberate choice to suggest 
Victorian times. 
Finally, an example of change of use from icon-index to 
symbol in a Sunday Times Magazine cover (I11.9). A miscell- 
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9. The Sunday Times Magazine cover, 14 Sept. 1980. 
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aneous group of 40 or so snapshot portraits of British air- 
men are casually arranged over the cover page. Singly we 
surmise they would simply be used for personal memory 
purposes; collectively they represent the Battle of Britain 
heroes of 1940, and this is confirmed by the RAF colours in 
the bottom right corner and the statement: "Killed in 
Action July-October, 1940". Something of the imagined 
spirit of that time is conveyed: casualness, cheerfulness, 
determination. The cover is at once iconic, indexical and 
symbolic: it gains from its authenticity, it encourages 
reflection on its factual. connection and it makes a complete 
general statement about a period that British Society 
collectively looks back on for presenting positive values 
in a time of extreme crisis, while it summarises a collective 
feeling about "face" in a time of national danger. 
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From the foregoing account of particular photographs and 
the specific features they contain, it is evident that 
we need now to go beyond the limits of Gibson's theory 
and Kennedy's denotative concerns. 
Gibson's limits are in a large measure self-imposed: he has 
focused on the need to discover and describe the kinds of 
information presented by the light in the environment, and 
has eschewed the examination of processes in the mind or 
brain. However, if we want to take these into account, 
and in the last few pages such processes - of inference, 
implication, abstraction and generalisation - have been 
demonstrated as a necessary part of the interpretation of 
quite complex photographs, do we have to return simply to 
the successors of Berkeley, the "information-processing" 
theorists of perception ? Do we find ourselves stranded, 
lost between concepts of information pickup and information 
processing ? Not only that, are we rendered immobile, so 
that we cannot move to an adequate account of the higher 
mental powers or make contact with social forces ? 
Fortunately, Gibson's colleague at Cornell, Ulric Neisser,. 
has formed a new comprehensive theory which provides a 
bridge between the two positions, and is set out in his 
usefully-entitled Cognition and Reality, published in 1976. 
Neisser did not begin as a supporter of Gibson; rather he 
developed his views through the study of cognitive function. 
However, he became critical of developments in this field 
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which he notes have "been disappointingly narrow, focusing 
inward on the analysis of specific experimental situations 
rather than outward toward the world beyond the laboratory". 13 
Attracted to the environmental position of Gibson, he notes: 
"The most important thrust of the theory is to suggest 
that students of perception should develop new and 
richer descriptions of the stimulus information, 
rather than ever-subtler hypotheses about mental 
mechanisms". 133 
At the same time, Neisser is also aware of the inadequacy 
of Gibson's position, "if only because it says so little 
about the perceiver's contribution to the perceptual act' . 
134 
Neisser takes the view that Gibson's work needs to be 
complemented by an understanding of cognitive structures 
and processes rather than simply structures derived from 
the environment. 
Neisser's notion of cognitive structure is embodied in the 
concept of the schema, which is at the heart of his 
proposed description of perception. The schema does not 
simply enable us to process information received, it also 
anticipates what may be received. Neisser himself argues 
as follows: 
"In my view, the cognitive structures crucial for 
vision are the anticipatory schema that prepare 
the perceiver to accept certain kinds of inform- 
ation rather than others and thus control the 
activity of looking. Because we can see only what 
we know how to look for, it is these schemata 
(together with the information actually available) 
that determine what will be perceived". 135 
This view differs from the linear model - and is similar 
to Gibson - in being based on information rather than 
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buffeting stimuli. Furthermore, the information-processing 
model relies on the memory of prevjous experience, a process 
which could lead logically to a dead end if there was no 
first recognisable experience, and which also could lead, 
in its extreme form, to solipsism, with "the perceiver 
lost in his own perceiving system", 
136 
Neisser's cyclic model (I11.10) avoids this trap with the 
idea of a schema which both modifies available information 
and directs attention to further exploration which samples 
an aspect of the object or scene in view, as shown in the 
diagram, Figure 1. 
Again, Neisser avoids reducing perception from "the active 
looking of everyday life" to that of "the restricted gaze 
of a subject who holds his head and eyes as still as 
possible"; he does not make his starting-point "a static 
and uncomplicated retinal image". 
137 Yet Neisser recog- 
nises the advances made by information-processing approaches 
on particular mechanisms in the visual system which detect 
pertinent features, 
138 information on which in the form 
of neural messages is then passed on to higher stages of - 
the brain, (where it is compared with previous experiences 
in a series of processes, according to Figure 2). He 
agrees that: 
"Neural systems that respond selectively to 
orientations, curves, colors, and movements have 
been identified by electrophysiological methods". 139 
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Nevertheless, Neisser finds difficulties in this model: 
"Particular problems arise in connection with 
selection, unit formation, meaning, coherence, 
veridicality, and perceptual development. How 
does it happen that different people notice 
different aspects of the same real situation ? ... Why do we often seem to perceive the meaning of 
events rather than their detectable surface features ? 
How are successive glances at the same scene 
'integrated' ? ... How is it that babies perceive 
objects from the very first, as they apparently do ? 
... What happens 
in perceptual learning ?" 140 
Neisser proposed a theory of cognitive structures within 
the perceptual act seen as a cyclical rather than a linear 
process: the viewer acts on the world and it acts on him. 
In his model, Neisser can begin with the action of the 
perceiver in the sense that he postulates innate structures 
or schemata ready to modify or anticipate events, even if 
these are initially of a rudimentary kind: 
"There can never have been a time when we were 
altogether without schemata. The newborn infant 
opens his eyes onto a world that is infinitely 
rich in information: he has to be ready for some 
of it if he is to engage in the perceptual cycle 
and become ready for more". 141 
His model provides for progress in perception through self- 
help and self-direction, and in this way perception is 
learned, though not necessarily formally taught. A baby 
gradually develops an ability to orientate sounds more 
easily, for example, as his schemata become more articulated: 
"The development of the schema is therefore from 
the general to the particular, from undifferent- 
iated to precise. But although this is the course 
of cognitive growth for schemata, it is not what 
happens to the perceptual acts themselves. The 
perceptual cycle is concrete and specific from 
the beginning. The baby's head movement toward 
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the sound source is perfectly definite, albeit 
slow, because a single definite source really 
exists. Perception is always an interaction 
between a particular object or event and a more 
general schema. It can be regarded as a process 
of generalising the object or of particularising 
the schema depending on one's theoretical 
inclinations". 142 
Arnheim, as a Gestaltist, is probably the theorist whom 
Neisser had in mind. Neisser's formulation is compatible 
with Arnheim here, but it is useful to note that his model 
goes beyond the Gestalt notions of spontaneous organisation 
and the principle that the whole is prior to the parts. 
Neisser regards the perception of the total pattern as 
important, but he sees it as only part of the perceptual 
cycle. He proposes the terms "preattentive processes" and 
"focal attention", (taken from Schachtel), as a means of 
accommodating both the Gestalt wholistic view and the 
analysis of particular features in a limited region of the 
field. As Neisser notes: 
"Since the processes of focal attention cannot 
operate on the whole field simultaneously, they 
can come into play only after preliminary 
operations have already segregated the figural units 
involved ... The requirements of 
this task mean 
that the preattentive processes must be genuinely 
'global' and 'wholistic'. Each figure or object 
must be separated from the others in its entirety, 
as a potential framework for the subsequent and 
more detailed analyses of attention". 143 
Hochberg evolved a theory of perception rather similar to, 
though independent of, Neisser, and Hochberg uses a 
"language" analogy to explain this part of the theory. 
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It is however a different aspect of "language" from that of 
the strong conventionalists with their emphasis on arbitr- 
ariness. Hochberg is concerned with the articulatory 
aspect of "language" in the analogy, and sees the analysis 
of features such as "a prototypical edge, corner, or 
bulge" as comparable (albeit loosely, it must be said) to 
Chomsky's theory of the grammar of verbal language: 
"We can plausibly regard these underlying visual 
concepts (or "deep structures") as prototypes by 
which the viewer can encode the important aspects 
of the environment; the prototypes can in turn 
serve as features by which the viewer can test and 
encode larger schemas such as objects constructed 
from, and which they serve to distinguish". 144 
Hochberg goes further than Neisser in relation to Gestalt 
principles by proposing that the Gestalt "laws of organis- 
ation" can be collapsed into the "features that most 
probably identify objects" 
145 
or "a visual language of 
objects". 
146 However, this step deprives us of the 
advantage of Neisser's global preattentive process which 
is a convincing, and indeed necessary, explanation. Other- 
wise we find ourselves with problems of aggregation of 
items and lack of veridicality, the bane of the empiricist 
tradition. However, Hochberg's formulation can be seen at- 
its most plausible at the analytical stage of quite complex 
pictures where the analysis of probable features is fed 
back to a schema which may even be more socially influenced 
rather than naturally derived - as in the recognition of 
Harold Wilson in a cartoon from his Gannex raincoat, cited 
earlier (Page 67). 
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Neisser recognises that "the higher mental processes are 
primarily social phenomena, made possible by cognitive 
tools and characteristic situations that have evolved in 
the course of history", but he does not wish to gainsay 
the innate structural devices which are attuned to the 
natural environment: 
"Like other animals, we are born somewhat ready 
to pick up the expressive signals offered by 
members of our own species. Babies are innately 
prepared to receive-smiles or frowns, soothing 
tones or harsh inflections, as indications of 
what significant others will do next. Of course, 
this does not mean that our emotional lives consist 
of automatic responses to triggering stimuli, or 
that psychology will be made obsolete by progress 
in genetics. Schemata for action and physiognomic 
perception undergo as much development as any other 
cognitive structures; indeed, they are particularly 
dependent on social experience". 147 
Neisser proposes another diagram to be superimposed on his 
first one of the perceptual cycle. Here a wider notion of 
the schema, the "cognitive map" is suggested, affected by 
the "actual world" rather than simply the "actual present 
environment", and directing attention through a greater 
variety of means, as in Figure 3. Thus these additions are 
148 
"embedded rather than successive". 
Neisser's synthetic theory then begins with an assumption 
of innate capacity, and allows for growth in an interaction 
with both the physical and the social environment, thus 
encompassing both "natural" optical information and 
cultural convention. His model provides a comprehensive 
psychological framework which links with 
Peirce's categories 
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in explaining cognitive growth in the apprehension of a 
signifying medium like photography from the process of 
- recognition in the iconic aspect (from differentiated to 
precise), through various inferential procedures as schemata 
widen in the indexical aspect, to the abstraction and 
generalisation of the symbol and its cultural connotations. 
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MRS RICHARDS LIVES HERE 
- SHE 15 A GRANDMOTHER- 
WHAT DOES SHE DO AT 
WEEKENDS ? 
11. Colin Gillespie, Page Green Centre, Tottenham, 
"Local Study Exercise, " 1981. 
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What are the implications for education of this framework ? 
It should first of all be noted that only a general scheme 
for growth in pictorial competence has been put forward and 
that there is a.. need for further detailed research in this 
field*. It has been claimed that objects in ordinary 
pictures, for the purpose of basic recognition, do not 
present a problem for young children, and therefore require 
no special training beyond that given in the process of 
ordinary observation of things. At the same time, however, 
detailed photographs, because of their transportable 
convenience, provide opportunities for sharpening the 
perceptual abilities of children through looking at and 
recognising a large variety of subject-matter. The enumer- 
ation of things and details seen in a photograph is a 
useful device to further the process of differentiation, 
as is the detection of differences in detail between photo- 
graphs taken from the same aspect. A street could be taken 
by day and in the evening; or a country scene in summer and 
winter. 
In addition, the development of differentiation through 
inferential procedures from evidence provided could be 
*A view of recent research which has just come to hand is 
Richard Olsen, Albert Yonas and Robert G Cooper Jr, "Develop- 
ment of Pictorial Perception", in The Perception of Pictures, 
Volume 2, ed. Margaret A Hagen (New York: Academic Press, 
1980), pp. 155-192. 
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developed. For example, photographs of a variety of house 
frontages could be presented with the question: "What sort 
of person do you think lives here ?" This suggestion 
extends initiatives taken at Page Green Centre, Tottenham, 
by Colin Gillespie (I11.11). Again, photographs of 
gestures, facial expressions or stances could be useful 
for descriptive purposes. 
Perceptual work in primary schools tends to stop at simple 
differentiation as aids to speech and writing or growth in 
knowledge of school subject-matter - which is different in 
intention from the long-term aim of developing visual 
discrimination, in which photographs can play a useful part. 
While we recognise that there is information in a photograph 
which can be picked up as in ordinary perception, we need 
to become aware too of the differences a picture has from 
the ambient world, through attention being drawn to such 
differences. An environment can be seen in a number of 
ways, and a picture or series of pictures may show only 
a very particular aspect, because of a special purpose. 
Holiday brochure photographs are useful in this respect. 
Here active use of cameras could be made in a project 
attempting to advertise the local area as a holiday resort. 
At its most complex, the "conventionalising" nature of 
commercial holiday brochures could be raised. Again, personal 
snaps tend to show only the pleasant side of people, and a 
discussion of this phenomenon could lead, not just to an 
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illumination of why we want to preserve certain momentary 
images of ourselves but also to the "schema" of ourselves 
and our body image in comparison to that actually given at 
a certain moment - yet with a tendency to make that moment 
typical or generalised - in a photograph of ourselves. In 
such discussions, the terminology of Neisser or Peirce is 
not necessary with young age groups, but their basic 
concepts provide the framework, in a manner advocated by 
Jerome Bruner in The Process of Education on "the transfer 
of principles and attitudes", cited earlier (Page 8). 
These are only some suggestions for the kind of work that 
can be done from a consideration of the Peircean-Neisser 
framework of development, but even from these examples it 
can be seen that there is a rich field of development. 
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D. Photography and reality in aesthetic theory. 
We began this section by considering ordinary pictures and 
photographs, then moved to considering some more evocative 
images. We also moved from nature to convention in doing 
so, but we do not wish to imply that the aesthetic is just 
to be found in the artificial manipulation of images. For 
an aesthetic of photography we surely do not need to 
abandon the natural, indeed need to return to it, even when 
we come to look at photographs from a more developed 
aesthetic position, that elaborated in realist film theory. 
Thus we need to take note again of the particular charact- 
eristic of photography: its specific relationship with the 
visible world which is recorded through the lens. The 
objects or events that are "there" in front of the camera 
are captured, frozen, immobilised on the emulsion and 
thence made permanent through the primary action of 
releasing a shutter. As Susan'Sontag observes: 
it ... a photograph 
is not only an image (as 
a painting is an image), an interpretation of 
the real; it is also a trace, something directly 
stencilled off the real, like a footprint or a 
death mask". 149 
This particular characteristic photography shares with 
film rather than with painting, and indeed it has provided 
the starting-point for a whole theory of film with its 
basis in the nature of photography. Such theory has been 
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13. Daily Mirror front page, 27 May, 1982. 
r. heroes-c... rs... 
14. Daily Mirror front page, 28 May, 1982. 
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particularly associated with Siegfried Kracauer. A consid- 
eration of his central tenet and its development may be 
illuminating at this point as it pertains so closely to 
photographic considerations. Kracauer states his position 
thus: 
"The basic properties of film are identical with 
the properties of photography. Film, in other 
words, is uniquely equipped to record and reveal 
physical reality and, hence, gravitates towards 
it". 150 
Kracauer's theory takes its strength from the ability of 
the camera to capture aspects*of nature in an objective 
manner; for example, to reveal landscapes such as that of 
Mars or those taken on aerial reconnaissance to which we 
referred in this section. The microscopic world is another 
clear instance. Here, as we noted with regard to newspaper 
photographs, function comes before aestheticising tendencies, 
yet the final result can have power and beauty, with 
qualities more hard-won than a painting, say, in the senti- 
mental or false-heroic style. Compare, for example, a 
typical nineteenth battle painting with a Brady photograph. 
The recent use of war artists in the Falklands conflict to 
illustrate events when press photographs were scarce showed 
how easily drawing falls into the heroic mode of depiction 
(I11.12). The front-page drawing for the Daily Mail 
contrasts badly in terms of reportage with photographs 
printed at a later date in the Daily Mirror (Ills-13 & 14). 
In such contexts, Kracauer's prescription that the photo- 
- 112 - 
grapher should curb his formative impulses to record and 
---. reveal the world before him seems eminently sensible. 
However, Kracauer's formulation is an aesthetic of film and 
photography, and the development of his premise about the 
basic characteristic of photography proceeds in an unduly 
limiting way by setting up a prescribed direction for the 
camera user, which is not simply a concern for the surfaces 
of the visible world. From saying that the camera records 
what is visually before it, he goes on to insist that the 
cameraman should have a predilection for the qualities of 
visible reality which he names as the "unstaged", the 
"fortuitous", the "endless" and the "indeterminate". Thus 
in what he calls the photographic approach, he goes so far 
as to say that "an impersonal, completely artless camera 
record is aesthetically irreproachable". 
151 Thinking of 
painting and its formal concerns as the antithesis of 
photography, Kracauer is loathe to admit the use of photo- 
graphy where the artistic, self-expressive side of the 
photographer will overwhelm the realistic endeavour which 
Kracauer regards as the major task. He wishes the photo- 
grapher to keep the realistic tendency always in higher 
balance to the formative: 
"What counts is the 'right' mixture of his realist 
loyalties and formative endeavours -a mixture, 
that is, in which the latter, however strongly 
developed, surrender their independence to the 
former". 152 
As a consequence, the photographer is concerned to study and 
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decipher the "elusive text" of nature of physical reality, 
and the photographers selectivity - and Kracauer recognises 
that he must be selective "in order to transcend the 
minimum requirement 1153 of following the realistic lead 
under all circumstances - is "closer to empathy than to 
disengaged spontaneity". 
154 
It is true that Kracauer has drawn attention to the validity 
and value of loose-knit rather than tight "set-up" compos- 
itions in the tradition of Henry Peach Robinson, but the 
effect is to discount all concern with formal articulation. 
Yet the images of a documentary photographer like Euan Duff, 
which seem to exemplify the qualities which Kracauer extols 
of the unstaged, the fortuitous, the endless and the indet- 
erminate, are not so unorganised as may appear at first 
glance. There is an order, if not an obvious one, in his 
work. It is appropriate, for example, that the photograph 
of the teenagers loafing aimlessly in the city street 
(I11.15) should not be tightly grouped, while their indiv- 
idual stances are revealed in outline through slight under- 
exposure; the central figure is given even more prominence 
by his distance from the other two groups and his light- 
coloured shirt, so that his direct stare at the camera 
presents a strong challenge in formal terms as well as in 
the context of the environmental reality. 
In Kracauer there is a danger of the elevation of the most 
banal surface impression of reality to artistic status. 
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15. Euan Duff photograph, from How We Are, 1971, Section 3. 
0 
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Euan Duff's work is far from being "artless", and is by 
no means amateur in a perjorative sense. Discounting the 
formal, Kracauer provides no sure guidelines for evaluation. 
If an artless camera record is aesthetically irreproachable, 
then who is to deny the range of meaning imputed to a fort- 
uitous, indeterminate photograph ? It will depend on content 
preference, without reference to formal means. Thus in 
seeking to combat "unfettered creativity"155 as the proper 
task of photography and film, 
156 he would appear to allow 
unfettered self-expression in the interpretation of meaning 
to enter by the back door. 
Kracauer then has drawn attention forcibly to the material 
basis of photography and this view is congruent with the 
use of Peirce's typology in this section on the potential 
of photography to move from the iconic-indexical to the 
symbolic. In a philosophical passage on the effect of 
"images of material moments" which stimulate in us "propos- 
itions regarding the significance of the things we fully 
157. 
experience", he comments that: 
"... if (such propositions) are true to the 
medium, they will certainly not move from a 
preconceived idea down to the material world 
in order to implement that idea; conversely, 
they set out to explore physical data and, taking 
their cue from them, work their way up to some 
problem or belief. The cinema (and, of course, 
photography) is materialistically minded; it 
proceeds from 'below' to 'above'. The importance 
of its natural bent for moving in this direction 
can hardly be overestimated". 158 
However, in refusing to move in the other direction, Kracauer 
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is implicitly denying the development of "photographic ideas" 
or visualising as a result of experience in the medium, and 
thus the basis of studio photography; whereas in Peirce's 
terminology such a development would simply be the process 
of "semiosis". 
In practical educational terms, Kracauer's view suggests that 
the activity of exploring the environment rather than formal 
considerations should be predominant in learning to take 
photographs, and content should be the important thing. This 
approach, however, may not lead to much sense of the potent- 
iality of photographic means. Kracauer also assumes in his 
exposition a very strong, highly motivated, even developed 
aesthetic impulse, which is hardly the norm and which indeed 
needs to be cultivated in an educational setting. 
Moreover, Kracauer in his account seems to deny the ultimate 
order of art, no matter how loose it may appear initially. 
As Arnheim comments in a review of his book, this manifests 
"an increasing surrender of the formative capacity of the 
human mind to the raw material of experience". 
159 
For 
Arnheim: 
if .., genuine realism consists 
in the interpret- 
ation of the raw material of experience by means 
of significant form and that, therefore, a concern 
with unshaped matter is a melancholy surrender 
rather than the recovery of man's grip on society". 160 
In practice, the shaping impulse plays a more important part 
than Kracauer indicates. Rather than use all formative 
options, photographers may limit them to achieve greater 
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power in particular areas. Cartier-Bresson, for example, 
eschews even the most basic darkroom techniques, as Gombrich 
notes: 
"It is known, moreover, that he not only refuses 
to pose a person, he will not even cut or crop 
any of his pictures which much include all he had 
on the film". 161 
These self-imposed curbs can be seen to have the purpose of 
concentrating the photographer's mind on "the decisive 
moment". What is important here is the discipline of 
selection as well as recording. As Cartier-Bresson himself 
says: 
"To take photographs means to recognise - simult- 
aneously and within a fraction of a second - both 
the fact itself and the rigorous organisation of 
visually perceived forms that give it meaning". 162 
Cartier-Bresson is thus recognising the importance of 
factors other than the visual reality, "the fact itself": 
that of his own powers of observation, intuition and organ- 
isation. In his photographic approach, he can be seen in a 
sense to exhibit the four qualities noted by Kracauer, but 
he also has qualities of precision, order and clarity 
absent from Kracauer's account. Gombrich believes that the 
disciplines of drawing and painting - still practised by . 
Cartier-Bresson - have been criticially important in giving 
him an intuitive sense of the right moment of pictorial 
structure: 
"Nearly all his pictures exhibit that visual 
balance, that secret geometry of a formal 
composition which counteracts the impression 
of the merely fortuitous and the contingent". 163 
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Kracauer does not discuss the value of this kind of struct- 
ural backbone: although he mentions Cartier-Bresson's photo- 
graphs with approval, he describes them unhelpfully as 
"snapshots". 
16 In his desire to differentiate photography 
from painting, Kracauer then plays down the sense of formal 
structure in photography so that the value of work which is 
impersonal and not deliberately artful can be brought to 
light. In doing so he runs the danger of approving the 
merely banal and neglecting the role of the imagination. 
While admitting that the absolute objectivity of an imper- 
sonal rendering is not attainable, 
165 
and that there is an 
inevitable subjective element, he is nevertheless very 
cautious in admitting explorations of the formative tendency. 
Where formative impulses and realistic intentions are of 
equal strength, he finds "two conflicting desires" rather 
than creative tensions. The latter must be subordinate to 
the former in his view, although he does see their ambiguity 
as a "veritable tour de force". 
166 A more open view of 
developments of the realistic property can now however be 
noted - in welcoming the surrealistic, for example - in the 
writings of the French essayist, Andre Bazin. 
Bazin, like Kracauer, begins to theorise about film from 
the premise of the fundamentally realistic nature of the 
photographic image. Indeed, his influence on Susan Sontag, 
quoted earlier, is clear: just as she compares the photograph 
to a footprint and a death mask, so he likens it to a finger- 
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print and the Holy Shroud of Turin. 
67 
Furthermore, Bazin 
eulogises on the automatic nature of the actual forming of 
the image, regarding this part of the photographic process 
as a salutary contrast to the Romantic/expressionist 
aesthetic which would elevate the individual personality 
of the artist to a position of supreme importance: 
"All the arts are based on the presence of man, 
only photography derives an advantage from his 
absence. Photography affects us like a phenomenon 
in nature, like a flower or a snowflake whose 
vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable 
part of their beauty". 166 
Bazin is not here denying human creativity, but he sees part 
of the expressivity of the photograph as emanating from 
nature itself. In this sense photography for Bazin is 
potentially more powerful than the kind of painting which 
strives only to imitate the illusory appearances of things. 
Because of the absence of human intervention at the actual 
moment of exposure, that is., when the shutter has been 
released and the film registers the image, photography 
for Bazin has "a quality of credibility absent from all 
other picture-making". 
169 He sees this transference of 
reality from the thing to its reproduction as a major reason 
for such diverse effects as "the charm of family albums" 
and the power of surrealism. As he notes, "photography 
ranks high in the order of surrealist creativity because 
it produces an image that is a reality of nature, namely, 
an hallucination that is also a fact"170 
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EXHIBITION OF NEWS PHOTOGRAPHS BY 
V BOCK OF THE EAST LONDON ADVERTISER 
16. Tony Bock photograph, from exhibition poster by Half 
Moon Photography Workshop (publisher of Camerawork), 
1976. 
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17. Herbert Bayer, "Lonely City-dweller, " 1932. 
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The surrealist potential of photography is probably much 
wider than that of painting, which seems to have a limited 
stock of surrealist images. In photography the world 
itself can be explored for images rather than simply the 
dream-world. Even a newspaper sports page photograph of 
footballers frozen in the act of jumping has a quality of 
bizarre strangeness, as is the image of Tony Bock, a photo- 
grapher on the East London Advertiser, of the small boy 
walking across waste land away from a scene of building 
demolition. (I11.16). We do not necessarily need to adopt 
a montage technique to achieve this effect, although even 
here it is the "real" qualities of eyes, hands and empty 
city facades that make Herbert Bayer's photograph so 
powerful (111.17). Both images express in different formal 
ways a strong feeling of alienation. 
This quality of "credibility" can be utilised at many levels 
in education, and not only to evoke a surrealist or quasi- 
surrealist effect. For example in Junior School, in more 
light-hearted vein, "real" faces of the children in 
surroundings of drawn and coloured make-believe fantasy can 
make a strong impression in its contrast of authentic face 
in a transposed context. "Mug shots" can be used as a 
starting point for an imaginary picture on a theme such as 
"Me in Ten Years Time", "Myself When Old", or a complete 
change of identity such as a Red Indian, knight, witch, 
mermaid or even fish !* 
* See Appendix One. 
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18. Roger Vulliez photograph, in Exploring Photography, 
1978, p. 142. 
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As we noted before with Kracauer, however, a realist 
aesthetic is in danger of ignoring the formative aspect in 
the photographic act. The most sophisticated development 
in photography is to highlight the photographic paradox of 
its realism and its difference from reality - the fact that 
the print is a two-dimensional surface, without such qualities 
as mass, a mere piece of paper. A photograph in this mode 
is that of Roger Vulliez, showing what is clearly a photo- 
graphic print of the photographer (or a model artist) who 
is in the act of cutting the print of himself (and his 
"body") with a knife (I11.18). Undoubtedly such photographs 
take their effect from the "authentic" power of the photo- 
graphic image, and the interplay between two and three 
dimensional seeing. 
In the context of adult education, the new range and potent- 
iality in photography was given a national showing in the 
BBC2 series by Bryn Campbell, Exploring Photography, broad- 
cast in 1978 and 1979. In the introduction to the book of 
the series, Campbell stated that his priority was to 
discuss "visual ideas rather than practical instruction" 
(the staple of photographic education till recently) and 
did so through looking at the work and practices of some 
of the world's leading photographers. In his final chapter 
on "The Image", Campbell commented on the use of visual 
paradox and ambiguity: 
11 
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"This fascination with the vocabulary and nature 
of photography and a heightened awareness of the 
differences and possible interplay between object 
reality and image reality is one of our most 
marked obsessions ... The creative possibilities become increasingly varied and complex". 171 
But the paradox for the photographer is that he does have 
a tie with reality, an umbilical cord which gives life to 
the photograph while it serves to constrain him. The 
tension is well stated in a quotation from Minor White, 
one of the major influences on the new resurgence in 
British photography, a few pages later in the book: "the 
photographer has to free himself of the tyranny of the 
visual facts upon which he is utterly dependent". 
172 
The question now is: if photography is capable of complexity 
and the stimulation of conceptual thought, what help is the 
notion of "language" applied to photography ? So far this 
problem has been kept at a distance, but it will now be 
necessary to look more closely at the term. 
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SECTION THREE - PHOTOGRAPHY AS "LANGUAGE" 
INTRODUCTION 
In closing the last section with considerations of the 
complexity of photographs, we quoted Bryn Campbell's comment 
on the contemporary "fascination with the vocabulary ... 
of photography". It is very easy to slip into an analogy 
with verbal language, but what we need to do now is to 
consider the range and extent of this analogy; more 
importantly, its usefulness to our understanding of the 
nature of photography. Does the orientation - or orient- 
ations - it gives us compatible with that nature ? Does 
the analogy provide a sound base for the development of 
understanding ? 
We have already considered "language" from the point of view 
of its cultural alignment, *as a starting-point for an 
account of pictorial perception, and we have opposed that 
position, we trust successfully. Since "language" is, 
however, a many-faceted term, it will be necessary to 
consider its range of common meanings. Within these, 
the question of articulation arises almost immediately. 
However, the cultural association of "language" is a key 
idea, and we will return to it when we come to consider 
"language" as described by structuralist linguistics. 
Educational implications will also arise as we proceed. 
*See Page 75 
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A. Basic differences of photography from verbal language. 
To consider photography as "language" would at first sight 
appear to be an unfruitful undertaking: the two phenomena 
do not appear to have anything significant in common. 
Indeed, what strikes Lis at once are their inherent differ- 
ences. These differences are apparent if we consider the 
first, literal meaning of "language" provided by the 
Shorter Oxford Dictionary: "The whole body of words and of 
methods of combining them used by a nation, people, or race". 
1 
When we attempt to apply this definition to photography, 
we do not find any obvious relevance. Photographic images 
have no evident constituents comparable with the words of a 
verbal language; nor do they belong exclusively to a 
particular nation, people, or race. Moreover, if we compare 
methods of combining words with the making of photographs, 
we seem to be faced again with an impasse: their procedural 
methods appear to be inherently and fundamentally different. 
To expand on this point we may consider the constituents 
and internal fabric of verbal language and photography 
respectively. The words of a language are formed from a 
fixed number of sounds in speech; or, in alphabetic 
writing, an alphabet of letters corresponding to these 
sounds. These sounds and letters are arranged in various 
combinations and permutations which transmit their meaning. 
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Photographs on the other hand are direct and immediate and 
have no comparable formal mechanism. Even if part of their 
meaning arises from the recognition of pertinent features, 
these in themselves have no fixed or detachable signific- 
ance. In a photograph, stripes, for example, can be part 
of an awning, steps, a zebra, or a shirt. 
Here it may be noted that Umberto Eco in Italy has probably 
made the most ambitious. attempt to posit the existence of 
basic minimum units of a picture, based on the perception 
of the image, yet having reference to articulation like 
that of verbal language. In a paper presented at the 
Pesaro Film Festival in 1967, he argued: 
"The problem now is to see whether it is possible 
to reduce the language of the image to code, and 
to reduce the supposed language of action to 
convention". 2 
However, in articulating iconic codes into three groupings, 
in what he regards as a justifiable variation from language's 
two, Eco has to recognise that: 
"Iconic codes shift easily within the same 
cultural model, or even the same work of art". 3 
For this kind of analysis, then, their instability and 
weakness is a basic problem, as Eco notes: 
"Undoubtedly the iconic codes are weaker, more 
transitory, limited to restricted groups or to the 
choice of a single person, inasmuch as they are 
not strong codes like those of verbal language; 
and in them the optional variants prevail over 
the truly pertinent features". 4 
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In 1976, while developing a broader dynamic analysis, Eco 
concedes the enormous difficulties and ultimate inappropri- 
ateness of his earlier theory of iconic codes and their 
separate constituents: 
"One can isolate pertinent discrete units within 
an iconic continuum, but as soon as they are 
detected they seem to dissolve again. Sometimes 
they are large conventionally recognisable config- 
urations, sometimes merely small segments of line, 
dots, black areas (as in a drawing of the human 
face, where a dot represents the eye and a semi- 
circle the lips; yet we know that in a different 
context the same type of dot and the same semi- 
circle would instead represent, say, a banana and 
a grape pip). Thus iconic figurae (the smallest 
unit posited by Eco) do not correspond to ling- 
uistic phonemes because they do not have positional 
and oppositional value". 5 
To continue with the language/photograph comparison, we may 
observe that words have to be heard or read in a certain 
prescribed sequence, for example, from right to left in 
Arabic or Hebrew script, vertically in Chinese, or left to 
right in our more familiar Western languages. Photographs 
have no such prescribed sequence of reading which it is 
necessary to follow in order to apprehend their meaning. 
We can approach the interpretation of a photograph from a 
variety of directions and still make some substantial 
sense of it. Reading English from right to left or Chinese 
horizontally, on the other hand, will frustrate our under- 
standing of the structure and meaning of the language. 
Furthermore, we may note that photographs depend upon the 
action of light which registers on film in terms of tiny 
grains of tone or colour. Photography is thus a process 
which can provide great detail and is capable of recording 
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very subtle variations of light. This kind of subtlety, 
dependent on light for its effect, is clearly not a 
property of words. It has, however, been a preoccupation 
of the "classic" school of twentieth century photographers 
such as Edward Weston and Ansel Adams (as well as the narrow 
and purely technical obsession of many amateur photographers 
concerned simply with "definition"). John Szarkowski reminds 
us that "Adams' work is based on the translation of light 
6 
into precise tonal relationships". 
We should also remember that a segment in time, typically 
a fraction of a second, is taken of a scene or event by the 
camera, and this moment is made available for later perusal. 
It is evident that this report on the world is very different 
in kind from a verbal report. In addition, we can point to 
the way the framing of a photography provides a major part 
of its meaning, for example, in the informal style of 
composition adopted by photojournalists like Dr Erich 
Salomon and Alfred Eisenstaedt in the twenties and thirties 
when they pioneered the possibilities of the miniature 
camera. In many of their photographs, people look out of 
frame at the cameraman (now the viewer) or at someone cut 
off by the border. As Peter Pollack says of Eisenstaedt: 
"His scenes ... in their intimacy, make a 
viewer a participant, giving him a feeling of 
being actually present beside the photographer, 
for example in a picture of 1932 showing a 
lovely dark-haired girl seated in an adjoining 
box of the beautiful five-tiered La Scala opera 
house in Milan. It is a suspended moment, just 
before the conductor lifts his baton and the 
lights are lowered on a most appealing, festive 
social scene". 7 
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Words do not work thus with fragments of time and dispositions 
in space. 
This example also shows the ability of the camera to give a 
sense of "presence". Yet it is not necessarily a kind of 
verbal present tense that is conjured up; for Roland Barthes 
in his reflections on photography in 1982, the photograph is 
an emanation of the past, "at once the past and the real". 
Thinking of a photograph of his much-loved mother when alive 
and young, he comments: 
"The effect it produces upon me is not to restore 
what has been abolished(by time, by distance) but 
to attest that what I see has indeed existed". 8 
An emphasis on the realistic aspect of photography (in 
common with film and television) has a long history going 
back to its invention; although it has by no means gone 
unchallenged, it would be reasonable to claim at this point 
that words do not possess this special linked relationship 
with concrete reality which is a characteristic of photo- 
graphy, and do not obviously resemble their referents, The 
link between a word and its referent is forged by social 
convention, so that the same photograph of a woman may be 
verbally described as "femme" in French, "Frau" in German 
and "mujer" in Spanish. 
This distinction between words and photographs also points 
to particular strengths of verbal language: its capacity 
for modification of its described material and the potential 
for generalisation. The photograph may show us the image of 
a particular person and it can do so in great detail. But 
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an important question to ask here, if not to answer 
completely, is: how far can it go beyond this ? It may be 
said, for example, that portrait photographs can flatter. 
Peter Pollack comments that "Yousuf Karsh, in his powerful 
portraits, transforms the human face into legend". 
9 It is 
also the case that a photographed person may be, or be seen to 
be, a typical representative of a particular class of 
persons, for example, a peasant, a housewife, a secretary, 
a bricklayer. August Sander's photographs portrayed 
typical representative members of the social classes of 
Germany in the inter-war period. 
'0 However, if we want to 
speculate in depth on such theoretical matters as the 
position of women in contemporary society, where "structure" 
words such as the determiner "some", the modal "might", the 
intensifier "quite", the conjunction "so" and the subordin- 
atives "when", "if", "although" and "because" are so useful, 
11 
then photographs are ill-equipped and cannot compete. 
Their very concreteness and specificity, their tie with brute 
reality, may militate against generalisation. 
From these preceding considerations we may reasonably conclude 
that photography has a closer affinity with pictures in 
general than with words. Pictorial meaning, we may say, 
is based on a recognition of the world as we apprehend it 
spontaneously, rather than on the deciphering of marks, 
the interpretation of which we have had to learn step by 
step. Jurij Lotman, a Soviet scholar of cultural typologies 
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writing in a study of cinema, finds this division a funda- 
mental one: 
"Over the entire history of mankind, no matter 
how far back we penetrate, we find two independent 
and equal cultural signs: the word and the picture". 12 
The philosopher Susanne Langer makes a useful distinction 
between "discursive" and "presentational" forms which 
corroborates the differences already described. After 
referring to the basic principle of "wholeness" in gestalt 
psychology, she goes on to differentiate the verbal from 
the non-verbal, and the visual in particular: 
"The most radical difference is that visual forms 
are not discursive. They do not present their 
constituents successively, but simultaneously, so 
the relations determining a visual structure are 
grasped in one act of vision". 13 
Langer thus opens up again the fundamental issue of the 
minimum element or unit which can be identified and described 
in a picture or photograph as compared with that in verbal 
language. A picture is composed of areas of tone and/or 
colour, "elements that represent various respective constit- 
uents in the object", but she rejects these elements as 
basic signifying elements: they have no recognisable and 
transferable identity. "In isolation we would consider 
them simply blotches". This is despite the fact that "they 
are faithful representatives of visual elements composing 
the visual object". 
14 Her contrast is with the word, 
which can be recognised as an identifiable thing and indeed 
collected, as in a dictionary or a thesaurus. 
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Here Langer is making a broad comparison, which, in the 
light-of modern linguistics, needs some modification. In 
linguistic theory there are two kinds of minimum element: 
one pertaining to meaning, the morpheme or moneme (roughly 
corresponding to the word, though meaningful parts of words 
like the two halves of "lighthouse" are included) and the 
other pertaining to form, or distinctive sound, the phoneme 
(for example, single "r" as opposed to double 'Irr" in 
Spanish, making a difference between "pero" = but, and 
"perro" = dog)15. A more appropriate contrast then would 
have been between a small area of light and shade and the 
phoneme. However, her basic contention still holds: like a 
word, the phoneme can be identified and used elsewhere as a 
significant unit. Moreover, it is a basic unit in the 
articulation of a language. Thus Langer can still validly 
maintain: 
"It is impossible to find the smallest independent 
symbol, and recognise its identity when the same 
unit is met in other contexts". 16 
At this point it may be argued that pictures can be analysed 
and decomposed by a raster in photomechanical reproduction 
and transmission, and in this sense its elements can be 
enumerated. The intricacies of this question cannot be 
rehearsed here, but the important point to note is that 
this concerns the question of reproduction of a single 
image and not of the original construction of the picture. 
Umberto Eco considers this issue and sums up as follows: 
- 135 - 
"Thus replicability through computers or other 
mechanisms does not directly concern the code 
governing the replicated sign. It is rather a 
a matter of technical codes governing the transmission 
of information (a signal-to-signal process), to be 
considered within the framework of communication 
engineering". 17 
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B. The practical unity of communication and the role of 
metaphor in the development of ideas: "language" as 
style. 
Despite these differences, however, pictures and words do 
not have the antipathy of oil and water: they can mix. In 
practice they can work together very amicably, as we can 
see demonstrated most forcibly in the heyday of picture 
magazine journalism. Wilson Hicks, head of the photographic 
department of Life from 1937 to 1946, refers to Langer's 
distinction between presentational and discursive modes 
before describing the process of reading pictures and words 
in a magazine. His hypothetical reader first of all "gets 
the general idea" from the visual structure of the photo- 
graph which he takes in "all at once", and then turns to 
the words, "with a quick promise to himself to return to 
the picture". 
18 There is thus a continual interaction 
between the two modes until the meaning of each is completely 
understood, the two being read in different ways and at 
different times, even though these may be close together. 
Having affirmed a basic contrast of articulation in the 
two forms, however, Hicks then goes on to declare: 
"The intent of photojournalism is to create 
through combined use of dissimilar visual and 
verbal mediums a oneness of communicative 
result". 19 
Although there have been two different kinds of media 
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involved, a fusion has occurred, not on the printed page, 
. but 
in the reader's mind. At best, the two media can 
combine in the reader's consciousness to make a unity of 
effect, what the gestaltist would no doubt call a new 
whole and what for Hicks constitutes a single expressive 
statement: 
"In a single expressive statement it is essential 
that the complementary relation between picture 
and words, in terms of subject matter, be fully 
realised. Unity of effect can be obtained by 
a use of words in counterpoint to picture. The 
subject matter of the mediums might differ 
completely and yet, through an ironic or other 
interplay, produce a singleness of effect in the 
fusion process". 20 
With the phrase, "a oneness of communicative result", we 
have a practical means of uniting photography and language - 
they can come under the banner of "communication", while 
still preserving an autonomy in articulating their meaning. 
Both are methods or means of expression and communication, 
or simply communication, if we include, as Hicks obviously 
does, the notion of expression within communication. Even 
in other contexts we can do this: as Jacobson points out, 
the intrapersonal, as compared to the interpersonal, is 
an aspect of communication. 
21 
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How does this joining of language and photography now affect 
our consideration of the term "language" ? Up to this 
point we have considered the term only in its primary 
literal meaning, as a body of words and ways of combining 
them, and used that meaning to control the discussion. 
However, this literal meaning is not the only meaning of 
"language": the term is polysemic and has a number of 
meanings. We should, however, note at this point that a 
dictionary will not yield all of them, since a term shifts 
meaning according to context, association and figurative 
use. 
22 Ullmann in this connection makes a useful distinc- 
tion between referential and operational or contextual 
meaning. 
23 In referential meaning, since there is a recip- 
rocal relation between "name" and "sense" (Ullmann's words: 
other colloquial usage would be "term" and "meaning". A 
linguist following Saussure would be "signifier" and 
"signified" respectively), we can start from the name and 
look for the sense or senses attached to it, as we do in a 
dictionary (or we can proceed from sense to name). In the 
contextual definition, meaning is defined in empirical 
terms, in its use in the language (the name of Wittgenstein 
in his later writings being particularly associated with 
this definition). Ullmann points out that the two definit- 
ions are really complementary, and that one should not 
exclude the other: 
"(The operational definition) contains the salutary 
warning ... that the meaning of a word can be 
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ascertained only by studying its use". 24 
We shall be concerned now with contextual leading to 
figurative meanings of "language" and it will be useful to 
consider an instance. What, for example, is intended by the 
title, Photography is a Language, a book which appeared in 
1946 ? The author, who had a background in photojournalism, 
defines it "as a means of expressing ideas and emotions, 
as well as direct facts", 
25 
a meaning which is close to, 
but more extensive than, the "transferred" or figurative 
meaning established by 1606, "method of expression other 
than by words", 
26 but here extended in the context of 
informational journalism. 
In considering photography as "language" in this way, it is 
apparent that we have made only a loose comparison. The 
questions we can go on to ask are: How useful can this be ? 
Can the term "language" be more than a loose metaphor ? 
What kind of connections can be made ? In addition, since 
we have pointed to some basic differences between words and 
pictures, will such an analogy sometimes not be useful, but 
be positively misleading, for example, if pursued too far ?. 
I propose to look at the analogy between "language" and 
photography more closely in a number of different contexts 
* The word "metaphor" is being used in a wide sense here, to 
cover what is, strictly speaking, the metonymy of the 1606 
definition. 
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in which it has been used significantly: from the practice 
of journalism and advertising to the discipline of ling- 
uistics. Each of these areas will be shown to use the 
term in a different way, some more rigorously than others. 
The appropriateness of such usage will be examined in the 
light of its contribution to further understanding, to 
providing insight and illumination into the nature and 
practice of photography, and in particular to education in 
photography. 
Dictionary definitions give established meanings of words. 
The "transferred" meaning of "language" already quoted is 
in effect an analogy which has become so common as to be no 
longer apparent in our consciousness. In pursuing this 
investigation, it will not be enough to rely simply on 
dictionary definitions, established meanings of "language", 
but rather to see verbal language itself as something which 
is constantly growing and to see the notion of analogy or 
metaphor as an important means of providing a basis for 
growth. 
Such a way of considering the nature of language is not 
universally held, however. A scientific attitude valuing 
plain, unvarnished statement would consider metaphor as being 
useful only for poetry or adding colour to a statement, but 
not as a way of developing cognitive meaning. There is an 
echo of this in the dictionary definition of metaphor as: 
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"The figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term 
is transferred to some object to which it is not properly 
applicable"27 (my emphasis). In this line of thought, 
derived from classical Greek rhetoric, the metaphor is an 
ilustrative device, an embellishment to or enhancement of 
a meaning which could be expressed in a more literal 
fashion. Thus, "He was a lion in the fight" could be more 
plainly rendered as "he was brave"; the basic meaning being 
retained in the latter. form. As Paul Ricoeur notes, metaphor 
was supposed "to decorate discourse, and therefore to serve 
the main purpose of rhetorical discourse, which is to 
persuade and to please". 
28 In the field of poetry, a more 
extravagant example can be found in Carew's lines: 
"Grief is a puddle, that reflects not clear 
Your beauties rayes". 29 
Nowadays we are taken aback, and perhaps amused, by this 
literary "conceit"; but we would not want to take it further. 
It would not appear to have a general use as a metaphor 
outside of the context of this poem. 
We should remember, however, that this is an example of a 
specific poetic usage which has not been generally adopted, 
unlike for instance John Donne's aphorism from the Sixteenth 
Devotion, "no man is an island". Metaphor can move then 
from having a place within the context of a poem to becoming 
a part of our everyday thought and language: the implications 
of the metaphor fit a variety of situations. Again, the 
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force of metaphor - one thing is another - can make us 
rethink our usual structuring of knowledge and our customary 
separation into different areas of the reality we think we 
know. It is in this way that metaphor can have a fundamental 
role to play in the development of thought: it can help us 
think of new ideas and foster the development of invention. 
Indeed, it was for this very purpose that the Synectics 
Group was formed in Cambridge, Massachussets, no doubt as 
part of the American concern in the late 1950s about falling 
behind in the "space race". * This is the very opposite of 
metaphor as pure decoration. 
If metaphors are at the heart of our thinking 
30 however, it 
may not be realised that they have a strong influence on 
* For a systemic practical application, see William JJ 
Gordon, Synectics: the Development of Creative Capacity (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1961). 
The scope of the work is defined as follows: "The word 
; synectics' from the Greek, means the joining together of 
different and apparently irrelevant elements. Synectics theory 
applies to the integration of diverse individuals into a 
problem-stating, problem-solving group. It is an operational 
theory for the conscious use of the preconscious psycholog- 
ical mechanisms present in man's creative activity. The 
purpose of developing such a theory is to increase the 
probability of success in problem-stating, problem-solving 
situations". (Introduction, Page 3). 
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notions which we already have. In this sense metaphor has 
become a "model" and acts as a means of controlling and 
structuring how we think about something. Just as we are 
not aware of a "dead" metaphor, so we may not be aware of 
a fossilised model. Thus there is a potentially negative 
as well as positive side to the enlargement of metaphor. 
In architecture, for example, the notion that "a house is 
a machine for living in" can be useful in helping us to 
think about dividing domestic interior spaces into work 
areas, and so on; but it can be a deadening influence on 
architects when blank and featureless walls become the 
norm and factory-type structures become the model for all 
buildings. 
To take another example closer to photography, let us 
consider the notion of regarding the eye as a camera. This 
particular analogy has in the past led to a number of inter- 
esting insights, and has been favoured in behavioural 
psychology, where simulus-response methods have been used 
to investigate matters such as the response of the eye and 
brain to changes in light stimulus. Woodworth sees the 
eye/camera metaphor as almost completely descriptive: 
"The human eye is a registering optical 
instrument, like the camera. In fact, it is 
a camera, the sensitive plate being the retina, 
which differs from the photographic plate in 
recovering after each exposure so as to be 
ready for the next one". 31 
This model, however, has the danger of being too passive 
and mechanical in implication. Rising awareness of and 
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reaction to the model's deficiencies have led to a more 
active model. As RL Gregory validly puts it: 
". The eye is often described as like a camera, 
but it is the quite uncamera-like features of 
perception which are most interesting". 32 
When metaphor employed as a model is not subject to continual 
critical revision, therefore, there is a danger of the model 
becoming a reductionist frame rather than opening window. 
The ideal is one where metaphor acts as a fertile basis for 
the expansion of meaning, but with that growth, its clarif- 
ication and ultimate refinement. The "language" metaphor 
applied to photography will of course be looked at in the 
light of these considerations. 
While verbal language may extend and refine its meaning 
through metaphor, photographic images have extended their 
influence in a more conspicuous, tangible way. We have 
already noted how ubiquitous they are in our contemporary 
society. "Picture information" has enormously increased 
in our century, as John R Whiting pointed out in 1946: 
"The picture magazine, the documentary photo- 
graphic series, the industrial picture essay, 
the educational picture book, the newspaper, 
the movies, the slide film - these use the new 
language most significantly". 33 
Like Hicks, Whiting does not see the word and the picture 
going their own way. He sees the practical unity of word 
and image as more powerful than the two working separately: 
"One picture is not necessarily worth a thousand 
words. But pictures, plus related facts, plus 
visual presentation, do constitute the language 
of photography". 34 
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This audio-visual "language" is a notion which has been 
developed recently in a Schools Council Project. 
35 
Apart from the work arranged and encouraged by this official 
project, and various other experimental work such as that 
carried out at Middlesex by Ted Booth, Colin Gillespie, 
Keith Kennedy, Marshall Mateer and Terry Quirk, little has 
been done in this area, and the relationship between the 
visual and verbal modes of communication has not been satis- 
factorily resolved in the educational curriculum. In 
schools, because of different traditions of education, 
there has been resistance, conscious or unconscious, between 
the two modes of communication; there is a gap in under- 
standing between teachers of verbal skills and the visual 
which is difficult to close. Douglas Lowndes, writing as 
an art educator in 1968 about his pioneer use of photo- 
graphy and film-making in school, makes the comment that: 
"The split between the literary and the visual is 
so great that it is often impossible for teachers 
themselves to exchange ideas and viewpoints. 
Projects involving art and English suffer because 
of the lack of comprehension on the part of 
teachers, of each other's perceptions and 
responses". 36 
The lack of understanding is not confined to education, but 
is present in society at large. The compatibility of word 
and image as a working partnership, described earlier by 
Wilson Hicks, is an idealised equilibrium, and conceals a 
shifting balance of practical influence between practit- 
ioners of the word and the pictorial image respectively. 
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To see this shifting relationship between word and image 
makers at work, it will be useful to look at the comments 
of William A Reedy, an advertising magazine editor for 
Kodak. An experienced photographer himself, he is concerned 
with the development of photographic ideas in the field of 
persuasive communication, and his book, Impact -_Photograph y 
for Advertising, appears to be directed at those aspiring 
to work there and thus has an educational aim in a vocational 
setting. Aware of the increasing influence of the image, 
yet finding it difficult to impress his working partners 
of the word, he expresses his frustrations thus: 
"That photography is a language is well 
understood; that pictures often occupy the 
lion's share of space in a communication is 
obvious; yet, too frequently the photograph 
half of a communicating partnership is dismissed 
as an afterthought". 37 
The use of the term "language" has a curious effect in this 
passage. Reedy seems to both acknowledge the continuing 
cultural prestige of verbal language by using the term as 
the basis for his declaration, yet saying that the image has 
in fact more importance, while using "language" to urge 
that the image should be given more consideration Reedy 
unfortunately does not completely define or articulate for 
the reader what he means by photography as a "language": 
it is simply "well understood". By this he appears to 
refer to power of communication, "impact", as the term is 
employed in the title of his book. An implication of 
"language" for him is speed of communication which will 
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arrest the eye: 
"Saying something is what photographic illustr- 
ation is all about. It is the presentation of 
an idea in a photographic language. Being visual 
makes it quicker in its transmission than a 
written appeal, but the appeal is similar". 38 
What Reedy does by way of further explanation throughout 
the book is to demonstrate by means of photographic examples 
how visual ideas are put into practice in this field of 
communication. His educational method is then not so much 
expository as teaching by example: he provides a certain 
variety of contemporary work, with short accompanying 
comments. It is left up to the viewer/reader to find out 
or analyse how a picture works in detail. 
In this influential area of advertising (as in photojourn- 
alism), photography has so far been seen as a "language" 
only in a general sense. The "language" analogy is a loose 
one subsuming photography with verbal langauge under a broad 
heading of communication. 
This formulation has a general utility, but does not take 
us very far. There are also attendant dangers: there is, 
for example, no explanation of the specificity of photo- 
graphy - as a "language" it is after all "well understood" - 
and examples are given only the briefest of comments. Thus 
there is a danger of a retreat from the necessary verbal 
communication needed to point to features to be noted 
within an illustration. Reedy complains about lack of 
attention to the photographic, but if he is concerned to 
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win over and educate a readership other than the purely 
visually-minded, he cannot afford to fall back on the almost 
purely pictorial to make his points. If everything is self- 
evident, he would not need to publish his book; and he 
undoubtedly needs to elaborate more fully on the visual 
ideas contained in the examples given. Indeed, his brevity 
accentuates the apartness of the pictorial to a point of 
complacency, leading to the conservative ("Do it this way ! ") 
rather than the exploratory ("Why did the photographer do it 
that way ? "). 
A further danger for Reedy's approach lies in the way he 
regards words as competitors to be overcome. They appear 
as obstructions to a limited ideal of irrational, instant 
communication. His ideal is not one of visual complexity 
but of basic "eye-appeal", signalling through the trans- 
parency of shape and texture in the photograph directly to 
the senses. Where Bazin's photography "affects us like a 
phenomenon in nature", Reedy's has no trace of the spiritual. 
Thus in exemplifying his three central working principles - 
"To stop the eye ... To set the mood ... To start the 
sale ... "39 - Reedy makes the following comment on a large 
poster of a cool bottle of "Dr Pepper" floating on ice 
(111.19): 
"A 214-sheet poster must project its message quickly, 
for often its effect is almost subliminal. A 
moderately hot day is all that is needed to make 
this one work to perfection. There is no need for 
words, the picture is the message". 40 
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19. "Dr. Pepper" advertisement, 
1973. 
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This poster would appear not only to work well to Reedy, but 
to exemplify his conception of a standard of excellence: 
"A really great poster needs nothing but a word 
to say it all, and there are times when it doesn't 
need that. It is the ultimate of what an advertising 
illustration can be, for it can stop the eye with its 
design, set the mood with its content, and start the 
sale with the desire it creates". 41 
For Reedy a strong stimulus seems to be required, here artic- 
ulating and intensifying the basic drive of thirst. He has 
no doubt about what will work and leaves unexamined his 
basis of behaviourist "stimulus-response" psychological 
theory as well as the relationship of the photograph of the 
bottle to the real thing. He says nothing about how the 
appearance of the drink is enhanced, removed from its mundane 
context and made "ideal" and desirable through being covered 
in clear, luminous, liquid droplets of condensation, its 
transparent red body standing out from a dark blue back- 
ground, its form lying in a cool bed of ice, inviting to 
the eye, apparently graspable. To achieve this effect requires 
more than an absence of words, rather a particular kind of 
object presence, achieved by the use of certain kinds of 
lighting and colour effects which analysis could have 
elucidated. (Compare Berger on advertising, Pages 217-218. ) 
Instead, Reedy reverts to his overall principles which are 
very basic, if not rudimentary. By omitting discussion at 
anything other than a general level of guidance, he also 
does not provide for the possibility of other approaches 
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than his own - for example, the Harp lager poster of 
summer, 1980, which relied less on the drink being shown 
than an indirect reference: to the highly popular character 
"J. R. ", then playing in "Dallas" on British tv screens. 
Such an appeal - more intellectual than sensuous, playful 
rather than aggressively enticing, sophisticated rather than 
"hard sell" - derives from a view which no doubt foresees 
the potential barrenness of the Reedy approach, where 
familiarity of object can lead to indifference, and illus- 
trates the need to infuse photographic advertising with a 
more radically varied approach than the monolithic one favou- 
red and promulgated by Reedy. 
If advertising in photography then has the possibility of 
a number of approaches, Reedy's is revealed as being only 
one of them, not the only one. The "language" of photography 
is not only a means of "instant" appeal, but could be many 
things: fantasy as in "Marlborough Country" cigarettes, 
gallant adventure for a lady who likes "Milk Tray", and 
whimsy for Guinness. Thus the term "language" can shift 
towards the aesthetic realm, and a meaning of "style", a 
definition of the Shorter Oxford Dictionary being "a manner 
or style of expression". 
42 In this sense, Reedy's "language" 
is only one of a number of possible "languages" of photo- 
graphy. 
For Reedy, "language" is no more than the enhancement of an 
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object in the real world, and his method can be seen as no 
more than a stylistic option in the aim of making a product 
attractive to the consumer. While this meaning of "language" 
draws attention to the possibility of styles in photography, 
we shall not pursue the notion of group or personal style 
further here, since it is an area which is just beginning 
to be opened up in photography with the acceptability of 
photography's art status. 
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C. The analogy with linguistics: semiology and semiotics 
and their influence. 
It is important to note here that photography was not 
accepted as a "language" in the aesthetic sense during its 
early history. Indeed, the history of "art" photography is 
one of prolonged struggle both to gain acceptance as an art 
and to find its own identity, its own mode of expression, 
its "language" in that sense. 
An entry dating from 1976 in the Supplement to the Oxford 
English Dictionary introduces a new factor in the definition 
of "language". A French concept of language, embodied in 
the term "langue" is now included and is defined as: "a 
language viewed as an abstract system accepted universally 
within a speech community in contrast to the actual 
language behaviour of people". 
43 In this definition, the 
first term of Saussure's distinction, "langue/parole", 
has been adopted. An explanation for the third French term 
for "language" should be noted here - that for "langage". 
This term is closest to a pragmatic English view of 
language as a heterogenous collection or aggregate of 
utterances. 
Both "language" as a means of communication and "language" 
as style (whether attached to a nation, group or individual) 
give photography the benefit of relatively autonomous 
status. They are loose metaphors. A tighter metaphor will 
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be put forward, a closer model proposed, when "language" 
is defined according to the principles of structural ling- 
uistics in the Saussurean tradition and its offshoot, 
Parisian semiology. 
For Saussure, the founding father of modern linguistics, 
"langue" was a key conept. Influenced by the sociologist 
Durkheim, he reacted against the 19th century historical 
and causal characterisation of a language as the sum of the 
elements which compose it. In its place he proposed a 
study of language at a selected point in time, a synchronic 
approach, taking a slice through history and examining the 
pattern. For him, "langue" as a system of norms or conven- 
tion came before the individual act of speech (or "parole"). 
"Langue" was assimilated by individuals as an integral part 
of the culture in which they lived. The study of the system, 
of language per se should therefore have priority. He 
stressed as a first principle the "arbitrary" nature of 
the sign in verbal language, pointing out that the signifier 
had no natural connection with its signified. For example, 
an object for sitting on has as its signifier "chair" in 
English, but "Stuhl" in German (Saussure did not regard 
onomatopoeia as an organic element of language). In thus 
freeing "langue" from a direct connection with the world, 
Saussure enabled linguists to concentrate on patterns of 
similarity and difference; and indeed the fruitful notion 
of the phoneme as the minimal functional unit of language 
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followed as a consequence of this approach. Jonathan Culler 
describes his influence as follows: 
"Saussure's influence on modern linguistics has been 
of essentially two kinds. First, he provided a 
general orientation, a sense of the task of 
linguistics, which has been profoundly influential 
and indeed has seldom been questioned, so much has 
it come to be taken for granted as the very nature 
of the subject itself. For Saussure the linguist's 
task was to analyse a language as a system of units 
and relations; to do linguistics was to define the 
units of a language, the relations between them, 
and their rules of combination". 44 
But Saussure had a vision which extended beyond linguistics: 
"A science that studies the life of signs within 
society is conceivable ... I shall call it 
semiology (from Greek semeion "sign"). Semiology 
would show what constitute signs, what laws govern 
them. Since the science does not yet exist, no- 
one can say what it would be; but it has a right 
to existence, a place staked out in advance". 45 
At this point, Saussure foresaw semiology as the master 
model: 
"Linguistics is only a part of the general science 
of semiology; the laws discovered by semiology 
will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter 
will circumscribe a well-defined area within the 
mass of anthropological facts". 46 
Later, in the "Cours", he changes tack: 
"One remark in passing: when semiology becomes 
organised as a science, the question will arise 
whether or not it properly includes modes of 
expression based on completely natural signs, 
such as pantomime. Supposing that the new science 
welcomes them, its main concern will still be the 
whole group of systems grounded on the arbitrar- 
iness of the sign ... Signs that are wholly 
arbitrary realise better than the others the ideal 
of the semiological process; that is why language, 
the most complex and universal of all systems of 
- 156 - 
expresion, is also the most characteristic; in 
this sense linguistics can become the master- 
pattern for all branches of semiology although 
language is only one particular semiological 
system". 47 
Roland Barthes, in adapting Saussure's notion of semiology, 
qualitatively extended the role of the "master-pattern": 
"We must now face the possibility of inverting 
Saussure's declaration: linguistics is not a part 
of the general science of signs, even a privileged 
part, it is semiology which is a part of 
linguistics". 48 
Semiologyin Barthes' project then becomes a "trans-lingui- 
sties". The nonverbal is subsumed for examination under an 
imperious language regime. Barthes affirms a literary 
supremacy: 
i'... we are, much more than in former times, and 
despite the spread of pictorial illustration, a 
civilisation of the written word". 
He also describes "systems of signification", his alter- 
native term for "languages", thus: 
"It is true that objects, images and patterns can 
signify, and do so on a large scale, but never 
autonomously; every semiological system has its 
linguistic admixture. Where there is a visual 
substance, for example, the meaning is confirmed by 
being duplicated in a linguistic message ... " 49 
Yet we are all familiar with photographs which have no 
need of a caption, even in advertising. Barthes' affirm- 
ation is also at odds with Wilson Hicks's cited earlier, 
Page 137. Hicks states that the reader gets a "general 
idea" from the picture, goes on to the words and then back 
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again to the picture, and so on "until the meaning expressed 
in each medium is completely understood". 
50 For Barthes, 
however, "to perceive what a substance signifies is 
inevitably to fall back on the individuation of a language 
(langue)". 51 Working from the concept of "langue", Barthes 
here is so preoccupied with a notion of meaning, system- 
atically produced according to social norms on the verbal 
model, that he neglects other forms of meaning. 
We can acknowledge that the research which has emerged from 
this semiological approach has been important in the develop- 
ment of analytical work on the photographic image, espec- 
ially in the fields of advertising and newspapers, and 
particularly with regard to the notion of ideology. 
52 
However, in the process of the extension of the term, the 
metaphor of verbal language has grown into an all-embracing 
model: and "langue" has become the criterion of all 
"language" meaning. It has developed beyond being a tool 
in the development of knowledge in fields outside ling- 
uistics. It has become a ringmaster. 
Against Barthes, to whom we will return, it is salutary to 
compare Arnheim at his most provocative: 
"In order to evaluate the important role of 
language more adequately it seems to me necessary 
to recognise that it serves as a mere auxiliary 
to the primary vehicles of thought, which are so 
immensely better equipped to represent relevant 
objects and relations by articulate shape". 53 
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Rather than elaborate on the differences represented by 
these two writers, some of which are differences of persp- 
ective (Arnheim sees meaning in space-time configurations 
ignored by Barthes) it will be more useful at this point 
to note that semiology is not the only general study of 
signs. The term "semiotics" was adopted by the Inter- 
national Association for Semiotic Studies, founded in 
1969.54 (However, "semiology" is still a useful term to 
delineate Barthe's formulation). 
The widest interpretation of the general idea of signs is 
that proposed by Sebeok who wishes to include the animal 
kingdom within the purview of the field: "The subject 
matter of semiotics is, quite simply, messages - any 
message whatsoever ... the study designated semiotics 
comprises the set of general principles that underlie the 
structure of all signs, constituting a code ... Semiotics 
is concerned, successively, with the generation and 
encoding of messages, their propagation in any sensorially 
appropriate form of physical energy, their decoding and 
interpretation". 
55 Methods employed then will vary in 
this more tolerant framework. 
For Sebeok, "the subject matter of linguistics is confined 
to verbal messages only . The fundamental competence 
underlying verbal messages is generally assumed to be 
1) special-specific and 2) species-consistent. Species- 
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specificity of the linguistic propensity means that the 
formal principles we deem sufficient to characterise 
natural (or verbal) languages (spoken or not) differ 
radically from those found sufficient to characterise any 
known system of animal communication, including man's so- 
called nonverbal communication systems". 
56 Sebeok sees 
semiotics as concerned with two complementary, interdep- 
endent aspects: communication and signification: "semiotics 
can be informally defined as a science that studies all 
possible varieties of signs, the rules governing their 
generation and production, transmission and exchange, 
reception and interpretation". 
57 The term "science" here, 
in the light of Sebeok's caution on Saussure's use of the 
term, arrogating "more than the field can as yet deliver", 
58 
must be taken in a wide sense. 
Where the Saussurean tradition concentrated on syntax and 
the articulation of defined minimum units, leaving out of 
consideration the producer of signs and the receptor, a 
"communication" perspective includes these as necessary 
aspects. The simplest communication diagram is: 
sender receiver 
--------- message ------- 
or addresser or addressee 
Sender can be replaced by photographer, the message is the 
photograph and the receiver can be a viewer or group of 
viewers. Each of these terms can be given further 
elaboration. The movement of the message, for example, 
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should not be seen as moving in a simple, one-way direction, 
as in "stimulus-response" theory. In photography, this may 
be difficult to justify if the model is seen to be a 
conversational one of verbal interaction. Yet on a more 
extended time-scale, feedback or influence can be made felt: 
and even in modern mass media communication, this notion of 
two-way traffic can be said to be potentially there. 
Surrounding the diagram.. should be "context" as this is a 
fundamental factor to consider. A particular context may 
be said to influence how a photograph is taken or viewed, 
for example, a modern informal portrait compared to a 
formal Victorian one. The fact that many of us now look 
back on Victorian portraits with a sense of nostalgia 
indicates how viewers change in their interpretation of 
the same artefact. 
The message can be regarded as part of a "code", a term 
taken from information theory, rather than the more strictly- 
defined "language". Cherry defines, with Sebeok's approval, 
"code" as "an agreed transformation, or set of unambiguous 
rules, whereby messages are converted from one represent- 
ation to another". 
59 The diagram can now look like this: 
CONTEXT 
code 
addresser message addressee 
I medium 
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Saussure defined a sign as a relation between a material 
form (the signifier) and a concept arising from it (the 
signified). The major problem with photographs in the 
Saussurean perspective is that the relation between a 
picture and the object taken is not obviously arbitrary 
(as a word can be to its signified). Rather it seems 
obviously not arbitrary. There is a relation of likeness: 
more - there is a causal link. Here the semiotic typology 
of Charles Sanders Peirce offers a way through this 
difficulty. 
Peirce is, indeed, a co-founder of semiotics. His work in 
the 19th century as a "backswoodsman" in the area of 
semiotics has only recently been recognised for its 
importance (particularly by Sebeok), partly because his 
writings were scattered and those on signs were not put 
together by him. 
60 His definition of sign is widely 
recognised: "(It) is something which stands to somebody for 
something else in some respect or capacity". 
61 It will be 
useful to rehearse his definitions in full here. Peirce's 
major typology is a three-fold one which is claimed to 
encompass all signs: the icon, the index and the symbol. 
These terms are of course given specialised meanings, and 
are not simply common dictionary meanings. 
A sign is an icon to the extent that it resembles its 
referent. Paintings are predominantly icons, as are 
diagrams, which have an abstracted resemblance. A sign is 
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an index to the extent that its significance depends on a 
real connection between the sign-and what it signifies. 
Peirce gives the following examples: 
"I see a man with a rolling gait. This. is a 
probable indication that he is a sailor. I see 
a bowlegged man with corduroys, gaiters and a 
jacket. These are probable indications that he 
is a jockey or something of the sort. A sundial 
or clock indicates the time of day". 62 
Finally, a sign is a symbol to the extent that its signif- 
icance depends on human convention or an arbitrary decision. 
In this form it corresponds to Saussure's notion of the 
arbitrary, the word. 
It is important to recognise that these categories are not 
mutually exclusive. Most signs have more than one aspect, 
and all three aspects can overlap and be co-present. Thus 
the photograph in general terms can be said to be both 
iconic and indexical; as Peirce states: 
"Photographs, especially instantaneous photographs, 
are very instructive, because we know that in certain 
respects they are exactly like the objects they 
represent. But this resemblance is due to the 
photographs having been produced under such 
circumstances that they were physically forced to 
correspond point by point to nature. In that 
respect, then, they belong to the second class 
of signs, those by physical connection. " 63 
While this Peircean formulation may be thought a weakness 
as an ideal or pure categorisation, it can also be seen to 
be a strength in indicating the possible spectrum of a 
medium. The iconic-indexical aspects link the photo- 
graphic sign with reality, in both an imputed sense in 
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terms of resemblance and in a factual sense in terms of 
indexical connection. This allows for the photograph to 
be seen both as factual evidence and as material for the 
imagination through interpretation. Finally, a photograph 
can become predominantly symbolic, as the Picture Post 
photograph, "Two Nations", cited above, demonstrates (Page 88). 
This strategy then allows for both the factual connection 
with the referent and various possibilities of signification, 
which can be related to an elaborated communication diagram. 
It has a clear link with the process of perception which is 
so obviously fundamental to the nature of photography. 
In addition, the Peircean typology allows a widerperspect- 
ive than photography considered by itself. We can see that, 
within the photograph, there are often other kinds of 
signs, e. g. gestures, clothes, objects - for a photograph 
is also a carrier of other signs - and these, although 
frozen in a moment of time, retain significance as signs, 
in modified form as part of a "code" in the everyday world, 
both in the natural and conventional mode. Not bound to 
the verbocentric dominance of the Saussurean tradition, 
less impersonal than "langue" easily becomes, retaining 
a link with nature and recognising the variety of system- 
isation within communication, the Peircean trichotomy 
provides a useful basis for a semiotic perspective. 
Photography is not submerged, and its possibilities for 
communication and signification can be explored rather than 
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restricted. 
The broad-based framework outlined by Sebeok implies that, 
unlike Saussure, we should not only be directly concerned 
with the synchronic study of communication but with the 
diachronic aspect as well, that is, with the history or 
evolution of signs. This would also take advantage of the 
burgeoning interest, both at a popular as well as a serious 
professional level, in nonverbal behaviour. 
64 
While there 
are a variety of approaches, Weitz notes that "biological 
themes run ... through all the areas of nonverbal communic- 
ation", 
65 
and that "resurgence in the popularity of biolog- 
ically based theories of human behaviour has led to a 
greater focus on nonverbal communication as a link between 
ourselves and our animal(chiefly primate) forebears". 
66 
In Britain, this area is associated with the variable, 
often highly speculative, yet extremely well documented 
work of Desmond Morris. 
67 
In this field of work there is a tension, either overt or 
implied, between the biological and cultural approaches, 
68 
but the biological emphasis does lead us to the question 
of the existence of universal signs in the natural mode. 
Eibl-Eiblesfeldt, a leading empirical investigator in the 
cross-cultural field, declares: 
"The similarities in expressive movements between 
cultures lie not only in such basic expressions 
as smiling, laughing, crying and the facial 
expressions of anger, but in whole syndromes 
of behaviour". 69 
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He also instances the complex of patterns in behaviour such 
as that of coyness, embarrassment and flirting; and in 
embracing, as a pattern of greeting. 
We cannot omit from this picture, however, the effect of 
cultural pressure which can lead to cultural variation. 
As RA Hinde comments on the "eyebrow-flash", in meeting, 
which has wide, virtual Universal agreement: 
"In greeting, people of many cultures smile, 
nod and raise their eyebrows with a rapid 
movement, keeping the eyebrows raised for about 
one sixth of a second. This eyebrow-flash is found 
in many parts of the world, including cultures 
which have had practically no contact with the 
Western world. There is however some cultural 
variation: in Central Europe reserved individuals 
do not use it, and in Japan it is considered 
indecent and is suppressed". 70 
This natural base to behaviour has then to be seen in inter- 
action with cultural convention. Such a field of human 
display is an obvious area where the camera comes into its 
own for exploration and discovery. Here knowledgeable back- 
ground study can be invaluable in linking practical work 
(for example, of spaces between people), 
71 the critical 
reading of photographs, and recent research. Notions of 
the contributions from both the biological and the cultural. 
theorists are necessary. Gesture, body movement, facial 
expression and the various kinds of paralanguage accompanying 
speech are clearly a central area of study for photography, 
whether documentary or advertising in intent. The appeal 
of the Scottish Widows advertisement (I11.20) is evidently 
the "natural" behaviour of father and child, although the 
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20. Scottish Widows advertisement, 
Observer Magazine, 1973. 
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family theme is used for commercial ends. 
If photography is not bound by the cultural barriers 
applicable to verbal language, however, too great a desire 
to generalise what is in fact culturally specific can be 
misleading. Gesture, for example, can change in meaning 
when used over a period of time in particular cultures, -and 
may even alter widely. The ring gesture, made by thumb 
and forefinger, signifies "O. K. " in our culture, but could 
be obscene, worthless, insulting or threatening in other 
countries. Thus an advertisement in 1977 for the Greek 
Olympic Airways as the "O. K. " airline (I11.21) surely 
misfired when it showed photographs of the ring gesture 
being made by an Arab and the Venus de Milo as well as by 
a British business man and a woman tourist. An Oxford 
research team, including Desmond Morris, made a detailed 
field study of gestures in use in over twenty-five countries 
across Western Europe and the Mediterranean, and their 
comment on the ring gesture is as follows: 
"To sum up, the ring is another example of a 
multi-message gesture, with several distinct 
meanings, as you travel from place to place. 
It carries an O. K. message everywhere except 
Tunisia, a zero (i. e. meaning "worthless") 
message in Belgium, France and Tunisia, an 
orifice message in Turkey, Greece and Malta, 
and a threat message in Tunisia". 72 
The producers of this advertisement would appear to have 
been unaware of these variations in meaning. 
It is against this background that Feininger's claim for 
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photography being a universal language has to be seen: 
"In contrast to the spoken and written word a 
picture can be understood anywhere in the world. 
It can bridge the chasm created by differences of 
languages and alphabet. It is the means for 
universal communication. It is the language 
of One World". 73 
This claim can be made too easily and rashly. The things 
shown in a picture may have misleading cultural signific- 
ance. However, certain of our basic experiences belong to 
our common humanity: birth, sickness, courting, sorrow, 
laughter, work. While variable, their expression has 
shared roots. This is the valid aspect of "The Family of 
Man" exhibition of 1955 which toured many countries through- 
out the world, in celebrating "the essential oneness of 
mankind". 
74 The appeal of a photograph is very often the 
recognition of a variation in what is recognised to be the 
captured moment of a common experience. 
Sebeok's framework of signs includes a developmental aspect, 
with a basis in Rene Thom's "catastrophe" theory. While 
the implications of this theory are for present purposes 
matters for future speculation rather than present descrip- 
tion, it can be said that the theory claims to combine a 
wide sweep of natural and human phenomena within a number 
of basic patterns. As Sebeok comments: 
"It so happens that images are a major feature 
of his theory; he has proved that, despite the 
almost limitless number of discontinuous 
phenomena that can exist, there are only a certain 
number of different images that actually occur". 75 
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In similar, if less ambitious vein, Feininger, who has 
explored similarities of pattern in nature and man, can 
say in support of such of his comparative photographs of a 
snail shell and a staircase or bark beetle tunnels and 
embroidery: 
"In the last analysis, everything made by human 
hands and most things conceived by the human 
mind have their prototype in nature". 76 
Photography here becomes a very useful way of exploring 
basic underlying structures - the construction plans of 
nature. 
This area of exploration has obvious educational potential 
in encouraging the search for underlying patterns in nature, 
even without looking for underlying similarities between 
made-made and natural constructions. Since similarities 
are not of the same size, the use of the close-up can, for 
example, reveal the tree-like pattern of frost in a window. 
A book which 'Could provide an impetus for this area of 
enquiry is Theodor Schwenk's study of the movement of water 
and air, and the wave forms. and other patterns produced in 
rivers, whirlpools (large and small), sand, as well as 
plant and tree growth. 
77 There are also obvious links with 
motifs in, for example, the circular forms of Celtic art. 
In this kind of study, photography as exploration of given 
areas with its preservable selectivity can lead to the 
discovery of common forms which in turn can make the basis 
for decorative motifs, that is, such enquiry has potential 
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for increasing knowledge as well as providing ideas for 
art work. On the other hand, a linguistically-inspired 
approach will emphasise the differences between cultures 
rather than underlying unity, although both semiology and 
semiotics are by their very nature and purpose attempts at 
a grand synthesis. Eco, for example, in his 1976 summation 
of the state of semiotics, as he sees it, declares: "The 
laws of signification are the laws of culture". 
78 Roland 
Barthes, who most obviously announced his pioneering work 
of culturally-concerned semiology through the publication 
in France in 1957 of his collected essays, Mythologies, 
critised sharply what he considered to be the sentimental 
optimism behind The Family of Man exhibition. Taking a 
Marxist stance at this period, he commented disparagingly 
on world-wide photographs on the theme of work: 
it ... it will never be fair to confuse in a 
purely gestural unity the colonial and the 
Western people ... we know very well that work 
is 'natural' just as long as it is 'profitable', 
and that in modifying the inevitability of the 
profit, we shall perhaps one day modify the 
inevitability of labour. It is this entirely 
historified work which we should be told about, 
instead of an eternal aesthetics of laborious 
gestures". 77 
Barthes' Marxist stance, however, insofar as it is histor- 
ical, is basically at odds with the approach he formulates 
under the influence of Saussure - for Saussure is anti- 
historical. His theory of language is concerned to isolate 
a static system of relations rather than an historical 
determination: 
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"The first thing that strikes us when we study the 
facts of language is that their succession in time 
does not exist insofar as the speaker is concerned. 
He is confronted with a"state. That is why the 
linguist who wishes to understand a state must discard 
all knowledge of. everything that produced it and ignore 
diachrony. He can enter the minds of speakers only by 
completely suppressing the past. The intervention 
of history can only falsify his judgment". 80 
The Saussurean thrust is a formal, indeed a formalist, one. He 
defines langauge as basically "arbitrary', and thus cuts it 
off from a direct connection with reality itself. The sign 
is defined as a whole arising from the relation between the 
signifier or sound-image representation and the signified or 
concept. 
81 The referent is left out in this approach, 
unlike that of Peirce. 
Barthes is not a thinker to be deterred by obvious contra- 
dictions, however, even when they appear. fatal. A clever 
stylist, he can hold them in suspension through the magic of 
his manipulation of language and even win through to new 
insights. Basically Barthes is an individualist and he never 
completely relinquishes the existential phenomenology of his 
early writings in the tradition of Sartre. His structuralist 
phase, influenced by Saussure, never abandons the essential 
unity and finally undetermined quality of the person - 
principles undermined by the pronouncements of structuralists 
like Foucault* and Culler who elevate system, on the model 
*Foucault himself avoids the label "structuralist" on the 
grounds that he does not use the techniques of linguistics; 
but see Richard and Fernande DeGeorge, eds, The Structuralists: 
From Marx to Levi-Strauss (New York: Anchor-Doubleday, 1972), 
Introd. p. xxvii. 
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of the formal language system, into an iron determinism and 
postulates the death of the human subject in the Cartesian 
tradition. Thus for Foucault, "man is in the process of 
perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever 
brighter upon our horizon", 
82 
and for Culler "the self 
comes to appear more and more as a construct, the result 
of systems of convention". 
83 
For Barthes, however, if the 
"author" of a text is cast aside as inappropriate, as in 
structuralism proper in a new and radical version of the 
old "intentional fallacy" from American literary theory of the 
19140s, 
84. the individual voice reappears in the form of the 
critic; as Barthes unintentionally acknowledges in an essay 
on structuralist method, "the birth of the reader must be 
at the cost of the death of the Author". 
85 
Finally, in 
Camera Lucida, he reverts to a personal reading in discuss- 
ing the photographs; systems of "language" considered as 
codes are not all-embracing "even if, obviously, certain 
codes do inflect our reading of it". 
86 
Yet if Barthes pursues a personal path while appearing to 
embrace system, his intellectual progress has nevertheless 
been very influential, not only in Paris where he was 
accorded intellectual "stardom", but elsewhere in particular 
academic and practical areas. Moreover, the Marxist 
impulse encouraged him to look closely at the workings of 
popular phenomena, including photographic images, rather than 
remain within the realm of literary or fine art. His 
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important contribution in Mythologies was to open up 
examples of popular culture for analysis. However, his 
aim was different from that of the English writers like 
Richard Hoggart and Paddy Whannel, who valued popular 
culture; 
87 
rather, Barthes is concerned to "attack the 
essential enemy (the bourgeois norm)". In doing so, he 
advocates close analysis of the phenomena he studies, a 
procedure also advocated, if less methodically, in 
relation to English literary texts, by the influential 
English academic and fierce critic of popular culture, 
FR Leavis. 
88 Some receptive ground was therefore laid for 
Barthes' acceptance in England by the Puritan intellectual 
tradition. 
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D. Denotation and connotation in Barthes and Hall: 
attitudes to the function of myth and ideology in 
the image. 
The "language" model, based on Saussurean linguistics, has 
been shown to have had an ambitious programme in the hands 
of Barthes, no less than the centralisation of nonverbal 
kinds of meaning through its own system of signification. 
Barthes, as a key figure in the project, was not however 
as fully committed to the structuralist tenets of imper- 
sonality and system as those he influenced, as we shall see. 
In countering some of the implications of semiology, a looser 
model in the form of Sebeok's semiotics has been projected 
as a better model for an over-arching theory of signific- 
ation and communication; and we have found that this is 
friendly to discovery procedures in photography, partic- 
ularly in relation to natural phenomena. By contrast, 
semiology is concerned with how meaning is propagated in 
society in systems of signification, which are essentially 
filtered through verbal language. 
It will be useful now to look more closely at the distinc- 
tion of denotation/connotation, taken from structural 
linguistics by Barthes; and to see the terms in relation 
to other major concepts he extracted, in particular 
signifier/signified and langue/parole, which have already 
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been described. Discussion of these concepts will inevit- 
ably lead to accounts of the working of "myth" and "ideology" 
in society. 
Barthes was concerned in Mythologies with areas which could 
be said to reflect the taken-for-granted values of the status 
quo, what he calls "myth" but what other Marxists would 
term "ideology". Photography, however, appears "natural", 
not man or class-made. Barthes' principal aim in this book 
then was to provide a basis for a critique of myth or ideol- 
ogy and its quality of seeming to be real while in effect 
being cultural. In carrying out this aim he makes use of 
key concepts taken from linguistics which are set out more 
systematically and explored for their application in a 
variety of areas in Elements of Semiology, 
89 for example, 
langue/parole, signifier/signified. 
The main concept that Barthes makes use of in Mythologies 
is that of connotation, which is differentiated from 
denotation as two levels of meaning. This concept is taken 
from a Danish linguist in the Saussurean tradition, Hjemslev, 
who extended the formal emphasis of Saussure. Denotation is 
the level of the literal meaning (presumably in a picture 
what one recognises) and the level of connotation corre- 
sponds to the level of ideology, or more extensively, myth. 
In a diagram borrowed from Hjemslev, Barthes sets out the 
process systematically: 
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level of connotation signifer signified 
level of denotation signifier signified 90 
The sign on the denotative level, i. e. the relation between 
signifier and signified, becomes a mere element of the 
second system; it becomes the signifier of the next level, 
a wider system, and this refers to a signified which comes 
from ideology or myth. Thus a sign at the denotative level 
such as "roast-beef" can refer, in the context of a tourist 
brochure, to the wider notion of "Britishness". Barthes 
himself introduces the notion of myth to the level of 
connotation, and also of course the use of these two levels 
in nonverbal areas. 
Barthes gives his own example of a photograph; 
"I am at the barber's, and a copy of Paris-Match 
is offered to me. On the cover, a young Negro 
in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes 
uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour. 
All this is the meaning of the picture. But, 
whether naively or not, I see very well what it 
signifies to me: that France is a great Empire, 
that all her sons, without any colour discrim- 
ination, faithfully serve under her flag, and 
that there is no better answer to the detractors 
of an alleged colonialism than the zeal shown by 
this Negro in serving his co-called oppressors. 
I am therefore again faced with a greater semi- 
ological system: there is a signifier, itself 
already formed with a previous system (a black 
soldier is giving the French salute); there is 
a signified (it is here a purposeful mixture of 
Frenchness and militariness); finally, there is 
the presence of the signified through the 
signifier". 91 
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There are omissions in this analysis which leave us asking 
questions. Where does the ideology come from ? Barthes 
does not describe in detail the context of the magazine which 
would tend to induce in the "average reader" (whose role he 
assumes here) the kind of connotative meaning which he 
alleges would arise. Indeed, to make such a reading 
assumes that he, Barthes, can make a "true reading" able 
to see beyond myth, and further, that he can place himself 
in the position of a reader who cannot. If the system 
works, can this be so - otherwise than by assertion or the 
introduction of a theory of intuition ? Husserl's notion 
of epoche is latent here, that is, a theory of the ability 
to filter our prejudice and "received thought". Husserl 
believes this can be done through "reductions"; 
92 
as 
Kockelmans explains: 
"By reduction he means in general that methodic 
procedure by which one places onself on the 
'transcendental sphere', the sphere in which we 
can perceive things as they are in themselves, 
independently of any prejudice. In other words, 
it is a change of attitude, by virtue of which 
we learn to see the things we previously thought 
to perceive, in a different way, i. e. in an 
original and radical way. We penetrate deeper 
into things and learn to see the more profound 
'layers' behind what we first thought to see". 93 
Obviously such a theory - and its attendant philosophy - 
veers to the transcendental area of what we mean by the 
real, the opposite direction of a materialist Marxism, but 
it does attempt to answer an important question raised by 
Barthes' account. Peirce's account of The Principles of 
Phenomenology point in the same direction as Husserl's 
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more developed formulation. Regarding phenomenology, 
Peirce states: 
"It simply scrutinizes the direct appearances, 
and endeavours to combine minute accuracy with 
the broadest possible generalization. The 
student's great effort is not to be influenced 
by any tradition, any authority, any reasons for 
supposing that such and such ought to be the facts, 
or any fancies of any kind, and to confine himself 
to honest, single-minded observation of the 
appearances". 94 
Yet Barthes in his analysis is making an important point. 
He is saying that the appearances of the photographic 
image, because of its apparent reality, helps to establish 
the reality, i. e. the apparent commonsense, of the ideology. 
This is so despite the use of an analogy with the lingui- 
stics of verbal language which involves a number of mis- 
leading similarities where there are differences. The 
photograph, for example, is not "arbitrary" but is linked 
causally to its referent; the distinction signifier/signif- 
ied is not clear-cut in the case of the photograph for the 
image is like its referent to a degree; finally, each photo- 
graph is unique, though subject to stylistic conventions, 
and not part of a "langue" in the manner of verbal 
language. 
The question then arises: do we need this linguistic filter 
in order to find the Barthesian conclusion cogent ? It 
would appear not. Barthes, despite his claims to be 
founding a translinguistics as enunciated in his Elements, 
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is actually in this analysis only using the language con- 
cepts suggestively, as helpful metaphors to carry him to 
an insight, not necessarily dependent on the means. 
The metaphor has been useful insofar as it has taken 
Barthes beyond simple content analysis, prevalent in 
"effects" studies of the image, and the formal aspect of 
linguistics has made him aware of the internal relations 
of a photograph rather than an enunciation of objects. 
While using Saussure, Barthes ignores the "arbitrary" 
aspect; rather, he is aware that a photograph has a sense 
of presence and in that way is true to its referent while 
the myth is unreal as Barthes sees it: indeed in one passage, 
Barthes shows that he is not really making use of a concept 
of Saussurean signs at all, the basis of the linguistic 
model, but what Saussure defines as "symbol", something 
that is not completely arbitrary in his terminology. In 
Saussure the term receives only a paragraph of comment: 
"The word symbol has been used to designate the 
linguistic sign, or more specifically, what is here 
called the signifier. Principle 1 in particular 
('The Arbitrary Nature of the Sign') weighs 
against the use of this term. One characteristic 
of the symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary; 
it is not empty, for there is the rudiment of a 
natural bond between the signifier and the signified. 
The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not 
be replaced by just any other symbol, such as a 
chariot". 95 
It is a less-than-arbitrary definition of the word "symbol" 
that Barthes makes use of in the following passage: 
*Peirce's definition of "symbol" as an ideal category is 
that it is purely conventional. 
- 181 - 
"It is this constant game of hide-and-seek between 
the meaning and the form which defines myth. The 
form of myth is not a symbol: the negro who salutes 
is not a symbol of the French Empire: he has too 
much presence, he appears as a rich, fully experienced, 
spontaneous, innocent, indisputable image. But at 
the same time this presence is tamed, put at a 
distance, made almost transparent; it recedes a little, 
it becomes the accomplice of a concept which comes 
to it fully armed, French imperiality: once made 
use of, it becomes artificial". 96 
We could leave aside then much of the linguistic apparatus 
as dispensible ballast, retaining denotation/connotation 
as a useful distinction. The passage on its own has a 
certain power and subtlety; indeed it could be seen more 
truly as a phenomenological analysis as described above, 
or a description of Peirce's semiosis at work, but incor- 
porating a notion of false consciousness. 
What is missing here in Barthes' description is attention to 
those elements in the photograph to do with spatial 
relations and concepts of time. We are not give a repro- 
duction of the cover of the magazine unfortunately, but no 
doubt the placing of the soldier in relation to the flag 
in the space framed by the photograph and the kind of 
expression that was caught in the face and stance of the 
soldier are important elements in going from the particular 
to the general. Colour would be important too: it spec- 
ifies the tricolour rather than another country's flag 
on the basis of both natural colour discrimination and 
cultural agreement, and this object has attached to it 
notions of patriotism. As an action saluting the flag 
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attains its own generalised resonance which is not just a 
matter of translation into verbal language. 
Despite his claims for a "trans-linguistics", Barthes 
found it a major challenge to see nonverbal forms in terms 
of some principal concepts in linguistics. Recognising in 
his Introduction to his Elements that semiology might have 
to change its character, he also acknowledges that: 
"Such an investigation is both diffident and 
rash: diffident because semiological knowledge at. 
present can be only a copy of linguistic knowledge; 
rash because this knowledge must be applied forth- 
with, at least as a project, to non-linguistic 
objects". 97 
He could not have proceeded, of course, had he accepted the 
strict linguistic basis for the use of the term "language", 
that, for example, defined by Martinet as the principle of 
the double articulation of units, where we have monemes 
with a semantic content and phonic expression, the latter 
further articulated into phonemes, of which there are a 
limited number in each language and which provide the basic 
binary opposition. 
98 
To take the other extreme, Barthes was not so naively mis- 
leading as to suggest that an image is equal to a word, as 
is still sometimes suggested. This is a heritage from film 
theory in an early attempt, pre-linguistic, at a film 
grammar beginning with the image. Its method as applied 
in education has been parodied by Knight. 
99 Christian 
Metz, writing at the same time as Barthes, comments 
pertinently: 
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"The image is 'sentence' less by its quantity 
of meaning ... than by its assertive status. The image is always actualised ... A close-up 
of a revolver does not mean 'revolver' (a purely 
virtual lexical unit), but at the very least, 
and without speaking of connotations, it signifies 
'Here is a revolver !'" 100 
Yet the traces of the old "film grammar" still linger, 
however, as in suggested school exercises put forward in a 
Kodak publication where building sets of picture-grammar 
categories are recommended such as "pictures of objects to 
serve as NOUNS; pictures of people in actions as VERBS". 
101 
Barthes' formulations are at least based on a knowledge of 
and attempted departure from linguistics. The difficulty 
of the enterprise is summarised by Metz as follows: 
"Whether language or art, the image discourse 
is an open system, and is not easily codified, 
with its nondiscrete basic units (the images), 
its intelligibility (which is too natural), its 
lack of distance between the significate (or 
signifier) and the signified". 102 
The most sophisticated version of Barthes' early attempts 
to analyse the photographic image, is in "The Rhetoric of 
the Image". Here he considers the influence of the ling- 
uistic message in addition to that of the image proper. 
In one sense the conclusion is still the same: the photo- 
graph appears natural while in effect "the denoted image 
naturalises the symbolic message, it innocents the semantic 
artifice of connotation ... a pseudo-truth is surreptitiously 
substituted for the simple validity of openly semantic 
systems" 
103 (that of verbal language being the most obvious). 
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The function of the linguistic message is primarily as a 
control, that is, as "anchorage". The image is character- 
ised as "polysemous", capable of having a wide variety of 
interpretations, in its connotations. In the advertising 
image which he used as his example - and his model - it is 
important that only particular meanings are clarified. 
Thus: 
1' ... the text 
directs the reader through the 
signifieds of the image, causing him to avoid 
some and receive others; by means of a subtle 
dispatching, it remote-controls him towards a 
meaning chosen in advance". 104 
These quotations show the appeal of the analysis for those 
concerned with the function of ideology in society, whether 
in advertising or in the area of news dissemination, and 
this aspect of the analysis has had a wide influence. 
Less successful was his proposal for an image "language" 
asa rhetoric: it required an inventory of codes of connot- 
ation from which purely formal figures could be devised, 
but this proposal has not been easily fulfilled because of 
the weight of contextual meaning in photographs. (See Pages. 
129-130). 
Barthes' literary bias, however, most obviously comes through 
this conception of the caption. Here he assumes that the 
caption is in a position of dominance or provides a filter 
for meaning. He seems to accept an assumption that meaning 
arises basically through verbal language and its categoris- 
ation of reality. The way in which visual-spatial aspects in 
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themselves work to produce meaning is neglected. As we 
saw in the photograph by Euan Duff (see Page 114), such 
aspects are important ways in which meaning is conveyed. 
Yet it is the case that we often lazily accept the meaning 
given in a caption and do not search a picture extensively. 
In order to develop our notions of what is contained in 
photographs, we need to see in a purer form those which 
usually come to use accompanied by text. Exercises where 
captions from newspaper and magazines are omitted and then 
re-introduced can be very helpful in developing this aware- 
ness, and some examples of this type of work is given in 
the BFI Gauthier paper. 
105 Again, titles can be changed, 
and this makes us consider a different aspect of a photo- 
graph. The humorous caption is one way of doing this 
effectively, as Spike Milligan has shown in his delightful 
book on transport. Under an orthochromatic picture of 
Chinese boys on stilts, one serious-looking boy higher in 
the air than the four others, he has added to the main 
title, Transport: China, the caption, "Young boys saving 
shoe leather and training to be giants", 
106 
We can also develop a sense of pictorial values through a 
knowledge of pictorial styles, photographic or painterly. 
The Benson and Hedges cigarette series (I11.1), for 
example, depends for its full appreciation on a knowledge 
of Magritte. Barthel tends to assume in the context of 
his photographic essays, cultural knowledge is a given 
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artificial thing, is there, but in the context of school, 
_knowledge 
of previous pictorial configurations cannot be 
assumed, and can enrich the understanding when cultivated. 
Barthes' focus on the artificiality of bourgeois culture 
leaves such a valid educational concern blurred and uncon- 
sidered. The aspect which has commonly been taken out of 
"The Rhetoric of the Image" has been its political-cultural 
implications. 
However, the essay also appears to have a phenomenological 
aspect which has been overlooked. In his analysis, Barthes 
finds three messages: the linguistic message, and two in 
the "pure" image, a coded and an uncoded message. Thus 
Barthes makes a kind of descent from the obviously coded, 
verbal language, through coded signs in the image (he 
distinguishes four in the Panzani advertisement) to the 
uncoded image which is the literal or denoted message. In 
a sense this is a kind of "reduction" from the collective 
signs to a "pure" category of basic identification. Unlike 
the Husserl reduction, however, it leads not to "being", 
the things themselves, but to an existential absurdity, an 
area of unmeaning where uncertainty and terror lurk. This 
is the territory of Sartre's desorption of the tree root in 
Nausea: "Knotty, inert, nameless, it fascinated me, it 
filled my eyes, repeatedly brought me back to its own 
existence". 
107 Barthes, in an earlier essay, finds that 
pure denotation (strictly speaking, an "ideal" category) 
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is most nearly reached in traumatic images of such events 
as fires, catastrophes and violent deaths. Here, "The 
trauma is a suspension of language, a blocking of meaning". 
io8 
In this situation, the function of coded connotation "is to 
integrate man, to reassure him", 
109 to counter what he 
describes in the later essay as "the terror of uncertain 
110 
signs' 
This explanation is one surely closest to Barthes' personal 
roots. Its "reductive" emphasis leaves another possibility 
for a personal explanation of the real. The denotative 
area in this account is a metaphysical area - pushing to 
limits beyond social conventions. 
Thus Barthes does not abandon the photograph to the arb- 
itrary, to be in this way like verbal language; and indeed 
in his last book he emphasises the ability of the camera 
to capture the presence of a person, even if in doing so, 
it confines her/him in that frozen moment to the past. He 
also recognises there the limitations of a sociological 
analysis: 
"It is precisely because the Photograph is an 
anthropologically new object that it must escape, 
it seems to me, usual discussions of the image. 
It is the fashion, nowadays, among Photograph's 
commentators (sociologists and semiologists), to 
seize upon a semantic relativity: no "reality" 
(great scorn for the "realists" who do not see that 
the photograph is always coded), nothing but 
artifice ... " Ill 
Bartfies does not mention that he has been partly responsible 
for this "semantic relativity", even if through one-sided 
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interpretation of his own essays ! 
While recognising that the photograph is like other pictures 
in being analogical, he proclaims that he has always been a 
realist at heart and that the distinguishing feature of the 
photograph is its "evidential force" - thus, while no doubt 
comparing the automatic aspect of the camera with the 
wholly human intervention in drawing and painting, he 
concludes: 
"From a phenomenological viewpoint, in the 
Photograph, the power of authentication 
exceeds the power of representation". 112 
While Barthes then preserves a notion of the evidence of 
natural reality beside the elusive artifice of convention 
he finds in the image, it is the notion of artifice and 
"real-seeming" which has been taken up by other, more 
strongly Marxist thinkers. Barthes is fascinated by the 
paradox of photography: it is "a message without a code", 
113 
combining "spatial immediacy with temporal anteriority", 
its reality one of "having-been-there", thus "a reality 
from which we are sheltered", 
114 
real in its denotative 
ability yet artificially unreal in its socially constructed 
connotative realm. When this last aspect is taken up by 
Marxist writers, however, the notion of a reality beyond 
social determination becomes lost. Denotation as a cate- 
gory comes to be submerged under connotation, now considered 
as a form of social determinism; culture as politics 
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becomes all-important. The value of Barthes' analysis is 
that he makes a relation between nature and culture. The 
extreme Marxist formal analysis collapses this into culture. 
This defuses ultimately the special potency of the photo- 
graphic image which, if it is reduced to another manipulable 
artefact, loses all sense of power and value as "evidence". 
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Stuart Hall took up Barthes' notions and adapted them to 
his own use in an analysis of news photographs. 115 It 
should also be noted that in doing so he moves away from a 
dependence on linguistic analogies towards a greater depend- 
ence on modes of production and on social determination as 
seen in a Marxist sense. For example, he examines how the 
news photo signifies along eight different levels, and he 
is particularly concerned about the way the photograph 
articulates key ideological themes. "Double articulation" 
appears as "formal news values/ideological treatment - 
which binds the inner discourse of the newspaper to the 
ideological universe of the society" - only a passing 
acknowledgment to linguistics. 
116 
At first sight it appears that he strongly preserves the 
denotation/connotation distinction. Indeed he uses it 
quite explicitly, but simplified: "Codes of denotation 
are precise, literal, unambiguous". 
117 He also quotes 
JS Mill who observed that "A connotative term is one which 
denotes a subject, and implies an attribute". 
118 This has 
the benefit of freeing us from the mechanics of Hjemslev's 
linguistic diagram and its difficulties in relation to the 
image. However, the thrust of his argument elsewhere 
implies a breakdown of this distinction. He speaks of 
denotation as a "formal-denotative" mode; it is not a 
reproduction in essence but "a recognisable transcription 
of reality". 
119 For him "iconic signs ... are also coded 
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signs"120 (not a combination of the natural and the conven- 
tional). It is the basic unreality of photographs with 
which-he is concerned - the way in which their only- 
apparent reality is manipulated. Thus we return to the 
idea of the photographic image as basically conventional, 
and in that way like verbal language: 
"Here we assume that the photo signifies like 
all other signs in a discourse - that is, by means 
of a shared or learned code. In language, there 
is no message without a code". 121 
The word "code" is used instead of "language" in Hall's 
account, and though given a special meaning as a means of 
signification, its secretive and rigid implications rein- 
force the idea of the elusive but determining force of 
ideology which is Hall's theme. 
Hall's account is nevertheless a forceful one insofar as 
he situates his theme in the context of newspaper production 
and shows clearly where a number of choices are available 
for manipulation of the image. For example, he notes the 
compositional arrangements at the time of taking the photo- 
graph (placing of the subject in the frame, angle chosen, 
focusing) and in laying out the photograph on the printed 
page. 
Thus we have to recognise that the news image is shaped, and 
because of the time factor, very often according to formulae 
and "accepted" ideas which are simply assumed and not 
questioned. We need to become aware of the possibilities 
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of shaping, and this can most obviously be done through 
education. There is also no need to limit the kind of 
analysis Hall suggests to our own society. Cross-national 
examination of news is always revealing, and pressure towards 
conformity is clearly present in Marxist societies. Despite 
selection, however, evidence remains in the photograph, 
there are elements resisting transformation. 
The notion of ideology as- a homogeneous phenomenon which is 
widely pervasive in our society and insiduously influential 
through the press also required qualification in Hall's 
account. It is the case that British newspapers - because 
of their ownership and control and general policy attitudes - 
will be similar in their views on basic law and order 
situations, for example, if slightly different in their 
inflection of those attitudes, as Hall indicates. 
122 How- 
ever, they will be different in their treatment of political 
party events; here there is no basic consensus. Analysis - 
and comparison - of newspaper treatment of party events will 
therefore be revealing of differences of approach based on 
different beliefs. 
A Sunday Telegraph photograph of a Labour Party Conference 
provides an interesting example for comment here. (I11.22). 
The photograph has been taken from a low angle so that more 
than half the frame is filled with empty seats, implying that 
the meeting was badly attended. It should be noted that the 
theme of attendance is not a feature of the caption or 
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associated headlines, so that we have here an instance 
where the wording does-not limit the connotation of the 
image, as Barthes asserted it did. 
123 Instead, the 
connotations of the image work in relation to the headline 
theme of a "bitter attack" on Mrs Thatcher to make a further 
implication - or inference - that the Labour Party leader 
is going to extremes and encountering apathy. 
It is also noteworthy that a close examination of the image 
reveals a respectable attendance in the seats nearer the 
front of the hall; thus there is evidence available here 
to tell a rather different story. 
We also need to note that manipulation - the exercise of 
choice - need not necessarily be malign, but may be used to 
enhance the clear understanding of an event. For example, 
in the news coverage of the Falklands conflict, an under- 
standing of the vulnerability of the British ships to air 
attack while at anchor in San Carlos Bay became clearly 
apparent only when photographic film was released. 
Thus there is the question of ethics - professional 
ethics - to consider. Photographers can aspire to a display 
which reveals the salient features of an event. Not to do 
so is to descend to a level of assertion, where the eviden- 
tial quality of photography is neglected and everything is 
considered as coded. A strength of Hall's account is that 
he overtly preserves the denotation/connotation distinction, 
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despite a movement in his paper running counter to it. Yet 
if we lose the objective of attempting to distinguish 
between fact and value, and find the commonsense distinction 
between facts and interpretation in newspaper practice a 
12 
myth, "the utopia of naturalism", we are reduced to a 
choice of propaganda. 
Harold Evans begins a consideration of the problem of the 
news photograph as "fiction" with the formulation: 
"The camera cannot lie; but it can be an 
accessory to untruth". 125 
Evans is pointing to the way in which the camera is a tool 
in the hands of the user. It does record what is in front 
of it, but there are many cases where that "reality" has 
been enacted or re-enacted for the sake of the cameraman, 
even by news-photographers of repute. Evans mentions Bert 
Hardy, the famous Picture Post photographer: 
"Hardy, who won prizes for his brave photographs 
of the landing at Inchon under fire, can recall 
scores of 'news' photographs he staged". 126 
While "staging" may simply clarify what is happening 
("Please do that again. "), it is obviously open to abuse. 
Yet we may conclude with Evans, who considers a variety of 
examples: 
"To warn the risks of being deceived by a 
photograph is not to admit that photography 
permanently deludes". 127 
Thus if we need to cultivate a necessary scepticism on the 
part of the viewer of photographs and become aware of the 
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the possibilities arising from mediation, we also need to 
encourage the best purRoses of photography in particular 
areas of work. Human ingenuity - misused - can give us a 
deceptive picture of an event, simply because we were not 
present at the event and photography is selective - thus we 
need an ethics of photography pertaining to its appropriate 
use. With newspaper photography, there are dangers in 
dominant, including aesthetic, concerns, "in emulation and 
subjectivity which rate what a photographer can create 
higher than what he can report". 
128 However, deception is 
subject to correction by other observers, so that photo- 
graphic evidence as such is allied to the development of a 
notion of trust. We would hardly trust the photographs 
taken and used of an event by an extremist organisation. 
An example from the Provisional IRA's semi-official news- 
sheet indicates an obvious manipulation of photographic 
evidence through juxtaposition and the use of an untypical 
"caught moment". (I11.23). 
Unfortunately some Marxist analyses tend to extremes, and 
wide-ranging considerations become overshadowed by political 
didacticism. Thus in an article on the relation between 
photography and ideology in education, after hearing of 
the deficiencies of our educational system in class terms, 
we are told: 
"We believe that many of these attitudes and 
values in our society come about because of the 
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interlocking structures of oppression: 
PATRIARCHY ... CAPITALISM ... IMPERIALISM ... 
" 129 
This hectoring simplistic töne is unfortunate as the 
article contains a number of useful and lively suggestions 
for practical work in photography regarding, for example, 
stereotypes. In practice the authors assume that children 
are capable of change by themselves providing they become 
aware of pressures on them. Theirs can be a practically 
involved and humane Marxism at an operational level. In 
their identity projects, concerning the prevalence of 
notions of glamour instilled through the repetition of 
images of particular female beauty and perfection, there 
are a number of helpful insights: 
"Experience revealed that girls with a high visual 
self-image always glamourised their looks, whilst 
girls with lower visual self-image did 'character' 
studies, funny or fantasy faces". 130 
We can therefore agree with the authors' advocacy of "visual, 
nonverbal and ideological education", but not add as they 
do "against the dominant patriarchal capitalistic values 
inherent in education". 
131 (They would want to begin this 
before children learn to read and write ! ). The question 
of professional ethics is raised again by such a statement 
of a direct political aim as a primary objective. While 
it is important that teachers encourage their pupils to 
think out when possible, query and not simply accept conven- 
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tional values, an evangelical political programme is less 
than fully educational, if simply attempting to substitute 
one set of values for another, rather than to provide 
widely-informed understanding and the encouragement of 
responsible choice. 
The question of controversial values being introduced in 
school has been the main concern of The Humanities Project, 
in which photographs have been widely used as part of a 
library of "evidence" for discussion. 
132 The Project 
assumes a democratic ideal as a basis for reasoned discussion 
rather than positing a blanket ideological consensus with 
repressive tendencies. It assumes the value of as free a 
discussion as possible within the school situation on the 
basis of group discussion under the guidance of a proced- 
urally neutral chairman, and the help of issue-raising 
material, with conclusions being left to the pupil. This 
Project was originally for school-leavers, and obviously 
aims to develop independent decision-making. The role of 
the "neutral" chairman has been difficult to accept, but 
it is a procedurally neutral role that is required, and 
the teacher's opinion is withheld precisely to allow the 
pupils to test out theirs, rather than simply accept or 
reject the view of one in authority without thinking. 
Based on discussion, its home is in the English Department, 
but its use of photographs could well benefit from a study 
of their nature. Evidential images can provide excellent 
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material for discussion, but the role of empathy, for 
example, in creating differences of interpretation, needs 
to be understood (Page 207). 
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E. "Language" as a dominating cultural model in formalist 
Marxist semiology: responses to the model. 
The influence of Saussure and his linguistic theory has 
thus had many ramifications, beginning with a theory of 
language form and ending here with the exploration of 
political and other controversial areas in school. The 
reason for this span of-issues can be traced to the rise of 
formal theory in general to a position of key importance 
in the wake of the success of linguistics. The form of 
language became elevated through the influence of structur- 
alist theory to a "thing" - content became dominated by 
theories of form taken from Saussure's assertion that the 
inter-relation of formal elements was all-important. Where 
he applied the idea only to the form of language, others 
applied the idea to content. L4vi-Strauss, for example, 
used the basic notion in anthropology to find basic patterns 
in primitive myths. 
133 
Marxist theory would appear to be immune to this kind of 
influence; it is after all concerned with conditions of 
material existence, concrete reality, so that the purely 
formal worlds erected by structural thought - even if forms 
of content - would seem to be antipathetic. Nevertheless, 
the advent of Althusser's work in France provided a link 
between structuralism, the semiology to which it gave rise, 
and Marxism. 
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It is not intended to survey Althusser at length here, 
but his basic notion was a development of Marxist theory, 
in that he posited "relatively autonomous" areas of dis- 
course in the social structure in opposition to the trad- 
itional Marxist principle of direct economic determinism, 
that is, the superstructure was now only indirectly 
influenced by the economic base. In effect, this was a 
re-theorisation of the base/ superstructure metaphor, as 
Aithusser notes. 
134 
Althusser describes his notion of the Marxist whole as he 
now sees it as: 
it - constituted 
by a certain type of complexity, 
the unity of a structured whole containing what 
can be called levels or instances which-are 
distinct or 'relatively autonomous', and co-exist 
within this complex structural unity, articulated 
with one another according to specific determin- 
ations, fixed in the last instance by the level 
or instance of the economy". 135 
Thus the activity of the economic determinant is played down 
and even appears to be marginalised; as Althusser notes 
elsewhere: 
it ... the economic 
dialectic is never active 
in the pure state; in History, these instances, 
the superstructures, etc - are never seen to 
step respectfully aside when their work is done 
or, when the Time comes, as his pure phenomena, 
to scatter before His Majesty the Economy as he 
strides along the royal road of the Dialectic. 
From the first moment to the last, the lonely 
hour of the 'last instance' never comes". 136 
This formulation then leaves room for formally autonomous 
theory to enter the domain of Marxist thought. Moreover, 
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language itself, as an all-embracing formal system, comes 
to be elevated in structuralist thought to a dominating 
position in the formation of culture. As Levi-Strauss 
wrote: 
" ... language can be said to be a condition of 
culture because the material out of which language 
is built is of the same type as the material out of 
which the whole culture is built: logical relations, 
oppositions, correlations, and the like. Language, 
from this point of view, may appear as laying a 
kind of foundation for the more complex structures 
which correspond to the different aspects of 
culture". 137 
Ground was thus laid for the growth of a strange hybrid, a 
combination of linguistics-influenced formalism and 
Althusserian Marxism. This mode of thought flourished in 
the pages of Screen magazine in the seventies. Highly 
abstract and often unhelpfully obscure in formulation, it 
left practical educational concerns to its small sister 
publication, Screen Education. The dominant journal was 
mainly concerned with film, with only minor excursions into 
photography, so that the ramifications and vicissitudes of 
its career will not be surveyed here. They are well 
described, however, by McDonnell and Robins from an anti- 
Althusser Marxist position. 
138 Providing a general back- 
ground to problems in Marxist aesthetics, Terry Lovell's 
Pictures of Reality also gives a much-needed, clear, critical 
139 
appraisal of theories influenced by Althusser. 
A further complication was added to Marxist semiology with 
the attempted incorporation of the psycho-analytic theory 
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of Lacan. 
140 Theory which emphasised the dominance of 
system over the individual had need of a psychological 
explanation to account for the formation of the human being 
in alienation. Language theory from a strict structural 
position considered only itself, and not the speaker or 
listener; it was not a communication theory, and was there- 
fore not concerned with psychology. Marxism, an economic 
and social account primarily, had never evolved an adequate, 
congruent psychological theory. However, Lacan had both 
linguistic interests and an account of the development of 
the alienated self which began in childhood141 so that he 
appeared attractive to some theorists, including those of 
Screen. Thus Lacan postulated, via Saussure, "a language 
of the unconscious" - but it was a language of the 
imaginary, cut off from the world to which it referred. 
Thus it was hardly the basis for an ability to penetrate 
the supposed falsehoods of bourgeois society. Lacan's 
Language is self-referential: 
"Let me therefore say precisely what Language 
signifies in what it communicates: it is 
neither signal, nor sign, nor even sign of the 
thing in so far as the thing is an exterior 
reality. The relation between signifier and 
signified is entirely enclosed in the order 
of Language itself, which completely conditions 
its two terms". 142 
Such an alliance then was something of a yoking-together 
of opposites: neo-Freudianism with its basic pessimism 
could hardly be squared with a Marxist concern for 
changing the world, a world which Freud found basically 
- 205 - 
unchangeable, the human being a prisoner of his childhood. 
Moreover, the human subject in this theory was found no 
longer to retain his unity as a person. Instead he becomes 
simply the site for an interplay of ideas and beliefs; 
"the subject is the same process as the language itself", 
143 
in one formulation. However, if the "initial premise of the 
free human consciousness endowed with the capacity to 
44 
realise meaning111 is made problematic and thus attenuated, 
then it is difficult to place any confidence in any state- 
ment whatsoever. The human being is like a leaf open to 
any wind that blows. This kind of account then raises 
more problems than it solves. 
Victor Burgin, the writer-photographer who has written for 
both Screen and Screen Education and has been influenced by 
and contributed to this current of thought, ends an article 
on photography: 
"A fact of primary social importance is that the 
photograph is a place of work, a structured and 
structuring space within which the reader deploys, 
and is deployed by, what codes he or she is 
familiar with in order to make sense". 145 
But in the Marx-Lacanian account, the reader is doomed not. 
to make sense, to realise meaning. His work would appear 
to achieve nothing; he is like a hamster in a treadmill 
able to run hard but really standing still. We can only 
agree with an earlier statement by Burgin himself: 
it .., it must be arguable that the ability of the individual to 'see through' institutions, 
in a sort of autobiographical e oche, which 
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brackets merely conventional determinations 
of action, is a prerequisite of social 
change". 146 
Such an ability presupposes at the very least a "humanistic" 
kind of Marxism, a less than iron determinism in the inter- 
pretation of Marx by Luka'cs or even that by Erich Fromm, 
who believed that Marx's concern was "man's liberation ... 
from the prison his own arrangements and deeds had built 
around him". 
147 The reference to Husserl by Burgin suggests 
that the transcendental ego is a necessary assumption. 
Eco's formulation of the earlier "classic" semiotics is 
still apt: 
"The semiotic investigation starts from the 
principle that if there is to be communication 
it must be established and governed by the way 
the emitter organises a message. He does this 
according to a system of rules socially convent- 
ionalised (even at the unconscious level) which 
makes up the code ... 
It is obviously wrong to conclude from this that 
communication cannot innovate, invent, reorganise 
the modes of understanding between people. The 
message with an aesthetic content is an example 
of an ambiguous message, that brings the code 
into question ... If the codes aren't known, then neither is it possible to say where there 
has been invention. 
In this sense semiotic research, while apparently 
orientated towards total determinism, in fact 
seeks to demystify the false acts of liberty". 148 
Even if we consider Eco's concentration on social rules 
too overwhelming - with the natural aspect of communication 
omitted in his design, cases of empathy for example being 
considered as "mere stimulations" 
149 
- Eco does recognise 
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the need for a dialectic between "code" and "message" (which 
he prefers to the Saussurean "langue" and "parole" respect- 
ively, since he regards the double articulation and system 
of verbal language as a "special code"). 
150 Eco recognises 
that the social framework and system cannot afford to be 
too rigid; the elevation of "langue" to complete cultural 
dominance simply leads to paralysis. 
Here we should note that,, once we accept a certain looseness 
in an account of social determination and re-introduce the 
human ability to make sense as an assumption, the quotation 
from Burgin itself makes more sense. It still, however, 
follows a nominalist line (See Page 50) in that "what the 
world 'is' depends extensively on how it is described". 
151 
As we have seen, the linguistics-inspired model for photo- 
graphy was most influential through the work of Barthes, 
but we have also noted that Barthes himself recognised the 
difficulties of linking photography too closely to ling- 
uistics, and fell back on a phenomenological approach. He 
was well aware of photography's causal link with its 
referent, which Saussurean-based linguistics severed. 
He saw photography as being too insistently real to be 
convincing as a completely formal construct. Barthes was 
also too clearly Barthes to consider himself simply part 
of an impersonal system. Hall's social analysis also 
preserves the pragmatic ego and is not enticed by the 
extremes of linguistic structuralism in looking to language 
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for its control in the caption; rather, his paper concerns 
itself more directly with the practical processes and 
implications of newspaper production. Overall, it makes a 
cogent analysis of some potential means available for 
manipulation in the images of the popular press. 
What then can we take from these theoretical developments ? 
Regret at the overall development should not lead to a 
simply negative response. The notion of the variety of codes 
at work in the image need not, for example, be harnessed to 
Lacanian Marxist theory. We have already noted that the 
study of nonverbal behaviour is an important subject- 
matter for photography. We need not assume that social 
codes are all, but an interaction with the natural. The 
notion of the essential coherence of a good work of art 
should not be lost, especially that of a good image, simply 
because linguistic structuralism, in losing sight of human 
unity, has also lost sight of the structure of human 
expressiveness, and reduced human contemplation, particularly 
of images, to an anarchic free for all in interpretation, 
depending on which cultural wind is blowing. We need to 
re-introduce into the equation human intentionality as a 
potential consideration. 
At present, Marxist semiology appears to be going in two 
main directions as a result of the basic impetus of the 
linguistic analogy: towards "deconstruction" of given texts 
such as in advertising or towards more direct action in 
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social situations in the development of the scripto-visual 
message and photo-montage. Firstly, a move to self-reflexive 
work which considers the difference of the photograph from 
the reality it records: through revealing the allegedly 
simple "transparency" of the image, it can then teach us 
about the nature of illusion, in a Brechtian manner. Burgin 
is notable here. He has followed Barthes in regarding the 
caption as of crucial importance, though he recognises 
that in use it varies in importance from its function in 
newspapers through advertising and illustrated magazines 
to art or amateur photography, he still insists that the 
uncaptioned photograph "is invaded by language when it is 
looked at". 
152 Through the use of ironical titling - to 
advertising images, for example - he aims to make people 
think more deeply about the significance, especially the 
social significance, of the images they consume so easily. 
In this Burgin is following Walter Benjamin's precept: 
"What we must demand from the photographer is 
the ability to put such a caption beneath his 
picture as will rescue it from the ravages of 
modishness and confer upon it a revolutionary 
use value". 153 
Burgin, as a Marxist, is suspicious of mere external 
appearance. At the beginning of his article, "Photo- 
graphic Practice and Art Theory", he quotes a remark of 
Brecht: 
if ... less than at any time does a simple 
reduction of reality tell us anything about 
reality. A photograph of the Krupp works or 
GEC yields almost nothing about these 
institutions". 154 
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Thus Burgin agrees with Brecht and Benjamin in imputing an 
intrinsic inadequacy" to the photographic image. 
155 With 
his conceptual approach, he sees the important meaning 
coming from the words. This, of course, is to deny the 
positive qualities of photography in conveying meaning 
through space and time as well as the merits of an eviden- 
tial display which is not simply didactic, concerned with 
one interpretation of reality, but, like reality, is rich in 
information and many-faceted. 'Photography, of course, 
cannot compete with words in their ability to categorise 
and abstract in flexible yet logical terms. Thus the 
revival of the practice of photo-montage in the spirit of 
Heartfield faces intrinsic simplistic difficulties, though 
it is not one associated with Burgin - his kind of juxta- 
position is that of the image and the word (I11.24). 
Conversely, photo-montage in an art context can be amorphous 
and allusive, as the work of Moholy-Nagy, and, more recently, 
Stezaker. 
156 In school, montage or collage work can easily 
degenerate into 
the variables. 
crudely obvious 
Nevertheless, t] 
work. Thus the 
fit a choice of 
imagined future 
exercise. Here 
incoherence, and there is a need to limit 
Thus photo-montage can be either too 
as counter-propaganda or too imprecise. 
here is room for development in this area of 
use of the "mug-shot" heads of pupils to 
bodies from magazines embodying, for example, 
careers, can be a thought-provoking 
a "presence" is retained and variations 
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played against it. 
Burgin, while concerted with internal relations in the 
scripto-visual message, tries to develop a socialist 
formalism, inspired by Russian experiment in the twenties. 
Some conceptual photographers have been so obsessed with 
process that they have reduced content to the barest 
minimum. John Hilliard's "Sixty Seconds of Light 1970" is 
one example. 
157 It depicts twelve photographs of a dark- 
room timer taken at regularly decreased exposures and 
intervals of five seconds to make a sequence in which the 
photographed object appears in a variety of tonal guises as 
it fades from sight. Thus the difference of the object 
from ordinary observation is emphasised in the sequence - 
but the elegant demonstration is in a social vacuum. 
Hilliard's personal achievement has a quality of precision 
and neatness, but it is very narrow considered as part of 
an art programme or movement. 
A more direct concern with developments in photography at 
a more popular level of photographic articulation and photo- 
graphic education in an informal sense is the work of the 
Half Moon Project and its associated magazine, Camerawork. 
The Half Moon Photography Workshop, opening in 1975, "has 
been concerned with community photography in the East End 
as a means of raising social awareness and contributing 
towards social change. Its opening Statement of Aims 
declared: 
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"The running of HMPW will reflect our central 
concern in photography, which is not, 'Is it art ?' 
but, 'Who is it for ?'" 158 
In developing such aims there has been an attempt to 
develop the tradition of Picture Post photojournalism, with 
serious concern for social issues. Politically, however, 
Camerawork is much more radically left-wing (and has 
suffered from factional strife). A notable issue was No 8, 
a special issue giving wide coverage to the National Front 
march in Lewisham on 13 August 1977; another issue, No 9, 
examined "The Picture Story" and examined the situation of 
British troops in Northern Ireland as well as providing a 
sequence of the eviction of squatters. In an early issue, 
No 3, Victor Burgin contributed an article on basic 
aspirations and ideas in semiology, and there have been 
debates arising from semiological concerns. 
The question "Who is it for ?" has indeed been a crucial 
question. The promise of structuralist analysis was some 
system of internal structure of the image which would 
provide a constant meaning, on the analogy of the structure 
of verbal language. Burgin expressed it thus: 
"The nub of such a system is formed by 
relationships of similarity and dissimilarity 
of form and of content, with additional 
manipulations in the form of substitutions 
and permutations of elements". 159 
However, in practice this objective "system" never material- 
ised and instead we have a number of letters scattered 
throughout the issues of the magazine on the ambiguities 
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of photographic images, or at least their relative weakness 
in promoting a precise particular meaning, a clear message 
which could not be interpreted in another way - not of 
course in scientific terms. This was particularly obvious 
in the Lewisham issue where a picture of a policeman and a 
black protestor are shown shouting at each other. It 
depends on our sympathies how we interpret this picture. 
Contrary to Eco's diminution of empathy, cited earlier, 
Page 207, whom we empathise with affects our total inter- 
pretation. Robert Golden, writing in a letter about a 
picture of two smiling ladies at a garden party with the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, asks: 
"Do we see an enchantin, 
their representative of 
enjoying a witty moment 
or do we see scroungers 
provided to them by the 
class ?" 160 
g view of our betters and 
virtue in the flesh 
at a charming occasion, 
frittering away time 
wealth-producing 
While it is the case that the photograph suffers from 
"unresolved content", and the three people are seen in 
isolation, such an example, does point to the propositional 
weakness of photographs, and the dilemma for the politically 
motivated; Don Slater in another letter asks: 
"How can we produce oppositional images which 
will not be read through and hence absorbed by 
the dominant ideologies of representation and 
political discourse ?" 161 
Burgin's answer was deconstruction, a reformulation of the 
message; but Camerawork faced the question of audience. 
As John A Walker pointed out, photography was strongly 
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influenced by the context it appeared in, and by the 
psychology of the viewer. 
162 This implied a communication 
theory framework, wider than an internal analysis of 
"system".. (s, ee Page 161). For Camerawork, the community 
situation and the development of a magazine. offered some 
opportunity to build a favourable context for the reception 
of ideas, which the mass media did not provide. 
Nevertheless, the promise of photography as an "oppositional 
language", that is, as a persuasive rhetoric, is difficult 
to sustain, because of its unstable signs, and has not been 
fulfilled. The use of photo-montage is at present crude and 
unimpressive to the unconverted viewer. Furthermore, such 
rationales as were put forward were undercut by the nomin- 
alism underlying the linguistic analogy, as Bob Long 
unconsciously admits in a letter: 
"A photograph has variable meanings so that its 
particular meaning is simply whatever it means to 
the viewer". 163 
This is very different from being a selection of the reality 
it depicts, aspects of which can be emphasised by different 
viewers. 
Finally, the partisan political emphasis has often been 
dominant, and undermined the essential educational aim of 
developing wide understanding of issues. It has arisen on 
occasion to the intolerance of such statements as Bob Longs, 
taken from a final term undergraduate thesis: 
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"Our interest and enjoyment of the image must 
be questioned and analysed in such a way that 
political effectivity is the only criteria (sic) 
for selection and distribution". 164 
Lacan's work has been'criticised as unhelpful in a school 
context, not least for its esoteric inscrutability, but on 
that account the possibilities of more fruitful applications 
of some of Freud's key concepts of condensation and displace- 
ment in the "dream-work" 
165 
should not be dismissed, even 
if the total philosophy of Freud's theory is not accepted 
but is subject to critical revision. 
166 
The cogent analysis by John Berger of modern publicity or 
advertising - phenomenological, Freudian and Marxist in 
inspiration, though not doctrinaire - points a useful way 
forward. His description of the working of day-dreams 
through the effect of "glamorous" photographs, not based 
on a linguistic model though loosely using the word 
"language" to mean "conveyance of meaning", is most power- 
fully conveyed in the BBC film The Language of Advertising, 
written by Berger in the series Ways of Seeing, which was 
also produced as a book. 
167 
Where Lacan conflates the real and the imaginary, Berger. 
argues that publicity sets up an alternative - false - 
imaginary world. Through the glamorous day-dreams set up 
by advertising, the powerless worker believes he or she can 
become "enviable" simply through buying a product; at the 
same time as inadequacy is suggested, advertising provides 
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consolation with a dream. 
provoked: 
Thus a psychic division is 
"The interminable present of meaningless 
working hours is 'balanced' by a dreamt future 
in which imaginary activity replaces the passivity 
of the moment. In his or her day-dreams the 
passive worker becomes the active consumer. 
The working self envies the consuming self". 168 
These dreams are made the more powerful by the indexicality, 
the realistic rendering-of detail by modern colour photo- 
graphy. The textures in the advertising series with the 
slogan "Things happen after a Badedas bath", for example, 
encourage the erotic fantasy. (I11.25). 
Against this fantasy world, Berger sets a real world of 
lived experience. This real world can also be captured 
in documentary photographs, and Berger demonstrates that 
the gap between the real world and the advertising world 
is sometimes even present in magazine pages, where pictures 
of hunger in the Third World can be juxtaposed by a Badedas 
advertisement. 
169 We should note that the force of this 
argument depends on the former photographs not being 
imaginary fiction, and one strength of Berger's analysis . 
is his recognition of the recording qualities of the camera. 
The effect of such contrasts, even if unplanned, is to 
inhibit our taking any present action about the reality of 
our world and simply consume the photographs. Berger 
believes we should be making political decisions rather than 
purchases. 
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25. Badedas Bath advertisement, in The Sunday Times 
Magazine, c. 1975. 
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Berger's analysis of the workings of the pernicious effects 
of advertising comes over most strongly in the "dream- 
world" experience of the film. However, his critique perhaps 
unavoidably neglects the playful side of advertising, its 
positive inventive aspects, which have refreshingly come 
into more prominence recently, as in the Benson and Hedges 
series. (see Page 15)jand even in the incongruous world of 
Badedas baths. 
The "language" analogies we have considered have all 
pointed to the need for a communication perspective rather 
than a consideration of photography as a medium apart from 
a human context. Formalist Marxism has also pointed to the 
need for a psychology of the development of the human 
subject. We have already put forward such an account - 
though non-political - in the formulation of Neisser set 
out in Section Two. A re-consideration of his notion of 
"schema" will be useful here, in the light of the theories 
considered in this section. 
Neisser's "schema" provides a way of understanding how our 
given nature responds to our environment, including the 
social environment, and how "schemata" are built up, 
essentially in an interaction with the world. As Neisser 
notes, this is not deterministic: 
"Imagining is not normally confused with 
perceiving, because the latter involves the 
continuing pickup of new information". 170 
In pictures, however, as opposed to ordinary observation, 
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the information therein resists exploration beyond a 
certain point. A photograph is only an aspect of the 
environment recorded; we cannot walk round and into the 
space we see. Images are detached from their immediate 
context and it is in this that their danger lies. We need 
to be aware of this lack in the media as well as what 
pictures offer us in the way of new information. 
Regarding social convention, we should remember that 
children are relatively free from it: they are spontaneous 
and unpredictable. We grow into convention. Manipulation 
of course is possible but that also depends on the inform- 
ation available to us. Neisser assumes a surveying ability 
in our minds. In his framework, ideas can be potentially 
tried out in the environment and modified if necessary. 
While we are given ideas "ready-made", we are not determin- 
istically bound to accept them and act on them passively. 
In addition, simple problems will present themselves to us 
and we will evolve ways to solve them. 
Thus, to consider making an image, taking a photograph 
need not depend for its composition on a pre-given "schema". 
Practical considerations such as "Have I them all in the 
view-finder ?" will be more pressing, at least initially. 
Thus EH Gombrich's notion of a "schema" (i. e. a visual 
formula to depict something), 
171 
as a necessary pre- 
requisite to representation in drawing and painting, is 
inappropriate to photography, as far as the novice is 
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concerned. It has been argued by Novitz that, even for 
drawing such as biological drawing, only "a range of widely 
accepted general procedures"172 is necessary to begin, and 
these need not all be conventional but simply functional. 
Nevertheless, photography does share with perspective and 
painting a great number of ideas in common, concerning 
the disposition of people and objects in a scene, and the 
active photographer can benefit a great deal from a study, 
and practice, of traditional drawing and painting, as we 
saw with Cartier-Bresson. This does not mean that we 
should forget the unique indexical quality in photography. 
Bearing that in mind, there is no reason why the media 
cannot interact, as advertising has well demonstrated, 
provided the particular nature of photography is under- 
stood - and this particular "schema", or more generally, 
"cognitive map", in Neisser's sense, is best understood 
through actually using a camera. 
Neisser does not directly discuss photography but insofar 
as photography has commerce with the world, and the devel- 
opment of differentiation is the aim of both good photo- 
graphy and good observation, his comments are apt: 
"Perceptual cycles vary in the kind and scope 
of the information that guides them. Unsoph- 
isticated perceivers are tuned to relatively 
superficial features of their environment; 
skilled perceivers to subtler ones". 173 
The virtue of his model is its emphasis on the development 
of a personal world and the recognition of our existential 
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experience of personal choice. The individual is active 
and capable of invention, whereas in the Saussurean- 
inspired language model, with its roots in determinist 
sociological theory, "parole" is simply an exemplification 
of "langue", with no room for invention within the system. 
For Saussure, changes in language came from "extra- 
linguistic" sources, but with the extension of the language 
model to other areas, such areas were closed. A consequence 
of this is that system comes completely to dominate the 
subject. Neisser's formulation, on the other hand, pre- 
serves a balance between incoming information, even where 
incorporating convention, and the investigation of the 
environment to confirm, deny, or modify a schema. "Langue" 
appears as manipulation in a negative sense in some Marxist 
semiological critiques; but "language" as manipulation can 
also be seen in a positive, developing sense, as growth in 
competence. In the positive sense of manipulation, the 
selection of procedures in photography is enabling (distance, 
angle, tone, colour and so on), and in this sense the 
"language" of photography is a loose but useful metaphor. 
Neisser is concerned about the exploration of information, 
and this means that access to it should be preserved: 
"The connection between freedom of choice and 
access to valid information is fundamental; one 
cannot meaningly exist without the other. This 
poses a particularly acute danger to freedom in 
contemporary society, in which various kind of 
middlemen and media control our access to 
important facts". 174 
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In Neisser's perspective, the respect for factual information 
implies the journalist's respect for factual reporting - 
otherwise we are left with one brand of politician's truth. 
Finally we need to remind ourselves of the double-sided 
nature of communication whether in photography and the media 
or in education itself: 
"Human communication offers unparallelled 
opportunities for understanding, but also 
for error, misunderstanding, and deceit". 175 
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SECTION FOUR - PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE CURRICULUM 
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The nature of photography has been considered, both from a 
perceptual starting point and using verbal language as an 
analogy. It will now be the purpose of this final section 
to collect and consider the results of this investigation 
and review the educational implications for the curriculum. 
What conclusions have we reached about the nature of photo- 
graphy, the question raised at the end of Section One ? 
What can we say about its basic character ? What can we 
conclude about certain perspectives in examining the 
medium ? One main conclusion is a discouraging one for the 
supporters of an extending linguistics: that the language 
metaphor, when pursued to the point of being a model on 
the lines of Saussurean structural linguistics, is limiting 
rather than revealing. The preceding section on photo- 
graphy as "language" pointed to the danger of too close an 
identification with verbal language, so that one result of 
the investigation has been simply a clearing away of a 
misleading emphasis in theory. If this is not very 
positive, it is nevertheless important to recognise the 
constrictions of an inappropriate framework. 
Not all "language" meanings were adversely criticised, 
however. Obviously, the general sense of the communication 
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of meaning is appropriate. Another meaning of "language" 
suggests an independent role for a medium like photography: 
rather than bringing it under the aegis of verbal language, 
this meaning emphasises the medium's own particular method 
of articulation and communication, or a particular person 
or group's use of the medium - that is, "language" in the 
sense of "style". 
No doubt there will be further metaphoric forays with the 
term "language", and this thesis does not seek to deny 
their possible value. The "language" analogy implicitly 
raises the question of a mode of articulation, and this 
question has not yet been precisely answered from any 
perspective - and does not appear to yield precise answers 
as verbal language has done, although photography now 
challenges the word as a means for the communication of 
meaning in our society. Unlike the symbolic signs of verbal 
language, the iconic-indexical signs of photography lack 
the long-term stability of the signs of verbal language; 
and thus the solely synchronic approach and focus derived 
from Saussure - with the consequent neglect of the histor- 
ical or diachronic - is limiting. Precisely because of 
their ability, especially when well arranged, to germinate 
meanings in the minds of viewers, to grow from the indexical 
and iconic to the symbolic, photographic signs need to be 
considered for their evolutionary and dynamic qualities, as 
well as from a consideration of meaning arising through 
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patterns caused by juxtaposition or montage. Photography 
records and preserves an object or scene from a particular 
time and place, and this point of origin is of key import- 
ance in recognition and interpretation. On this theme, 
there is an interesting account of the variety of uses 
of a press photograph showing the dead body of a demons- 
trator at Kent State University in May, 1970, with a woman 
gesturing beside him, in the BFI Gauthier paper in the 
section on "The Emergence of an Iconic Sign". 
1 Gauthier 
describes in detail, in a manner not Peircean in terminology 
but congruent with Peirce, how the sign (essentially in a 
process of semiosis), goes from the indexical to the 
symbolic; and in doing so in this case joins with graphics. 
Instead of a linguistic framework, the outlines of a theory 
of photography based on an account of perception were given. 
This account contested that aspect of the Berkleyan tradition 
which emphasised the ambiguous nature of the stimuli 
reaching the eyes and neglected to examine the potential 
of veridical information in the light rays reaching the 
retina. A moderate realist rather than a nominalist stance 
was therefore upheld. Both Gibson and Peirce support this 
position of a basis in the real world, which the "construct- 
ive" theory puts in jeopardy. Likewise photography, with 
its "transference of reality from the thing to its repro- 
duction" also has a basis in actuality. 
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In contrast, a structural linguistic model would sever an 
already tenuous link with reality implied by the 
"constructive" tradition of perception, where the photo- 
graphic image is at a further remove from reality than the 
metaphorical "snapshot" image on the back of the retina - 
the basic unit in the "constructive" theory. That latter 
image is itself regarded as fundamentally a construct and 
reliant for recognition on stored memory, with that memory 
itself without guarantee of a basis in the real world - 
leading to a solipsistic loop, a world of self-reference. 
Instead, it has been maintained that a photograph, for 
practical purposes, can give a true denotation or descrip- 
tion of an object or scene, where the aim is basic 
recognition. Denotation is not to be collapsed into 
connotation; there is a difference between recognition 
and interpretation. 
In dealing with interpretation and thus connotation as well 
as the formation of convention, we have adopted Peirce's 
theory of signs and the comprehensive psychological theory 
of Neisser, who upholds the value of Gibson's contribution- 
on the objective information available from the environment 
through the light, but also understands the need to bring 
in the processes of mind to a theory of perception. We 
have used Peirce's notion of semiosis to demonstrate the 
passage from nature to convention. 
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These are broad outlines, but they have not the false 
rigidity of the formalist linguistics model. Flexibility 
is needed and these theories do justice to the potential 
range-of observation and photography. Moreover, upholding 
the realistic aspect of photography does not negate the 
recognition that the photograph is in important ways 
different from its referent. The photographer can make 
use of this difference, as Vulliez does (I11.18), in 
constructing his image. 
We have thus upheld a basic principle about the character 
of photography - its "certificate of presence" in Barthes' 
phrase3 - suggested that this special quality should be 
considered in relation to functional and aesthetic proced- 
ures. In addition, we have also defended the distinction 
between denotation and connotation, at risk in both in the 
theory of perception as a hypothesis (as Gregory puts it) 
4 
and in the over-ambitious structuralist "language" model 
according to which everything is either connotation or 
ideology. 
The argument of this thesis on the nature of photography 
has postulated a middle position between two extremes: 
on the one hand that which would identify photography with 
culture through the emphasis on convention (as we saw with 
Herskovits, p. 75), and that which would see photography as 
a pictorial Esperanto, as with Feininger, P. 170. Like 
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Gombrich in Art and Illusion, the account given here 
adopts a stance straddling nature and convention as in 
his theory of the pictorial image, but unlike him, begins 
with the denotative image and goes on to bring in connotation 
and convention. For a theory of photography, this is a 
particularly important progression, because of the iconic- 
indexical nature of the medium. We do not need a "schema" 
in Gombrich's sense to start taking photographs, as he 
maintains we need in order to draw. However, this does not 
mean that convention does not enter into taking photographs 
and is very influential, even at the level of the Kodak- 
type snapshot, with its encouragement of bright colour and 
bland, smiling images. 
A theory of photography can thus begin with the formulation 
of Kracauer, but need not be constrained by him. Photo- 
graphy does have an affinity for reality, but the photo- 
grapher need not keep to unstaged appearances. The 
discovery of unexplored areas and events in the world - 
the documentary impulse, for example, of Weegee - is not 
the only legitimate area of exploration for the photographer. 
Kracauer is unnecessarily prescriptive in this respect: 
he is demanding one kind of photographer. Surely the 
amount of staging and formal manipulation may vary according 
to personal temperament. Such manipulation is not to be 
denied expression, but a warning has to be added: too much 
"handling" can lessen the power of the fragment of time and 
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space captured by the camera. The portrait of MeVicar 
(Ill. 3), for example, moved towards simple caricature, away 
from the richness of actuality, and in that field the photo- 
grapher/printer has less flexible means at his disposal 
than the cartoonist. 
Critical work on photography in education has proceeded 
from a cultural-linguistic model in the main, with Sociology 
and English as the parent disciplines. In making a case 
for the ideological implications of photographs, this 
position has assumed that viewers in general see photo- 
graphs as "transparent", that is, as unequivocally true 
pictures of the world. Hall declares that "News photos 
have a specific way of passing themselves off as aspects 
of 'nature'. "5 But do most people now in fact see news 
photography as completely neutral and unbiassed ? People 
are now surely aware of how a cause can be promoted through 
visual demonstration which catches the news cameras. Again, 
most of the students in Kennedy's classes, as already 
noted on p. 87, found photographs "necessarily conventional". 
Even if it were the case that photographs were regarded as 
transparently true, should we then swing to the other 
extreme and asume that all is culture, or in a determin- 
istic Marxist view, that everything is political or 
ideological ? The circumstance that, in I11.20, the 
natural behaviour of father and child caught by the camera 
is used by the insurance company as a reinforcement of 
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family dependence does not make the photograph completely 
cultural. Although the image is mediated, and is being 
used in a public and not a family context, the captured 
gestures still have a natural base. 
While much useful work from the cultural base has been done, 
6 
such as, for example, the projection of stereotypes, there 
is a tendency to assume a convention of looking is simply 
culturally given. However, we grow into prejudiced 
conventions of looking through habit and without examining 
the evidence. Following Heisser, we should be alert to 
examine the information making up schemata. This of 
course the cultural model has encouraged, but what it omits 
from its purview is the field of nonverbal behaviour which 
is spontaneous in its expression and which can be captured 
by the camera. As a background study for photography, 
both cultural study and nonverbal communication are thus 
surely appropriate. 
In Sebeok's formulation of semiotics, which can be consid- 
ered to be an extension of "language", a more tolerant 
and less constricting model is put forward than that 
initiated by Barthes. With Sebeok, verbal language is 
considered as something special to the human species, while 
nonverbal language is shared with a variety of species on 
the evolutionary scale. Photography can then convey 
meaning in areas of behaviour which is not duplicated 
by words. Such communication need not therefore be sieved 
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through verbal language for its meaning to be gained. 
Rather, words may draw attention to meaning and point 
to it. 
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B. CURRICULUM CONSIDERATIONS 
We have already considered in Section One justifications 
of photography in the educational curriculum. Of the two 
types of justification put forward, the contextualist 
makes the most obviously persuasive case for inclusion, 
but with the danger of doing so in a negative spirit. It 
is obviously too simple an attitude to ignore the number 
of images in our environment; we need to try to understand 
how they come to influence is, so that we can cope in a 
more rational way with the persuasive blandishments of 
advertisements and monitor the kinds of selectivity inherent 
? 
in the presentation of news, especially in photographic 
images where they can appear particularly convincing as 
the record of an event. However, in addition to such 
analysis, 
8 
which as we have seen can become over-concerned 
with capitalist ideology to the detriment of the development 
of useful tools of analysis applicable to any society, 
there is a need for pupils to make use of the camera itself 
in a positive, personal way, so that the medium can be 
understood from the inside and not simply from discussion.. 
Thus the positively manipulative aspects of the camera can 
be developed, attending to'such aspects as the taking, 
printing and display of a picture. Insofar as modern media 
have developed as "one-way communication systems", the 
expanded notion of "langue" as a highly influencing system 
of meaning, however, has some force as a metaphor. Never- 
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theless, as we have seen, we do not need to learn the 
"language" of photography over a period of months to utter 
a metaphorical "sentence"; all we need to know to begin 
are some general procedures for taking apicture. (See Page 222. ) 
But photography need not be as simple as the humble snap- 
shot, for it can be developed to a high degree of sophist- 
ication. 
It is here that we encounter again the essentialist justif- 
ication for photography: its value as a medium for communic- 
ation, expression and appreciation in its own right, rather 
than simply as a vehicle for the carrying the messages of 
the phenomena it records. Here it shares a number of 
features with art in general, although we have emphasised 
its unique link with what appears in front of the lens. 
These two justifications, if accepted, will be closely 
joined to what we can consider to be the long-term aims - 
as opposed to the more intermediate objectives of photo- 
graphy in the curriculum. Following the widely accepted 
distinction of Hilda Taba between aims and objectives, 
the former providing a general orientation to a curriculum. 
and the latter the intended learning outcomesýLawrence 
Stenhouse states: 
"Aims are broad statements of purpose and the 
intention - to transmit culture or to develop 
a democratic way of life. " 9 
The aim of the study of photography from a contextual point 
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of view has already been touched upon: it is to enable the 
young person (or adult) to cope with and understand the 
persuasive devices, overt or implicit, of photography used 
as a mass medium. In doing so, of course the phrase, "the 
language of photography" may be used, and if this is used 
in a loose metaphorical way implying the transmission and 
generation of meaning, then this is perfectly acceptable. 
Where a close analogy, however, is claimed with the way 
verbal language articulates and it is asserted that, as a 
beginning, photography is "arbitrary", then the analogy is 
misleading. The opposite is the case: the particular 
characteristic of photography is its direct causal link 
with its referent. As we saw with formalist Marxist semi- 
ology, this leads to a dangerous confusion of imagination 
with reality, one which education is concerned to disting- 
guish in the young person. However, an objection may be 
raised that for photography in an essentialist framework, in 
linking photography to art, the general aim is to develop 
the imagination. This is not an impasse, however, for it 
is the essential paradox of photography that it combines 
both recorded actuality and the potential ability to fire 
the imagination. It does this through the human selective 
powers exercised in the framing and realisation of the 
image. Photography, with this challenge, can exceed the 
power of conventional drawing and painting by enhancing 
the expressive potential of nature: as Bazin claimed: 
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"Photography can even surpass art in creative 
power. The aesthetic world of the painter is 
of a different kind from that of the world 
about him. Its boundaries enclose a substantially 
different microcosm ... Wherefore, photography 
actually contributes something to the order of 
natural creation instead of providing a 
substitute for it. " 10 
Again, as Bernard Shaw said of portraiture: 
"The hand of the painter is incurably mechanical: 
his technique is incurably artificial ... And it is because the camera is independent of this 
hand-drawing and this technique that a photograph 
is so much less hampered by mechanical considerations, 
so much more responsive to the artist's feeling, 
than a design. " 11 
Photography is deceptively easy, but at its best displays 
insight and formal complexity. The precision of Cartier- 
Bresson and his unmatched power of freezing a flux of events 
into a unique order is worthy of the highest admiration. 
The creative use of location in Arnold Newman's portraits 
and his controlled use of camera exaggeration relay close 
study. 
12 At the fantasy end of the spectrum, the Smirnoff 
series, "Well, they said anything could happen", plays 
inventively with the formal pictorial context, while 
depending on the "real" effect of its detailed rendering 
of a mix of settings, people and objects. (I11.26. ). 
In looking at the value of photography, then, we have to 
consider a variety of purposes, a diversity of tasks. Here 
we need to consider the notion of objectives more closely. 
The objectives in taking - and viewing -a photograph will 
vary according to the intention and the context in which the 
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26. Smirnoff advertisement, in The Sunday Times Magazine, 1982. 
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photograph is taken, and thus affect the way the photograph 
is considered. This principle is applicable both inside and 
outside the classroom. The primary questions asked about 
photography will then vary according to the purpose of the 
task. 
With an audio-visual aid, denotative questions are normally 
uppermost. We ask: is this a clear, unambiguous rendering ? 
Apart from faults due to bad technique, photographs should 
not normally present problems, as we; contended with Kennedy, 
(see Page 43), except where there were omissions like the 
lack of elements to provide scale. Again, we would ask of 
a newspaper photo: does it give the main details of the 
event clearly ? In a fire, a "mood" shot of smoke and 
jetting water but little detail would probably be rejected 
by a newspaper editor in favour of one giving precise details 
of damage though less atmosphere. However, it is possible 
to combine description and formal and emotional power - for 
example in the well-known photograph of the American flag 
rising at Iwo Jima. This is an interesting example as it 
demonstrates the tension between connotation, the intuitive 
recognition of symbol, and the descriptive pressure to 
show details of the soldiers involved. As John Faber 
comments on the taking of the photograph by Joe Rosenthal: 
"The historic photo was unposed, live action ... 
Joe made two other photos of the men facing the 
camera. He wasn't sure his first picture would 
be used, because he couldn't see the faces of all 
the men". 13 
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27. Rothmans advertisement, in The Sunday Times Magazine, 1980. 
28. Tina Modotti (Mexico), "We Are Building a New World, " 
1930, in Germany - The New Photography 1927-33, p. 48. - 
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In a school project involving, for example, varieties of 
shop displays, clear denotation would be of paramount 
importance but these could be combined with pattern-making 
and/or character study in the relation between owner and 
setting. 
In photographs aspiring simply to aesthetic status, we do 
not have this primary denotative imperative. For example, 
an advertisement may show only the hand of a person and 
leave us to deduce the rest: indeed, details of status 
within the shot may enable us to infer the wealth and 
position of the person very quickly. The power of assoc- 
iation is used in a metonymic trope to make a compact 
utterance, (I11.27). In an educational situation, we may 
appreciate the formal invention and cultural detail while 
deprecating the envy-arousing intention. * 
A photograph may also have a complex denotative-aesthetic 
purpose in the use of the close-up, as Heise outlines in 
his preface to Renger-Patzsch's Die Welt ist Schön: on 
the latter's relationship to the botanist in observing a 
plant closely: 
"... the photographer isolates the characteristic 
fragment from the multiplicity of the whole, under- 
lines the essential elements and eliminates that 
which could lead to a de-concentration into the 
complexity of the whole. He captures the observer's 
attention and directs it to the strange beauty of 
organic growth. He expresses in a visual form that 
which the scientist can only describe". 14 
*Compare the very different close-up effect of Modotti, I11.28. 
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ART FORMS IN NATURE 
29. Karl Blossfeldt photograph from dustwrapper of his 
Art Forms in Nature (London: Zwemmer, 1929), in 
Germany -The New Photography 1927-33, p. 22. 
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Blossfeldt's close-ups, exemplified in Mellor's anthology, 
15 
(I11.29)7add the extra dimension of a comparison between 
natural design and artistic convention. 
Here it may be noted, although it is outside the scope of 
this thesis, that a theory of photography will have to enter 
into dialogue with theories of convention derived from art 
16 
history, such as that of Panofsky, and theories of form 
such as that put forward by Langer. 
17 
With such a variety of tasks, we need to consider the 
question of priorities: not just in terms of general aims 
or aspirations but also in terms of necessary competencies. 
In photography, as we have seen, our general aims will be 
concerned with the development of critical ability in 
relation to photographic phenomena in society and the 
development of skill and awareness in photographic use. 
But we should also ask what basic competence we need to 
develop in the use and appraisal of the medium, and ask 
this in relation to certain age ranges, abilities and 
aptitudes. Educationalists have hardly begun to ask this 
kind of question, answers to which need the backing of 
empirical research. 
18 
The often-repeated statement of Moholy-Nagy, "The illiter- 
ates of the future will be ignorant of the use of camera 
and pen alike", 
19 
should be brought once again to the 
attention of those who are concerned with basic skills. 
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Photographic image education is indeed basic. In our 
analysis we have seen photography as part of semiotics, 
as communication and signification, but in educational 
terms we could also characterise photography as part of a 
sound education in imagery. The fundamental aim of such 
image education would be the development of perception, 
both of incoming material and in producing messages. 
WGV Balchin and AM Coleman have for a number of years 
advanced the idea of "graphicacy" as a necessary basic 
skill, analogous to articulacy, literacy and numeracy. 
20 
Graphicacy is described as "the educated counterpart of 
the visual-spatial aspect of human intelligence and 
communication". 
21 This aspect or ability is inherent, 
something that we all possess, but which can also be developed 
through direct teaching; it is an educable skill in 
communication: 
"It is the art of expressing or receiving spatial 
information that cannot be fully conveyed by 
verbal or numerical means". 22 
However, despite this admirably wide definition, in pract- 
ice the focus of attention is on the development of concep-ts 
in geography, which is elevated to the position of a 
foundation subject in an article by Balchin: 
"It is only in the study of geography, 
however, that the possibility exists at 
school level of a wide and rigorous training 
in graphicacy". 23 
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Thus Balchin's conception of the proposed field of study 
is of the systematic teaching of accurate factual inter- 
pretation: 
"Graphicacy aims at an accurate interpretation 
of the real world and is concerned with Euclidean 
precision measurement". 24 
While claiming to be wide in scope, therefore, this approach 
is over-cognitive and neglects the aesthetic aspect of 
visual-spatial configurations. It is concerned purely 
with denotative aspects. 
Balchin maintained in 1972 that art education had not 
risen to the challenge presented by the concept of graphic- 
acy, owing to an over-emphasis on "free-expression work". 
25 
However, this neglects developments in art and design 
education, with emphasis on the latter, which have been 
concerned with the functional and denotative aspects of 
drawing in the three-dimensional field. 
26 
Nevertheless, Balchin has defined an area where valuable 
work is being done in research and applied development. 
A practical example of an educational project on education 
in map-reading has been described recently by John Bald, 
who outlines a well-thought scheme for introducing children 
to a variety of maps and their interpretation by way of 
familiar pictures, mainly photoraphs. 
27 Since maps are 
iconic-symbolic, in Peirce's terms, and incline towards 
the more abstract, conventional realm, their consideration 
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as "language" has more force compared to the analogy used 
with photographs. It is interesting to note that Bald 
operates from a Language and Reading Centre at Colchester 
Institute, Essex, and such a centre outside school may be 
the most useful base for a development of image education. 
His scheme considered the purpose of pictures in his first 
unit, their private and public use, and this is really 
part of a more purely photographic education, but which 
of course he cannot assume has been covered. 
[A 
comprehen- 
sive programme for image education including photography 
lies outside the scope of this thesis. As has been indic- 
ated, this needs to be discussed at length with education- 
alists active in the other relevant areas of visual educ- 
ation. The aim of this thesis has been to clarify the 
identity and potential of photography as a part, and a 
critically important part, of image education. 
Some general statements, however, can be made. Photographic 
image education forms a key part of the general area of 
education which should be devoted to the development of 
discrimination and differentiation in perception. This 
can be fostered in education through the observation of 
phenomena in the natural and social world, a study of the 
various effects of light, and a comparison between these 
and their rendering on photographic paper. Photography 
then has close links with the study of phenomena in the 
world - of natural form on the one hand and the area of 
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nonverbal behaviour on the other, the intricacies of which 
are only now beginning to be explored in academic research. 
This natural and anthropological knowledge is therefore 
photography's particular communicative concern - in life 
and in the photographic image itself - for such knowledge 
deals with visual-spatial configurations which photography 
is uniquely equipped to describe in an evidential manner. 
Further development in photographic awareness can take 
place in the mind of the learner with the growth of visual- 
isation. This vital development can be used for a variety 
of purposes and directions: towards bringing out the 
essential qualities of objects, towards images as metaphor 
suggesting more than their mundane reality, as Weston did; 
28 
Or towards a development of the manipulative powers of the 
various camera techniques and photographic processes; or 
towards the staging of scenes or events for the camera. 
These two latter developments move towards darkroom or 
studio-type procedures. Nevertheless, the heart of the 
photographic process is the act of recording, the release 
of the shutter at a certain time, and all extensions from 
this centre ignore the reality-reference at the peril of 
the loss of photography's essential power. Thus Moholy- 
Nagy's claim that "the photogram, or camera-less record 
of forms produced by light, which embodies the unique 
nature of the photographic process, is the real key to 
photography129 is useful only as an operational starting- 
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30. Läszlö Moholy-Nagy photogram, o. 1927, in Photography 
as Artistic Experiment, by W. Rotzler (New York: 
Amphoto, 1976). Plate No. 65. 
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point in classroom practice: it can end in a formalist 
cul-de-sac - as Beaumont Newhall pointed out: 
"The photogram maker's problem has nothing to 
do with interpreting the world, but rather with 
the formation of abstractions. Objects are 
chosen for their light-modulating characteristic: 
their reality and significance disappear. The 
logical end point of the photogram is the 
reduction of photography to the light-recording 
property of silver salts". 30 
We may modify this argument only by pointing out that 
Moholy-Nagy's most striking photograms often do in fact 
have a teasing relationship between the strong patterns 
they exhibit and the trivial objects from which they are 
derived. (I11.30). To stress the recording quality does 
not mean that photography is restricted to literal rendering: 
a great variety of experimental work can make variations 
from the essential centre of captured life; imaginary worlds 
which yet contain reality. 
From these broad orientations, can we make any headway in 
the question of how photography should fit into the curric- 
ulum ? To attempt an answer we need to consider again 
the issue of objectives. From our discussions of the 
variety of tasks in photography, we have seen that some 
are more precise than others. In a denotative task, the 
objective is clear and can be precisely measured against 
the objective. However, it is clear that the tasks required 
in a properly wide-ranging course should not all be of this 
order; if they were, we should have a narrow technical 
course. 
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Stenhouse criticises the foundation of a curriculum on an 
objectives model striving towards precision of behavioural 
objectives in the tradition of Taba. As he states: 
"The power and the possibilities of the 
curriculum cannot be contained within 
objectives because it is founded on the idea 
that knowledge must be speculative and thus 
indeterminate as to student outcomes if it is 
to be worthwhile". 31 
In its place, Stenhouse suggests a curriculum which would 
take account of changes-in direction as need arose: it 
would have instead of a specification of objectives a 
specification of content together with principles of 
procedure and appropriate criteria for evaluation based on 
ongoing work. 
This model, however useful for its emphasis on flexibility, 
and for use with a scheme such as the Humanities Project 
itself of which Stenhouse was Director, and where the 
"evidence" of photographs is variously discussed, is perhaps 
not so helpful for photography. Here we may turn again to 
Eisner. 
Eisner retains the term "objectives" within the common broad 
orientation of aims, but finds flexibility, not by positing 
a different kind of model to the limitations of the 
behavioural objectives one, but by distinguishing three 
different kinds of objective. The instructional objective 
is the behavioural one, where a terminal behaviour can be 
exactly specified, for example, the correct procedure for 
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developing a film. The expressive objective incorporates 
the open-endedness which is the general desired aim in 
art work: 
"(It) is an outcome of an activity planned by 
the teacher or the student which is designed 
not to lead the student to a particular goal 
or form of behaviour but, rather, to forms of 
thinking-feeling-acting that are his own making. 
The expressive curriculum activity is evocative 
rather than prescriptive and is intended to yield 
outcomes which, though educationally valuable, are 
not prescribed or defined beforehand". 32 
Eisner leaves the third type unnamed, but it could be 
called the design or problem-solving objective. Here a 
brief or problem is presented by the teacher for solution: 
"In such a situation, the problem is highly 
delineated but the range of potential solutions 
is, in principle, infinite". 33 
Photography in the commercial world works with defined 
tasks, and a curriculum can avoid the self-indulgence latent 
in. asole use of the expressive objective, that is, when on 
its own free of other objectives, as well as the rigidity 
of purely technical exercises, through the use of briefs. 
Briefs can promote the kind of choice-making and selection 
which is germane to the medium. As Peter Green said in his 
article, "Problem Solving and Design Education": 
"Central to any creative and critical education 
of vision is the educational process of problem 
solving. We as individuals are required to make 
more decisions, and more decisions, of wide- 
ranging consequence, are being made for us We 
can only develop a capacity for creative decision 
making, or a critical and articulate understanding 
of decisions imposed on us, if we have had genuine 
experience of making realistic decisions and of the 
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decision-making process ... We need to build 
and establish our own personal and critical value 
judgments rather then join a litany of mass 
response to the pressures of fashion, mass media and 
advertising". 34 
All three of these objectives have their use in a possible 
photographic curriculum. We need to know the desirable 
extent of skill and knowledge required and attainable in 
a course as precisely as possible. For this both experience 
and empirical research is necessary. We need also to leave 
room and give time so that work is evoked rather than 
prescribed, that pupils are encouraged to initiate and 
develop ideas. Finally, problems such as the assignment of 
a group photograph can lead to novel solutions where functional 
and aesthetic aspects combine. We should expect then that 
the type III objective could play an important part in a 
photographic curriculum, for the combination of recording 
and inventiveness is characteristic of a great deal of photo- 
graphic work. There is a necessary struggle with the index- 
ical quality of the photograph to incorporate other connot- 
ative qualities effectively. 
How then is this new model different from photography as 
presently practised ? In pursuing answers to this question, 
account will be taken of the establishment of "0" and "A" 
level examinations in photography in the seventies. This 
would at first sight appear to be a very real step forward 
in the establishment. of photography in school, but unfortun- 
ately they are formulated in such as way as to be counter- 
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productive in many respects to the development of photo- 
graphy as image education as envisaged in this thesis. 
"0" level examinations are the key here, for they provide 
the basis for a notion of general education, even if they 
are not taken by every pupil in a comprehensive school. 
If the "0" level, however, simply exhibits over-specialised 
tendencies, then this will no doubt affect even CSE exam- 
inations, and will tend to "mystify" a subject. Perhaps 
as a consequence of the desire to obtain "academic" respect- 
ability, this would appear to have happened to "0" level 
photography. Far from encouraging the notion that photo- 
graphy is necessary - and, more important, as basic as 
the three Rs - the "0" level promotes knowledge taken from 
science, technology and history to the point of obscuring 
proper priorities. 
In pursuing its central aims, the new model would then play 
down the emphasis in factual knowledge given to it by science 
and technological development in the basic or early stages 
of learning i. e., up to CSE or "0" level. Thus detailed 
knowledge as set in the AEB "0" level syllabus as, for 
example, "Outline of the composition of a simple emulsion", 
or "An outline of the function and composition of a typical 
developer"35 are, it is maintained, quite unnecessary for 
developing central aims such as a critical pictorial sense. 
This is not to suggest low standards, rather to encourage 
higher standards in essential techniques and knowledge. 
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Valerie Conway in a report on a teachers' conference in 
March 1979, held to discuss the AEB GCE photography exam- 
ations, complains of the 1978 paper relating to technique: 
"(It) seems far too specific and specialised 
and requires answers to such questions as for 
example: 'What do you understand by conjugate 
distances ?' or 'Draw a neat, simple, schematic 
diagram to show the basic construction of a modern 
35mm pentaprism reflex camera, labelling the parts 
and indicating the path of a central light ray. 
Give a description of the evolution of this type of 
camera, emphasising specifically those features 
which have contributed to its current versatility. ' 
This, in my opinion, and apparently of many other 
teachers, is too much to expect at "0" level 
standard". 36 
These are hardly the kind of questions to encourage 
pictorial versatility ! Yet the chief examiner, Peter 
Cumming, declared at the conference: 
"The aim of the syllabus at '0' level is to 
increase visual awareness, and at '0' level we are 
not particularly concerned with technical ability". 37 
Emphasising such detailed knowledge at this stage of 
learning would, it is maintained, only undermine this admir- 
able aim. These questions may be suitable for an "A" level 
paper devoted to scientific and technical photography, but 
certainly not one devoted to general education. 
Again, in the development of critical interpretation as 
envisaged in the "0" level paper, the emphasis is uncritic- 
ally wide, on quantity of information to the very probable 
practical detriment of quality, given the time available. 
A history approach is adopted including too much, with the 
inevitable encouragement of superficial coverage or 
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prepared packaged answers. As Valerie Conway comments: 
"I agree that the history of photography is 
desirable as a background study in order to help 
put the subject into context as is also the study 
and appreciation of the work of other photo- 
graphers. However what other '0' level subject, 
with any other examining board, requires a practical 
examination of up to 18hr duration plus a 21hr 
written paper consisting of two separate subjects ? 
The history section alone covers the whole history 
of photography, from its beginnings, with an 
additional study of 18 listed photographers". 38 
The advent of official national examinations has thus been 
disappointing. Their formulation, as criticised by Valerie 
Conway, makes photography a specialised subject suitable 
only for a minority with a grasp of physics and an appetite 
for rapidly absorbing knowledge of historical tradition. 
Furthermore, the relation between photography and broad 
social concern has been left out of account. 
Such a relation has developed in a non-examined area of 
photography in education - through the study of the host 
subjects of English and Social Studies. It has been mainly 
teachers from these areas who have contributed to the 
developments in Screen Education. While this thesis has 
been critical of the direction of the parent magazine 
Screen and the latter's unhelpful exposition of theoretical 
developments (the Spring/Summer 1973 issue introducing 
linguistics and the semiotics of Metz being a notorious 
example), nevertheless, the academic tenacity of Screen, 
and in turn Screen Education, has raised the level of debate 
surrounding photography significantly. Screen Education 
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has been concerned with such socially relevant themes as 
stereotyping and the representation of women. For such 
themes, discussion must play an important part, but it is 
a pity that such discussion is not more often directly 
linked with photographic practice. 
Social themes have a respectable tradition in English 
teaching, and teachers in this subject will happily use 
photographs as basic stimuli for verbal discussion of their 
content. As Gombrich noted, "the visual image is supreme 
in its capacity for arousal"39. Books like Reflection s40 use 
striking photographs as springboards for discussion on such 
themes as old age, parents and children, the neighbourhood 
and work. However, discussion can lead attention away from 
the visual-spatial aspects of pictures and not back to them, 
especially if there has been no experience and development 
in photographic image-making. Surely it is necessary to 
develop a basic "inside" knowledge of photography through 
practice at an early stage, so that discussion of photo- 
graphs does not simply regard them as illustrations to 
verbally-orientated concepts. 
What then of the influence of art itself.? The"O" level 
syllabus claims that, "The subject is to be treated as an 
41 
art medium rather then as a scientific record-maker". 
In the mainline of this tradition the emphasis is on the 
production of artefacts and the process of creativity or 
invention. The critical-historical is not regarded as 
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essential; as Jack Cross says of his subject: 
"It is concerned with making and doing, not 
with what has been made. It is about emotion, '- 
sensibility and conceptualisation. It cares 
about offering each individual a chance to 
communicate his own feelings in his own chosen 
way. It is about individual needs and personal 
judgments". 42 
Should the critical-historical then be reduced to an option 
as it is in the "0" level art ? This would surely be a 
great loss, for it could reduce photography at school to 
being simply the preparation of a useful hobby, with no 
real guarantee of encounter with outstanding aesthetic 
work or photography's social implications. Photography 
as an adjunct of art in this sense would then really be at 
risk. Furthermore, there is a strong developmental influence 
in art education theory, for example by Lowenfeld who 
emphasises the unfolding character of children's develop- 
mental stages and urges teachers to avoid intervening in 
the "inevitable" course of the child's artistic develop- 
ment. 
43 This tradition is in the process of being modified, 
but the introduction of critical appraisal into art work 
is sadly under-developed. Too often critical approaches 
are simply left to a "lump" in the later years when art 
history is taken. There is a reluctance to talk about work 
and draw attention to relevant aspects of it, immediately 
or shortly after an activity has been completed, to compare 
and contrast, to help fix principles through verbal means 
and to lead pupils to look at further work in the area 
in which they have been concerned. Perceptual different- 
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iation, the transfer of principles and the development of 
verbally communicated criteria can surely all be developed 
through such a "little-and-often" approach in the early 
years of Secondary School. 
Perhaps the most useful way forward is through the use of 
centres outside the school. 'Here the imperative of practical 
basic photography can be introduced if the necessary 
facilities are available. The problem of coping with numbers, 
which is always a difficult one in starting photography in 
school, is solved. There is the opportunity of being 
outside school, which can lead to projects were aspects 
of the neighbourhood are explored with cameras. A way 
forward has been shown by centres like Page Green, Tottenham, 
where a variety of projects using photography have been 
carried out, and which have helped to define the local area 
in visual form for its inhabitants. It is possible to 
envisage a basic course in photography per se from such a 
centre, on the lines of the project development by John Bald 
in graphicacy at Colchester Institute, Essex, (See Page 245). 
While being strongly concerned with the ideological 
implications of photographs, the Department of Cultural 
Studies at the ILEA Cockpit Arts Workshop has provided a 
very useful practical paradigm. 
44 
What is then being proposed for photography ? First, the 
prospect of its being regarded as part of a larger image 
education, a project which lies in the future and depends 
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on discussion among interested parties about similarities 
and differences within the area. Secondly, the prospect of 
a greater diversity of subject interests impinging upon 
photography, for example, the study of nonverbal communic- 
ation, drama-type activities, social involvement. These 
suggestions tend towards multiplicity, heterogeneity. 
Thirdly, we need a bringing-together of the functional/ 
aesthetic activities and social concerns - but without 
drifting into agit-prop. Fourthly, in order to achieve 
a new unity, we need to call for new priorities. The 
central concerns of photography, it is maintained, are 
perceptual differentiation, the development of a critical 
picture sense and the recognition of photography's funda- 
mental recording role combined with a variety of experiment 
which respects the synthesising ability of human vision. 
Photography can provide basic enabling visual skills for 
everyone in our society, a means of making our own images 
and forming critical judgement. We too easily take for 
granted the visual products of mass reproduction. If 
photographic education could be developed on a sound basis, 
it would be an education which not only confronts the 
manner in which socially dominant meanings come to us in 
visual form, but which enables us to transcend them. 
Photographic education is potentially a central arena for 
developing creative and critical pictorial awareness. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX ONE 
Oakdale Junior School, Redbridge: photography combined with 
art work, 1980 - 81. 
The objective behind this work was to encourage the use of 
the imagination using both the evidential and the mentally 
"arousing" qualities of photographs. It is a development 
of an idea first used by Keith Kennedy to stimulate notions 
of "identity". 
1 
"Mug-shot" photographs of a class of nine-year-old children 
were taken on a 36-exposure roll of black and white film. 
These were developed, a contact sheet made and further 
copies made on a Xerox machine. The sheets of faces were 
given to the class teacher who then used them on a theme of 
imaginary futures and imaginary role-playing. 
The "real" face which remains constant is played off by the 
variety of contexts into which it is put. 
At this stage of child development there is little imagining 
of a possible future in the real world (though this could 
be stimulated with the same technique used with school- 
leavers), but this exercise does provide an opportunity for 
trying out imaginary husbands, wives, boy/girl friends as 
well as a wide range of fantasy situations. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Middlesex Polytechnic, 1979: evidence and possible 
inferences from a photograph by Bill Owens captioned, "We're 
really happy. Our kids are healthy, we eat good food and 
we have a really nice home. "2 From his Suburbia (San 
Francisco: Straight Arrow, 1973). 
This photograph was shown to Foundation art students 
together with a questionnaire for filling in: once at the 
beginning of the session, with "X"s on the scale given, and 
again at the end with "0"s . 
The objective here was to encourage and evaluate semiosis, 
i. e. provide an opportunity for the discussion of an 
interesting photograph and its critical evaluation, at first 
from terms given by me; then, following a discussion of 
various aspects of the photograph, to see if there was a 
change in evaluation. Even if there was no change, the 
process of looking closely, writing and discussion should 
have produced greater perceptual differentiation of aspects 
of the photograph. I saw the photograph as an ironic 
picture of a suburban group, but the "evidence" for this 
conclusion is not immediately obvious, nor in fact 
conclusive. 
Thus, in the course of the session, after the initial 
filling-in of the questionnaire, discussion ranged over 
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various aspects of the photograph. I asked if a change of 
context would affect the way we saw the photograph: would 
we see it differently if found on a gallery wall as 
opposed to a Sunday supplement, for example ? If the 
former, does the relatively wide angle lens with its 
slight distortion of the verticals then become more than 
a functional device to incorporate the whole room and imply 
a comment on the ultimate insecurity of their lives ? 
Does the caption - "evidence" of what they said, but perhaps 
over-fulsome - tilt the balance towards a critical view of 
the pair and their surroundings ? 
After the discussion, the scale was filled in again, to 
indicate if there was a change in evaluation. In addition, 
there was an invitation to add other constructs, polarities 
of opinion. Some participants disagreed that the photograph 
was ironic; for no clear evidence of an ironic intention was 
produced from the photograph itself. How one responded 
depended to a certain extent on one's opinion of suburbia 
and affluence. Nevertheless, an ironic assumption is 
plausible from a variety of subtle indicators. 
- 265 - 
ý' from Suburbia. 
36'. Bill Owens, "We're Really Happy ... 
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Your name LooKIt_rr AT A 
Photo title 'kl ... 
1Clýn PHOTOG? APH (I ) 
Here rtre some adjectives which can relate to the photograph and 
which provide a means for expressing your response to it. Put; 
a cross, an "X", in the box as close tc, or distant from the 
opinion you favour. Put an 'EX" in the middle, the "Pon't Know" 
column, if you are undecided hetwnen two opposites. 
Add up to five more adjectives of your own, with their opposites 
as you see them, and put to your 
"! )nn' t ? snow" 
I- / 
I23567 
interesting 
trivial 
casually compose 
involving 
coherent 
objective. 
inventive 
sincere 
affirming 
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Important 
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long : 
arranged 
subjective 
conventional 
ironic 
denying 
37-40. 
Two examples of forms used in discussion with Bill 
Owens photograph. 
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(2) 
I. wor what audience would you crnsid his p otograp uitable? 
2. '. ihat context do you infer for the photograph? 
3. s) 1"Ihat are you certain 
about wh t ou ear 
b) What do you imagine, 
infer, think, suppose, Lai% 
about what you see? 
r 
61 
4. What components, and their relationships, would you describe 
as contributing to the meaning of the photograph (including 
the"verhal caption)? 
VV 
$. Are there any aspects ycu find puzzling and out of place? 
6. Wh3t is the overall meaning of the photograph for you, in a 
sentence? 
yt& -(7-b (! t3uu Z; b mýp- Oýi - 
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APPENDIX THREE 
Little Ilford School, Newham *: work with a CSE/"0" level 
class in photography, 1980. 
This was quite a strictly controlled situation as the demands 
made on the pupils - of average ability - were high. The 
examinations required a detailed knowledge of cameras and 
techniques, with the proficient use of a variety of equip- 
ment. A certain knowledge of basic physics and chemistry 
was required for the 110" levels, and pupils taking this 
course were therefore inevitably a selected group. Learning 
technical theory also took up a substantial proportion of 
time. 
It was not possible in such circumstances to deviate far 
from the pre-set requirements of the course. My main object- 
Little Ilford School has been notable for introducing film 
study into its curriculum in such a whole-hearted way that 
everyone in the early years of the school takes a course in 
the film department. As a way of leading up to film, there 
is also a course in image education, described in detail in 
Screen Education No 13 (Winter 1974/75), pp. 36-39. Since I 
was concerned to develop critical work in photography per se 
on a basis of practice - as would be necessary in an art 
class -I did not opt to teach on this course when given 
the opportunity to teach at the school. 
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ive, however, was to introduce where possible elements into 
the course which would encourage more critical discussion 
of images, including both aesthetic and social implications. 
This was done by presenting the pupils with a collection of 
twelve photographs at the beginning of the course (I was 
there for a term). These photographs were chosen as repre- 
sentative of what photography meant to me at the time, 
bearing in mind the context of teaching teen-agers. Thus 
they provided an initial invitation to dialogue. (In 
addition, an adaptation of a Kelly Grid was prepared and 
one was given to each pupil to fill in and this encouraged 
the comparison of images and close looking). 
During the course, photographs were shown after or shortly 
after an activity to encourage widening of concepts learned. 
For example, Feininger's photographs of natural patterns 
were shown after an exploration of the environment. 
A further objective was to encourage the positive manip- 
ulation of the camera. While the camera records object- 
ively, there is a need to be able to notice aspects of 
the world in new ways. Operationally, then, we have to 
disrupt ordinary, mundane seeing in order to encourage a 
new kind of seeing, a new kind of differentiation. We can 
therefore borrow the formalist notion of "making strange" 
as a useful teaching device, especially in the initial 
stages, without going to the point of assuming that this 
3 
process creates a fiction, cut off from the world. 
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The world is immensely rich in information and this process 
gives access to aspects not usually noticed of things. 
Here the use of the close-up, the ultra close-up if possible, 
is an invaluable method for stimulating a change in percep- 
tion. This method was used in the course, at first in the 
classroom, then later outside. 
Again, in order to encourage the recognition of form in 
reality - which would make satisfying images on the "frame" 
of photographic paper - the pupils were shown how to do 
photograms using an enlarger. Finally, the pupils took 
potraits of one another using a white background and minimum 
props like a chair, with simple side lighting from windows. 
The task here was to "catch" moments which were expressive 
of the person, while being encouraged to try a variety of 
poses. 
Because of the course's theoretical demands, e. g. detailed 
knowledge of various types of lighting and lamps, it was 
virtually impossible to introduce any developed discussion 
of the social implications of images during the term. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of the way the McVicar image was. 
presented on the cover of The Sunday Times * was undertaken 
after the pupils' own portraiture session. Here the 
mediations practised on a portrait photograph to gain a 
certain effect and influence the way we saw the person, could 
be effectively brought home. This example alone showed 
* No. 11 in series of photographs given. See I11.3. 
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that the approach of developing critical concepts within the 
context of personal practical activity can be very worth- 
while. Clearly, consideration of new priorities in exam- 
inations in photography are necessary, if the beginnings 
of the full potential of the creative and critical practice 
of photography are to be realised. 
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41. Set of photographs used for 
discussion at Little Ilford. 
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42. Example of Close Up of Wellington boot, interior. 
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43. Example of Close Up of gravestone. 
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